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Introduction: Bodies in focus 
This thesis explores transpeople’s embodiment and bodily aesthetics. I use the concept 
“bodily aesthetics” to refer to the appearance of the body that is subjected to judgments, 
whether that is personal and/or public. These judgments feed into personal body images, 
which help to formulate understandings about identity formation. The thesis addresses 
bodily aesthetics rather than gender identity. This shift in emphasis is a response to the bulk 
of work on trans embodiment centring on gender and thereby excluding a more nuanced 
understanding of transpeople’s bodies. Starting from a position, which foregrounds gender 
identity overlooks the specificity of the body and thus, leaves bodily aesthetics neutral or 
absent in the formation of bodily experiences and forms of consciousness. As is commonly 
the case, theorising trans bodies through a gender identity framework mistakenly suggests 
that the (modified) trans body is a result of a particular gender identity rather than the 
(modified) body becoming a part of the gender identity. By framing my analysis of 
(different) bodily aesthetics and the relationship they have with gender identities we will be 
able to understand more fully transpeople’s body projects. Moreover, we will be able to 
consider how bodily aesthetics inform social relations and the judgments upon trans bodies. 
There is very little written on the psycho-social role of trans bodily aesthetics, as a set of 
discourses, practices, perceptions and experiences of embodiment. These aspects have 
neither been developed in transgender studies nor within the fields of UK medicine, law 
and politics, areas which this thesis aims to pay attention to. 
 
Therefore, my main research questions are: 
• How do transpeople consider and experience their bodily aesthetics? 
• What are the similarities and differences between transpeople’s desires to modify 
their bodies? 
• What bodily aesthetics do transpeople; clinicians and the Gender Recognition Panel 
(GRP) consider as an adequate commitment to a gender identity? 
• How far is the commitment to a gendered identity based upon bodily aesthetics? 
 
Often bodily aesthetics of transpeople are situated within (social) psychological studies of 
pathology, such as “body dysmorphic disorder” (Money, 1996) and gender identity 
discomfort (Marone et al., 1998). There is still a dearth of empirical research relating to 
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transpeople’s body images and bodily aesthetics in the discipline of sociology. My research 
differs substantially, then, from previous work by situating it in a phenomenological 
framework. Phenomenology suggests that meanings are produced by an active relationship 
between the human and their world. A phenomenological study is a study of experiences, 
actions and practices and their embodied meanings (Heinamaa, 1997). 
 
I start by focussing on bodily aesthetics, which will allow us to understand the lived 
experiences of transpeople who have passing/non-passing, beautiful/ugly, normative/non-
normative bodies. I do this by employing a heuristic device that divides the body into three 
different modalities, the “social body”, “sexual body” and “phenomenological body” (see 
below). I focus on those transpeople who have had, or plan to have surgeries and who use 
body modification technologies as well as those who do not or can not. For example, I 
explore the narratives of transpeople who offer intimate details of their body projects and 
their understandings and experiences of aesthetic practices, such as clothing and 
prosthetics.  
 
Whilst there has been a growth in sociological work on the body in recent years very few 
projects have been concerned with the aesthetic bodies of transpeople. Recent work has 
suggested that the materiality of the body, to apply sociologist Arthur Frank’s (1990) 
understanding of bodily aesthetics consists of a set of “linkages between bodies as lived and 
bodies as inscribed” (1998: 101). To put it another way existentialist phenomenologist 
Merleau-Ponty, defines the “proprioceptive” sense of the body, summarised as, the felt 
sense of the body’s relationship with space, time, objects, people and its action-in-the-
world (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1962]), as the most decisive constituent of being a body. 
Complex relationships are established through intersubjective and interchanging aesthetic 
imaginings and personal reflections upon one’s own transient “body image(s)” (2002 
[1962]). The way we understand our bodies is through our body images (Weiss, 1999). 
These body images are adaptively produced through identifications and disidentifications 
with our own body, as well as upon the bodies of others. Judith Butler (1990) suggests that 
these appearances and styles are performative and produced in relation to “symbolic” 
norms and come to constitute what we know as gender. According to this perspective 
gender is a bodily style, a way of donning one’s own body as a cultural sign. Whilst there is 
some agreement with this perspective in my thesis, I argue that some participants do 
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agentically transform the symbolic signs of gender in imaginative ways and, as such, are 
not purely the products of a Foucaultian discursive determinism employed by Butler. We 
can not dispense of discourses fully, but need to combine the fleshiness of the body with 
discourse. 
 
Foucault’s (1998) work on the body has been hugely influential even if somewhat lacking 
on the specific issue of bodily aesthetics and the judgements surrounding particular bodies. 
Foucault claims that bodies are inculcated with modes of being through subtle power 
relations, which he calls “bio-power.” It is from this work that Foucault shows how the 
body is not a natural one but rather socially produced through regimes of knowledge and 
power. From the eighteenth century with the advent of capitalism, “bio-power” in the form 
of “knowledge-power” was, according to Foucault, present at every level of the body 
through the discourses of powerful institutions, such as law, army, schools, police, 
medicine and the family. “Bio-power” works upon members of the population’s “social 
body.” The “social body” is produced through the regulatory ideals of society’s norms, 
rendered through these power relations a “docile body.” The “docile body” becomes 
inscribed through discourses and the subject also inscribes him/herself by utilising these 
discourses. However, Foucault seems to conceive the body as a blank surface upon which 
power is inscribed (McNay, 2000), not a physical, material, fleshy entity of varied form, 
which this thesis addresses 
 
Implicit in the “docile (social) body” framework is a hierarchy of bodily practices, which 
are split into simplistic dichotomies of “good” and “bad.” We can perhaps see this best in 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality in which the homosexual became a (lesser) species. 
Nonetheless, Foucault also leaves a space for discourses to be reversed, especially in his 
later work (Foucault, 1989). Reverse discourses come to fruition through the very discourse 
that was meant to exert power over bodies. These reverse discourses are seen as creative 
and agentic aspects of ethical living in Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence” actualised 
through technologies of the self (1989). McNay (2000) suggests that Foucault’s account of 
agency is too voluntaristic and therefore moves from untenable moments of submission to 
dominant discourses (docile), to moments of volutaristic self formation (agentic). This is 
because Foucault’s focus is on a dichotomy of power/antipower, even though he seems to 
suggest otherwise (Foucault, 1982). This position also reduces differentiation between 
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people on the basis of “good” and “bad” practices as Foucault’s focus is on aesthetics in the 
form of ascesis – technologies of the self – (McNay, 2000) rather than aesthetics in the 
form of experiential feelings about bodies and bodily aesthetics. The point is, for Foucault, 
discourse produces good (valued) and bad (reviled) bodies, but does not explain why those 
with socially valued bodies may still feel bad about them. Foucault does not contemplate 
(self) judgments surrounding aesthetic bodies as does Goffman (1963, 1969) for example, 
which leaves docile/agentic bodies with little form. This hinders our understanding of how, 
when and by whom bodily aesthetics are constituted through discourses and what effects 
this has on the docility and agency of bodies. 
 
The use of discourse and reverse discourse is important for my study of transpeople; 
however, the docile/agentic dichotomy is problematic. Whilst participants were well versed 
in the discourses surrounding their trans-sexing, and whilst they utilised them to constitute 
their sense of self, bodily aesthetics problematised this dichotomy. For example, the “social 
body” of some participants could be interpreted as correctly adhering to prevailing norms 
of masculinity and femininity through the use of hormones and surgery, passing as gender 
normative – the goal of dominant discourse. The body of the transperson may also be 
accepted in more intimate surroundings by sexual partners even when that body is not non-
normative according to hegemonic discourse, but the transperson may still be unhappy with 
their material body. Therefore, it was not social discourses of bodily aesthetics or 
acceptance by intimate partners that was important but whether or not the transperson was 
satisfied with their own body. This phenomenology of the self was sometimes more 
important than general social principles or judgments made by others. The social aspects of 
the body and the sexual aspects of the body in Foucault’s discursive theory lack a 
phenomenology of the material bodily aesthetic. 
 
Bourdieu goes some way to redress this deficiency and provides a more dynamic generative 
understanding of bodies within what he calls the “habitus” and the “field(s).” The habitus 
shapes the performances within, or access to, different fields, such as social spaces or 
sexual spaces, for instance. The idea of “capital” in its various forms – economic or cultural 
for instance – is utilised by “social agents” with the intention of creating (self) value. 
McNay (2000) embellishes Bourdieu’s ideas by including a more profound focus on gender 
identity. She manages to convincingly retain some of the entrenched and embodied ways of 
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life of women (and men) by using the notion of the field in such a way as to show how 
women’s internal differentiations of gender identities are not only deep-rooted, but can also 
be agentically transformed within fields. In this way transpeople can accrue “gender 
capital” in the fields of masculinity and femininity through using “economic capital” to 
purchase surgery or through “cultural capital” (accurate gender performance). In order to 
do this they must negotiate their gendered habitus. A similar argument has been made by 
Holliday (Holliday & Cairnie, 2007) using the notion of “body capital” to explore the 
experiences of cosmetic surgery patients. 
 
However, Bourdieu gives little attention to the aestheticisation of society and the 
phenomenological dimension of lived experience and its potential for the transformation of 
attitudes and habits. He rejects aesthetic experiences by interpreting them as private 
subjectivism and self-centred narcissism (Shusterman, 2002). Whilst McNay’s (2000) 
feminist project extends Bourdieu’s through gender identity, it too fails to interrogate 
bodies in their particularity.  
 
I suggest then that personal and public representations of transpeople’s bodies are 
agentically constituted and that these are expressed and dependant on their being-in-the-
world horizon. Following Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987), Cromwell (1999) has gone 
some way in conceptualising the trans-body in a more nuanced way. Cromwell uses the 
concepts of the “social body,” “political body” and “phenomenological body.” The “social 
body” refers to the representational use of the body as a natural symbol with which to think 
about nature, society and culture. The political body or “body politic” (Cromwell, 1999; 
Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987) refers to the surveillance over and control of bodies by 
States in relation to sexuality, reproduction, human difference, deviance, work and leisure. 
The “phenomenological body” or “individual body” is a “body-for itself,” where lived 
experience of the body is experienced as existing apart from others. Whilst this way of 
conceptualising transpeople’s bodies may provide new insights into the ways that bodies 
are controlled and experienced, I suggest that we need to understand the body in an even 
more nuanced way than that offered by Cromwell. This is because the “body politic” is not 
just a top down means of controlling bodies, as I illustrated above, but simultaneously 
requires bodies to know and accept the discourses of sexuality, deviance, and other 
surveillance strategies for it to function effectively. I propose, therefore, that we include a 
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“sexual body” alongside the “social” and “phenomenological” and conceptualise them in 
slightly different ways. Furthermore, I suggest that the “body politic” be redeployed. 
Redeploying the “body politic” as a set of discourses that work on the body in different 
spaces is needed because they influence the representations of the “social,” “sexual” and 
“phenomenological” bodies in subtle ways. 
 
Thus, I suggest that what I call the “sexual body” and “phenomenological body” need as 
much attention as the “social body” to understand how bodily aesthetics enhance or worsen 
the generative aspect of the habitus and fields. I will introduce the concepts of the “social,” 
“sexual,” and “phenomenological body” to overcome this deficit in both discourse models 
and theories of habitus and fields that I find in Foucault’s, Bourdieu’s and McNay’s work. 
And I will differentiate the discourses at work (body politic) on bodies in different spaces, 
which is missing in Cromwell’s work. 
 
The “social,” “sexual” and “phenomenological body” in my research are not discrete ones, 
but heuristic devices to show how in particular spaces and at particular times body images 
are consciously produced, which then affect discursive and material presentations of the 
body. From these states of consciousness body images of self and of others help to stabilise 
our own body image, at least momentarily, into gestalts – unified wholes – which we 
identify or disidentify with. The concept “social body” is a body situated in various social 
spaces from which cultural meanings of other bodies may be incorporated. The social body 
image is understood through various instantaneous interactions, within various spaces, such 
as the workplace, the street, (sub)cultural spaces, doctor’s surgeries, family gatherings and 
so on. The “social body” image covers only aspects of the body that is socially visible. 
Therefore the important aspects for a “social body” image are the face, hands, clothing, 
shape under clothing and gestures. The body politic is also influential here, but it is not the 
overarching determinant in the resultant body image. There are social rules that influence 
social interactions, and from which a sense of the body emerges. The sense of the body may 
be a sense that transpeople are successfully passing or complying with social rules, codes 
and attaining a legitimate “social body” aesthetic, which may feed into a positive body 
image. Transpeople may also feel that they are not attaining the body aesthetic they had 
hoped for, which may create a negative experience of their body image. Of course there 
may be a whole spectrum of experiences, which are dependent upon the cultural and gender 
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capital of interacting people within the social settings and it is these I explore in this study. 
The body image may further be influenced by various expected social roles and social 
status. The absorption of intersubjective meanings and experiences feed back to influence 
body imaging and informs the transperson about how their “social body” is valued. The 
“social body” image and “performance” shapes an ongoing engagement with, and 
negotiation of, discursively constructed meanings surrounding the “body politic”, but they 
do so through an embodied process involving emotional responses [that push and pull in 
indeterminate ways]. What distinguishes the “social body” and the “sexual body” is the 
space and the people who are interacting.  
 
“Sexual body” images become focused and are “present” in different sexualised spaces. I 
am thinking here about the spaces in which people have sex or try to procure sex. The 
“sexual body” involves more intimate and stronger emotional responses than those that take 
place in social spaces. Often the “sexual body” heightens awareness of particular intimate 
aspects of bodily aesthetics. The “body politic” that influences this set of body imaging is 
the sexed body discourses that people are engaged with. However, once again, the “sexual 
body” images are not necessarily directed and determined by normative sexual discourse. 
“Sexual body” imaging is shaped through the interactions of sexual agents in relation to an 
ongoing engagement with meanings about the sexed body. Again body imaging is 
instantaneous and is influenced by embodied processes of sexual relations or potential 
sexual relations. For example, the experience of sexual pleasure may help create a body 
image, which goes beyond the normative discourses of sexual bodies. However, a sexual 
experience may also have adverse effects. The important aspect of the “sexual body” is the 
naked body. However, clothing, prosthetics and other aspects of bodies that are implicated 
in transpeople’s sexual relations can be incorporated into the “sexual body” image. 
 
The “phenomenological body” refers to a semi-private site in which reflection; ideals, 
imagination and intentionality are grounded or fantasised. Similar to Scheper-Hughes and 
Lock (1987) here the “phenomenological body” should be seen as the immediate, 
proximate ground upon which phenomenological truths and “sexual” and “social body” 
images are played out with the self to form a body image gestalt. The “phenomenological 
body” is therefore a locus of personal, social and sexual resistance, creativity, and struggle. 
In difference to Scheper-Hughes and Lock, I refer to the “phenomenological body” as an 
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intersubjective body, which is intrinsically associated with its habitus and the discourses it 
engages with, which aids in the evaluation of both possibilities and the limitations of the 
aesthetic body. These are marked by the  
 
the capacity [of the body] to open itself up to prosthetic synthesis, to transform or 
rewrite its environment, to continually augment its powers and capacities through 
the incorporation into the body’s own spaces and modalities of objects, that, while 
external, are internalized, added to, supplementing and supplemented by the 
“organic body” (or what culturally passes for it), surpassing the body not “beyond” 
nature but in collusion with a “nature” (Grosz, 1994: 187-188). 
 
My work describes the “social”, “sexual” and “phenomenological body” images of 
transpeople, how they are valued and who evaluates them. I consider transmen’s and 
transwomen’s personal bodily aesthetics, their desires to modify bodies and their 
commitments to gender identity in separate chapters. This decision was premised on the 
fact that the body projects were different for both transmen and transwomen. There has 
never been a discussion about sex/gender differences within transgender literature. 
Therefore, to structure part of my argument around this aspect, offers a stronger analysis of 
transsexual embodiment. These differences are allowed to come into play because of the 
focus I give to bodily aesthetics, rather than to gender identity alone. Moreover, my 
analysis shows that while there are differences between transmen and transwomen there are 
also differences within each group. 
 
Situating the thesis 
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In this thesis the term “transsexual”1 conveys the notion that this work is interested in 
people who were raised as one gender yet identify with another. The concept further 
reflects the participants’ recognition of themselves as people desiring a change of their 
personal, social and medicolegal identities from male to female or female to male. 
“Transgender” is also considered in this thesis, but as a concept, which relates to a more 
diverse set of identities and practices, such as transvestites, cross-dressers, intersex, 
genderqueer and Drag. Originally “transgenderist” or “transgenderal” was conceptualised 
by Virginia Prince to connote “people like herself who, though male, elected to live full-
time as women while retaining their genitalia” (Ekins & King, 2006: 16). More recently the 
term “transgender” has been used interchangeably with “transsexual” in medicolegal 
discourses and sometimes in place of “transsexual” and “transsexuality” (Bockting et al., 
2006; May, 2002). This is to suggest a move away from medical models, which do not fully 
encompass the diverse phenomenology of “transsexual” practices. Some “transsexual” 
participants in this research do regard themselves as “transgender” but in this thesis I refer 
to these participants as “transman/woman/people” unless “transgender” is specified in the 
interview transcripts. 
 
Over the last twenty years in both the humanities and social sciences there has been an 
increase in writing about transpeople’s lives, identities, psychology and communities, much 
of which has been written by transpeople themselves. Transsexual and transgender people 
have become more “visible” practically everywhere. Transgender academic and activist 
Stephen Whittle has noted: 
 
embracing the trans community and its culture has led us to an exciting position at 
the cusp of one of the most significant social and political changes in the 
                                                 
1 Although “transsexual” is a concept with medical overtones, I use it throughout the thesis to 
indicate a specific trans identity, which connotes a sense of transition from one sex to the other. 
Many transsexual people do not necessarily identify with this concept. Some may identify as 
woman, man, transgender, trans and so on; as this indicates that there subject position is about 
gender. However, some transpeople do not like the term transgender as it is usually regarded as an 
umbrella term that includes a diverse range of (political) identities that may not transition socially 
or legally from one gender to another. Throughout the thesis I also use transwoman/women or 
transman/men and transpeople respectively. Transmen (transman) is often used in contemporary 
texts to indicate a female transsexual (in medical texts) or Female-to Male (FtM). Conversely 
transwomen (transwoman) indicates a male transsexual (in medical texts) or Male-to-Female 
transsexual (MtF). 
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postmodern world. The struggles of trans people could have significant impact on 
all our freedoms (Whittle, 2006: xiv). 
 
Therefore, part of this thesis considers public aspects of transsexual embodiment and bodily 
aesthetics particularly within the discourses of medicine and law, which I term the 
“medicolegal alliance” following Judith Butler (1990). Butler’s concept is used throughout 
the thesis to highlight the interconnected relationship between legal and medical 
professionals, where the law privileges psycho/biomedical knowledge in the construction of 
(medicolegally) recognised bodies. 
 
Transgender jurisprudence is another field where in recent years there have been highly 
visible debates and subsequent political gains, in particular the introduction of the Gender 
Recognition Act (2004) (GRA). Transpeople were actively involved in formulating the law 
as parliament consulted a report by the Interdepartmental Group on Transsexual People 
(see Home Office, 2000), which was drafted by prominent members of the trans 
community in the UK. The question of bodily aesthetics was a major issue in the formation 
and passing of legislation. There have been a number of empirical studies that address 
bodily aesthetics however, much of this work was conducted outside the UK where 
political contexts and medicolegal systems have their own particularities (Bolin, 1988; 
Griggs, 1998; Halberstam, 1998a; Namaste, 1996). To date research with a focus on the 
bodily aesthetics in UK law is surprisingly absent, especially when we consider that 
judging evidence of body modification as well as the diagnosis of gender dysphoria is a 
paramount consideration for the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP) which decides who can 
and can not acquire a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) and the changing of a birth 
certificate. 
 
The political gains of legal recognition have not been wholeheartedly accepted by the 
transgender community. My interpretation shows that whilst most participants recognise 
that legal recognition is a step in the right direction, the medicolegal alliance presents 
another set of questions for participants concerning the ideological construction of bodily 
aesthetics, which occasionally, and rather surprisingly, conflicts with the Gender 
Recognition Act. I suggest that the diverse range of views that are apparent in this research 
are important for understanding the differences in the personal and public representations of 
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transpeople’s bodily aesthetics. These differences will afford a richer analysis of the 
aesthetic judgments that take place about trans subjects’ bodies. My analysis suggests that 
stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, which permeates transgender literature, are being 
challenged. Contemporary transsexual/gender bodily aesthetics mark a cultural, political 
and legal turn in how bodies are constituted in relation to the state. Therefore, this is a 
significant and opportune moment to direct sociological attention to contemporary bodily 
aesthetics and to the embodiment of transpeople in the UK. 
 
Academics/activists are beginning to produce theoretical work alongside politicised 
transgender communities, which has helped to create both an academic field of research as 
well as highly organised political groups who provide critiques of the self, medicine, 
politics and law. This thesis is situated at the intersections of these fields. My analysis of 
the UK’s political horizon suggests that theorising transgender politics become 
unproductive and divisive when dichotomies of assimilation and transformation are 
applied. I show how particular political praxes and cultural productions work to change the 
dominance of normative phenomenological, social and sexual bodily aesthetics in various 
ways, which are then far from assimilable into normative culture. Similarly, I suggest 
“queer” cultural productions are not actually so different in perspective to political praxes, 
which works through mainstream structures in an attempt to queer the status quo. In giving 
a more nuanced analysis of political work and cultural production, this research aims to 
contribute to the work on transgender politics. 
 
There have been numerous research projects in the disciplines of medicine, psychology and 
social psychology, which have sex dimorphic and heteronormative models at their 
analytical base. Sex dimorphic models are based on the “expected” XX and XY 
chromosomal dimorphism and heterosexual/homosexual sexuality binary. Doctors, 
psychologists, and psychiatrist use these models to explain the aetiology of transsexualism 
in a pathological framework (Benjamin, 1966; R. Green, 1987, 1994; R. Green & Money, 
1969; Money, 1995; Money & Ehrhardt, 1972; Money & Tucker, 1976; R. Stoller, 1975, 
1985). I show that much of the sexological work on transsexualism relies on hegemonic 
understandings of social bodily aesthetics theorised as “masculinity” and “femininity” to 
augment essentialist claims about binary sexes. My research illustrates that some 
transpeople do not fit neatly into these “scientific” models, which causes a problem for the 
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“diagnoses” and for the “cure.” The phenomenological interpretation, in this thesis, 
highlights the insufficiency of traditional medical models for both the aetiology and the 
diagnoses of transsexualism (Benjamin, 1966; R. Green & Money, 1969; Money, 1995; 
Money & Ehrhardt, 1972; R. Stoller, 1975), because they do not consider the aesthetic 
considerations of transpeople today. Moreover, one interesting and I argue more positive 
aspect of sexological work that is evolving, with new practitioners coming to the field, is 
sexology influenced by feminism, queer and postmodernism (May, 2002; Wren, 2005). 
These new perspectives understand transsexual embodiment as adaptive rather than as an 
innate gender core. By researching into all these interesting contexts in the UK enables us 
to gain more awareness about the agentic and reflective “nature” of transpeople’s bodily 
aesthetic practices. 
 
Chapter outline 
Part one explores the theoretical approaches to transpeople’s embodiment and bodily 
aesthetics. In Chapter I Shifting the Medicolegal Constructions of Transsexuals’ Bodily 
Aesthetics I consider key medical and legal theoretical approaches to transsexuality. I 
outline a changing landscape of institutionalised transsexuality in order explain the 
medicolegal context within which part of this thesis is situated. By locating aesthetic 
judgements from the medicolegal perspectives this will illustrate the contemporary climate 
in which transpeople negotiate and constitute their bodily aesthetic. I move on to position 
my own analytical approach in Chapter II. In Theorising Trans Embodiment and Bodily 
Aesthetics I review key sociological and philosophical approaches to (trans) bodies and 
(trans) bodily aesthetics, which enables me to structure my analytical approach and connect 
it to the thesis’ aims. In Chapter III: Methods, Methodology and the Research Process I 
explain the reasons behind my analytical approach to transsexual bodies, which includes 
deeper reflection on the research questions. Furthermore, I include an explanation of my 
methods, the limitations of the research and my ethical concerns. In this chapter I also 
provide pen portraits in order for the reader to familiarise themselves with the participants 
and the three Trans-Community Organisations (T-CO), which I focus on in this research. 
 
Part two consists of two empirical chapters, which consider transmen and transwomen 
separately. In Chapter IV, Recognising the Self: Transmen’s Body Projects I consider 
“body projects” in relation to the three organising themes (Attride-Stirling, 2001), of the 
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“social,” “sexual,” and “phenomenological body.” These themes inform us about how 
culture and the bodies therein are mutually influential in relation to embodiment and 
gendered feelings. This chapter will also illustrate how hormonal technologies affect the 
aesthetic and psychological positions of transmen. Idealised bodies are considered in 
relation to limitations of the technologies, such as aesthetic surgeries and how these 
situations are negotiated. These focal points will illustrate both the similarities as well as 
the range of transmen’s “body projects.” 
 
In Chapter V, Recognising the Self: Transwomen’s Body Projects I illustrate the broad 
range of transwomen’s subject positions and move beyond monolithic and universalist 
understandings of transwomen and exploring instead the diversity of their narratives. I will 
also draw comparisons with the transmen’s narratives explored in Chapter IV. Using the 
heuristic devices employed in the previous chapter on transmen – the “social body,” 
“sexual body,” and “phenomenological body” – I consider the participants’ childhood 
recollections. Following this, I concentrate on the decision making processes and the 
emotional ambivalence inherent in the desire to transition from male to female. The penis 
as a potent symbolic signifier and understandings of the sartorial aspects of trans-sexing 
will be considered in relation to stereotypicality. I will then consider hormone therapy in 
relation to beauty and femininity. Finally, I will explore the various surgeries, aesthetic 
outcomes and the “passing” “social,” “sexual” and “phenomenological” bodies of 
transwomen. 
 
Part three considers public aspects of transpeople’s embodiment and bodily aesthetics. 
Chapter VI, Framing Bodies in Trans-Community Organisations in the UK critically 
explores the particular political framings of “social bodily” aesthetics in three major Trans-
Community Organisations in the UK, the Gender Identity Research & Education Society 
(GIRES), Press for Change (PFC) and a “DIY” Queer collective that is based in 
Manchester, UK, but which has contact with related collectives across the UK. In this 
chapter I will analyse and stress these frames in relation to bodily aesthetics that are absent 
from, have moved away from, or been integrated within the T-COs political considerations 
and ask: why might this be? In this chapter then I investigate how these frames of (absent) 
bodily aesthetics are used within campaigns, for legal, medical, and representational work. 
In the final empirical chapter, Chapter VII, Negotiating Authenticity and Bodily Aesthetics 
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within the UK’s Medicolegal System, I discuss the dialogues between general practitioners 
(GP) and transpeople at the preliminary stages of transition, and look at how these 
encounters are experienced. I move away from the concepts of the “social,” “sexual,” and 
“phenomenological body” and explore the concept of “authenticity” and how it is 
understood by clinicians and the transpeople in this study. I investigate how difficulties 
around “authenticity” are resolved. I then explore the experiences of transpeople’s 
treatment by the NHS and the private healthcare sector. I move on to include how 
successive policy implementations may have affected treatment of Gender Identity 
Disorder. Finally I assess how the Gender Recognition Act 2004 influences transsexual 
subjectivities and “authentic” bodily aesthetics in the UK. 
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Chapter I: Shifting the Medicolegal Constructions of Transsexuals’ Bodily Aesthetics 
 
After all, is there a problem? And if so, what is it? Are there [transsexuals], really? (de 
Beauvoir, 1997 [1949]: 33 my insertion). 
 
 
Introduction 
The picnicking of Simone de Beauvoir’s quotation from the The Second Sex above is to 
highlight this chapter’s central argument that, as with “woman,” “female” and “feminine” 
in her project, I am not intending to reveal transsexuality as a problematic biological or 
psychological fact. My aim is to illustrate medicolegal ontological assumptions about 
transsexuals and instead present a phenomenological description of how meanings are 
constituted around the “transsexual” subject. In this chapter I will offer descriptions of the 
theories, nomenclature and medical procedures, which have become prominent in the 
“treatment” of transsexuality. I will introduce some of the main protagonists of transsexual 
medicalisation, their theories, and how these have been influenced by the wider academic 
context in which their work was conducted. This will include illustrations of the links to 
preceding medical theorists and workers in the field of transsexualism and transgender. 
 
The medical recognition of transsexualism has allowed sex-changing to happen. Better 
surgical technologies in the 1950s allowed more successful and experimental sex-changing 
and development of institutions set-up specifically for the treatment, “diagnosis,” and 
“cure” of transsexuals. However, across the history of transsexualism the terms, 
“diagnosis” and “cure” have evolved in tandem with wider academic perspectives, which 
have clearly influenced their development. Transsexualism retains, within some medical 
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discourse, an assumed “biological sex” upon which a psychical “gender” is constructed 
using cultural notions of bodily aesthetics coded as “masculinity” and “femininity.” This 
includes an aesthetic experience, through which masculinity and femininity are performed 
by subjects and judged by ‘experts’. Distinctive masculine and feminine dimensions are 
intimately linked to and used by the “medicolegal alliance” (Butler, 1993) in the 
construction of a sex/gender order with regard to the transsexual subject, and constructs 
what it is to have a recognised, “authentic” trans embodiment and bodily aesthetic 
according to the law. 
 
I will show the historical connections between medicine and law in the constitution of 
transsexuals, followed by the contemporary reasoning for this, which permits a medicolegal 
change of sex/gender identity for legal purposes in the UK. I will then look at the use of the 
medical conception of transsexual embodiment in law as it is deployed in the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004. While for the purpose of this research it is not necessary to consider 
the entire Act, I do, however, intend to explore the clauses within it that specifically relate 
to medical and surgical requirements of transitioning. I will consider the evidence that is 
required by, and the responsibilities of, the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP) and thereby 
explore the “medicolegal” construction of transsexual bodies. I will suggest psychosocial 
models of masculinity and femininity become the prominent models of sexed bodies within 
the medicolegal alliance’s mandate on transpeople’s bodies. 
 
Establishing the terminology 
Transsexualism has a long history. The sexological fervour in early twentieth century 
Europe attempted to order and taxonomise forms of “inversion” – a term used to denote 
gender and sexual transgressions from the gender and heteronormative – (H. Ellis, 1917; 
Foucault, 1998 [1976], 2003 [1963]; Freud, 1905; Laqueur, 1992). The historical 
nomenclature has not only problematised transsexuality through its pathologisation, but has 
also brought to the fore concepts that have produced knowledge and set precedents for 
subsequent theorists and practitioners. Sex change operations in the early twentieth century 
were experimental, as at this time there was no official diagnosis, treatment, or standard of 
care for transsexuals (Drogo, 1973). Sander Gilman (1999) claims that surgeons gained 
experience in plastic surgery through treating World War I injuries. Working on the genital 
wounds of soldiers, surgeons began to imagine the possibility of sex change surgery. Critics 
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of these “sex change experiments” many years later provided evidence of plastic surgeons 
using transsexuals’ bodies experimentally to hone their surgical skills, whilst also 
“expanding their disciplinary jurisdiction” (Billings & Urban, 1996: 103). 
 
In 1931 Dr Felix Abraham reported in the medical literature that surgical conversion of a 
man to a woman had been accomplished (Drogo, 1973), and by the 1940s “transsexuality” 
began to gain credence as a medical definition. Transsexuals were understood as people 
wanting to live in the opposite sex to that assigned at birth. The American sexologist 
Cauldwell (1949) used the term “transsexualist” in the professional literature to account for 
this phenomenon. Transsexualism or rather, “true transsexualism” (Benjamin, 1966), as 
opposed to transvestism and other “gender variant” positions, became popularised in the 
medical literature by Harry Benjamin (Benjamin, 1966) in the 1960s. It seems that the 
possibilities of male-to-female sex change may have entered wider public consciousness 
shortly before in 1953 due to Christine Jorgensen, an American soldier who had a highly 
publicised sex change in Denmark, and through Roberta Cowell, who had surgery in 1951 
in England (Cowell, 1954; Whittle, 2002). 
 
In Western sexology, from the 1950s onwards, there were a significant number of studies 
that attempted to understand transsexuality, its causes, diagnoses, and “cures.” Just prior to 
these studies, biologists had determined five physical determinants of sex: (1) chromosomal 
sex, (2) gonadal sex, (3) hormonal sex, which happens at the prenatal and pubertal stages of 
development, (4) reproductive structures of the body, and (5) genital sex (Money et al., 
1955). From the 1930s onwards, many scholars concerned with transsexualism took their 
ideas and theories from the proliferation of studies related to biological anomalies, such as 
intersex “conditions.” The wider cultural debates were centred on whether “masculinity” 
and “femininity” and sex/gender configurations were a product of nature or nurture. One of 
the landmark studies in this area, was Terman and Miles’ (1936) psychological research, 
Sex and personality: Studies in masculinity and femininity. They concluded that 
masculinity and femininity are the “bipolar” arrangement of elements – characteristics 
constituted at opposite extremes – and which produce gendered personality, (whether 
natural or cultural) and are a fundamental aspect of human personality. They go on to say: 
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[m]asculinity and femininity […] are not to be thought of as lending to it merely 
superficial coloring and flavor; rather they are one of a small number of cores 
around which the structure of personality gradually takes shape. The masculine-
feminine contrast is probably as deeply grounded, whether by nature or by nurture, 
as any other which human temperament presents (Terman & Miles, 1936: 451). 
 
It is unclear whether Terman and Miles believe masculinity and femininity is constituted by 
a biological disposition or is socially acquired. Nevertheless, masculinity and femininity are 
deemed “core” “bipolar” aspects of sex/gender differences. The stress on a “core” obscures 
the extent to which masculinity and femininity are caught up in the complexities of lived 
relations and leaves them as overly simplistic and ahistorical stereotypes. 
 
Nonetheless, these “bipolar” aspects of sex/gender differences were incorporated into 
theories by John Money and his colleagues (R. Green & Money, 1969; Money, 1973, 1975, 
1995, 1996; Money & Ehrhardt, 1972; Money & Gaskin, 1970-1971; Money et al., 1955; 
Money & Tucker, 1976). John Money was one of the most prominent sexologists and 
psychologists at the John Hopkins School of Medicine, which has produced much 
sexological work in the US. Money has published widely on intersex conditions,2 
transsexualism, and “pathological” genders and sexualities since the 1950s and continues to 
be influential, being highly regarded and widely cited. Key principles about the standard of 
care and treatment practices in the area of transsexualism and intersex conditions are, 
according to the sociologist Kessler (1998), a result of Money and his colleagues’ 
dominance and influence.  
 
Money introduced the notion of “sex/gender dimorphic behaviour.” The reciprocal 
sex/gender concept – where biological sex is intrinsically related to gender expression – 
                                                 
2 There is a belief in traditional sexology that Homo sapiens are dimorphic with respect to sex 
chromosome composition, gonadal structure, hormone levels, and the structure of the internal 
genital duct systems and external genitals (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972). In relation to this assumption 
there is a ‘complimentary’ belief that there is a single, universally correct developmental pathway 
and outcome (Blackless et al., 2000), heterosexuality. If biological aspects do not develop 
accordingly, people are viewed by doctors as pathological and the label hermaphroditism (intersex) 
is applied. Intersex consists of numerous biological make-ups (see Fausto-Sterling, 1993). Rather 
than undermining the binary sex/gender system, intersex is instead utilised to reinforce notions of a 
sex/gender dichotomy through the discursive construction of pathological cases (see Longino & 
Doell, 1983), in need of medical intervention. 
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used by Money is best illustrated and critiqued in Judith Butler’s work on the heterosexual 
matrix (Butler, 1990). Butler (1993) suggests that “sex” was produced through regulatory 
forces, such as the medicolegal discourses. To regulate the notion of “sex” in society 
required a naturalisation process, which the sexually differentiated “biological” body stood 
in for. Sex differentiation was, in the majority of cases, authoritatively decided by the 
doctor based on the presence or absence of the penis, as I will explore below. From this, the 
cultural aspects of femininity and masculinity were applied dichotomously to the 
“naturalised” sexed body, which, if all is well, will procreate through the process of 
“natural” heterosexuality. Males were encouraged to do rough and tumble play, climb 
trees, interact with other masculine boys while girls were encouraged to wear dresses, 
practice at homemaking and mothering to fit their “natural” gender roles (Money, 1975). 
Any other behaviour was deemed deviant and therefore ripe for study. There are obvious 
similarities with 1950s Western middle-class gender ideologies in Money et al’s theories, 
where the male is  active, independent and rational and the female is passive, caring, and 
emotional (cf Friedan, 1964). 
 
Money and his colleagues purport that in the case of transsexuals, the development of 
gender roles is hindered because of an over exposure in childhood to unstructured gender 
roles and, therefore, the child is able to absorb, imagine, or act out more diverse gender 
formations. It is apparent from this theory that transsexuals are not born transsexual in a 
biological sense, but develop cross-gender characteristics because of the extended 
developmental span in childhood. It could perhaps be argued as Freud (1974) did that all 
newborns are “polymorphously perverse” and that their development into socially 
determined binary roles and norms is coercive. Hird (2002b: 49) writes: “Freud repeatedly 
emphasizes that the undifferentiated infant enjoys a myriad of diffuse pleasures, which the 
subject learns to restrict according to societal strictures.” Hird applies this to the pleasures 
of identification with gender and the melancholic formation of specific gender identities. 
Transsexuals refuse to suffer the melancholia of gender loss and are “eager to experience 
pleasure in all of its polymorphous possibility, [and] resist any attempts by the ego to 
narrow its sources of identification, and thus pleasure” (Hird, 2002b: 49). Cross gender 
behaviour in transsexuals can occur at any time due to this extended and yearned for 
exposure to both masculinity and femininity in the social setting. 
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In the 1960s social constructionism was gaining acceptance within second wave feminism 
and the social sciences (Berger & Luckmann, 1976 [1966]). Even though, in Money et al.’s 
view, socialisation plays a dominant part in the formation of masculinity and femininity in 
children (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972; Money et al., 1955; Money & Tucker, 1976) they are 
careful not to go down the purely social constructionist road. Money and Ehrhardt’s (1972) 
psychosocial theory is based on both biology (nature) and socialisation (nurture) because 
juxtaposing nature and nurture was, they said, “an out of date strategy.” Money uses 
evolutionary theory and biological psychiatry to enable this combination of the biological 
and the social and to intensify divisions between what is masculine and feminine. He 
coined the term “Phylism” in 1983 to describe imprinted building blocks “found” in the 
human that are responsible for the most basic sex differences – so, women usually 
menstruate, lactate, and carry the foetus and men usually impregnate. These biological 
imperatives are imprinted on the brain and result in a mental “gendermap” of the sexed 
body. At this point in Money’s work, there is a “procreative imperative.” Money concedes 
that there is no real evidence for his assertions: 
 
[t]he map in the brain of the body image in its entirety is still pretty much a 
scientific terra incognita (Money, 1995: 103).  
 
However, he continues: 
 
Its [the gendermap’s] significance is made evident in the syndrome of 
transsexualism. In the transsexual’s body image, the representation of the natal 
genitals is alien, and there is a fixation on having them surgically changed from 
male to female, or from female to male, to agree with the body image (Money, 
1995: 103). 
 
For “normally” gendered subjects, after the early years of infancy, coding of the gendermap 
reduces from a “bipotential” towards masculine or feminine “monopotentiality” (1995). 
This means that after infancy a person will feel comfortable with one gender identity and 
gender role (1995), rather than a polymorphous one. In this respect, Money’s theory mirrors 
Freud’s Oedipalised story (Freud, 1905 [1959]; Hird, 2002a). In transsexualism these 
anomalies are referred to as “incompatible gendermaps” (Money 1995). 
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More recently Money has refocused his theories to incorporate particular brain structures – 
especially the hypothalamus (Money, 1995; Zhou et al., 1995). This theory suggests that 
during the perinatal stage of brain development androgens in the uterus affect both sexual 
orientation and gender identity (Zhou et al., 1995). These types of neurochemical models of 
mental illness or disorders are increasingly popular in the contemporary psychology of 
deviance, especially in areas which consider violence and anti-social behaviour (N. Rose, 
2005) as well as “atypical” gender identities (Kruijver et al., 2000). With the use of brain 
scan technologies some theorists have famously predicted the future possibility of aborting 
foetuses that are likely to become homosexual (A. Greenberg & Bailey, 2001). These 
theories are based on the belief that functional brain scanning can give a definitive 
diagnosis of these “pathologies” due to recognising “deficiencies” in brain size and 
hormonal activity and that such technologies will eventually help in differentiating the 
“male” and “female” brain (Auyeung, 2006; M. Hines, 2006). However, the evidence that 
was offered in Auyeung and Hines’ papers was contestable. Hines (2006) equates hormonal 
brain activity as the cause of masculine and feminine behaviour. Her evidence suggested 
that it was testosterone activity that was visible when a male monkey played with a toy 
truck (symbolic of masculinity) and oestrogen activity was witnessed when a female 
monkey looked at the genital area of a doll, which was theorised as a “caring,” and by 
default, feminine activity. 
 
This rather dubious evidence is further challenged by a new study based on US high school 
students from eight states, published in Science (Hyde et al., 2008) magazine. This study 
found no difference between boys and girls’ academic attainment, now that both sexes are 
enrolling equally in advanced science courses. It would be interesting to scan the hormonal 
activity whilst these male and female students were “doing science,” which is often seen as 
a stereotypically masculine venture, to see if it was testosterone or oestrogen providing the 
stimulus for “doing science.” Hyde’s research lends much weight to the “gender 
similarities” hypotheses (Hyde, 2005) by way of breaking down stereotypes relating to 
masculinity and femininity. This all suggests that “masculinity” and “femininity” are 
ideological constructs and not ahistorical aspects of behaviour, rendering evidence about 
sex differences, coded as masculinity and femininity, problematic. Whilst there is no doubt 
that hormonal brain activity can be viewed, the conclusions drawn from the aesthetic 
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configuration within the scan require a much more systematic evaluation, removed from 
preconceived cultural notions of masculinity and femininity, for it to be convincing. 
 
Similarly the evidence provided by Kruijver et al. (2000) is unconvincing. One deceased 
transman and a few more deceased transwomen’s brains have been studied and found to 
have hypothalamus measurements in the range of “normal” men and “normal” women 
respectively (2000). However, some sexologists have incorporated this “evidence” 
alongside other endocrinological factors. Milton Diamond – a US sexologist who works 
with transsexuals, intersex and transgender people - proposes that transsexuality is, in fact, 
a form of intersex. He states: 
 
[t]ranssexuals, who I believe are intersexed, have the body and genitals of one sex 
and the brain of the other making reconciliation of their sexual and gender 
identities problematic. They solve their problems of reconciling, their disparate 
sexual identity and gender identity, by saying, in essence, “Don’t change my mind; 
change my body.” (Diamond, 2000: 50). 
 
This type of evidence has, however, been critiqued widely within medical discourse. 
Pfafflin (2006) a renowned psychotherapist and member of the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) refuses to acknowledge the role of the “bed 
nucleus” of the hypothalamus area as the single factor that causes transgenderism. Instead 
Pfafflin argues that the phenomenology of transsexuality is not characterised by uniformity 
and is manifested in numerous ways. Furthermore, the fact that there may be regrets after 
sex reassignment surgery (SRS) challenges a biological basis to transsexuality (2006). 
Additionally, biologist Fausto-Sterling (2000) suggests that these brain studies have not 
given definitive statistics and evidence to support distinct sex differentiation, meaning there 
is no consensus about the evidence. However, while Money and his colleagues, Diamond 
and others, were formulating aetiology and definitions of transsexualism, from the 1950s 
Harry Benjamin was working with transsexuals to help formulate a diagnosis and care plan. 
This resulted in his hugely influential study, The Transsexual Phenomenon (Benjamin, 
1966). His work continued until he retired in 1973. 
 
Diagnoses and “Practices of Care”: psychology and psychoanalysis 
 23
In 1980, the manual that logs psychiatric disorders, the DSM III (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987), included transsexualism for the first time. This label had a sociological 
tinge to its criteria. Individuals who for a continuous period of two years had felt 
themselves to be of the wrong physical sex, to that which they were assigned at birth, were 
diagnosed as “transsexual.” This diagnosis would be applied if the person wanted to change 
their body to that of the opposite sex. Another diagnostic label, Gender Dysphoria, was 
coined by Fisk in 1973 (Cohen-Kettenis & Gooren, 1999) was also used. Gender dysphoria 
is the term used to describe those suffering from a conflicting gender identity. In the revised 
1994 version, the DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the word 
“transsexualism” was replaced by Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which signified a 
person who has a strong cross-gender identification and who suffers from Gender 
Dysphoria. This time there was no two year time limit placed on the diagnosis. However, a 
sub-classification relating to sexual orientation was added specifying whether patients were 
attracted to males, attracted to females, or attracted to both sexes. The sub-divisions were 
not meant to influence treatment but were intended as heuristic devices to ascertain the best 
possible, if any, therapy to be offered. 
 
The Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders (Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001) has been used by sexologists, psychiatrists and 
psychologists since the original version of 1979 (now version 6) as a way of standardising 
key diagnoses and treatments in the area of transgender and transsexualism. It states that 
the initial diagnosis of the transsexual should be dependent on a thorough investigation of 
the patient’s background and childhood. Psychotherapy is followed by hormone treatment, 
if possible – which will help the transsexual by modifying the secondary sex characteristics, 
such as breast formation and fat deposits on the hips for transwomen, and the growth of 
facial hair and development of a deeper voice for transmen – as well as changing their 
behaviour. This social and technological intervention marks the start of the Real Life Test 
(RLT). The RLT has been ironically titled “the rite of passage to the surgical suite” by 
Richard Green (2006) and is used in the clinical setting to assess the social trials of cross-
gender living. This can be read as the aetiological aspects of transsexualism being 
superseded by social and agentic aspects of the transsexual’s trajectory. The RLT allows 
the transperson to decide if they will be able to successfully negotiate life in their gender of 
 24
choice. After all these criteria have been met, and no other pathological signs are 
uncovered, sex reassignment surgery (SRS) may be offered. 
 
The Standards of Care are presented as providing assistance to the “unfortunate” individual 
suffering from GID. It states: 
 
The general goal of the specific psychotherapeutic, endocrine, or surgical therapies 
for people with gender identity disorders is lasting personal comfort with the 
gendered self in order to maximize overall psychological well-being and self-
fulfilment (Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001).  
 
Although the system seems quite straightforward, King (1996: 97) warned twenty years 
ago, that this shift in focus may have less altruistic motivations. 
 
Gender dysphoria widens the area of expertise of interest of the practitioner. No 
longer is he or she concerned only with a special type of person, the transsexual, 
but all who suffer from gender dysphoria. 
 
Moreover, Billings and Urban (1996) have suggested that the surgical procedures involved 
in sex-changing are a lucrative business. This shift in emphasis from aetiology to managing 
a “condition,” may have come about because adult transpeople’s desire to have body 
modification, in varying degrees, could not be averted by the “reparative” medical practices 
that were, then, being performed in the clinical setting. I suggest, along with other critics 
(1996), that this focus was an attempt to control the sex-change industry. “Experts” in this 
area not only provided the diagnosis after a lengthy time span (recommended in the 
“Standards of Care”) (Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001), 
but worked closely with the surgeons who provided the surgical “cure” for adult 
transpeople. 
 
If financial gain is the motive, which is suggested by Billings and Urban (1996), clinicians 
and surgeons would require safeguards against potential laws suits that clients may bring 
for misdiagnosis. Transgender people have themselves brought this problem to light 
recently with legal cases in Australia and an investigation by the General Medical Council 
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in the UK (Jeffreys, 2008). The most convincing challenge to the diagnostic process, then, 
comes from transpeople themselves. Jillian St. Jacques (2007) suggests that people who 
decide that they are not transsexual after transitioning – “post-transsexuals” – are forcibly 
positioned in “narratives of regret” by the clinical researchers attending  them (cf Olsson & 
Moller, 2006). St. Jacques’ (2007) critique is based on the understanding that clinical 
writings on “post-transsexuals” are about them being unhappy in their new gender and, by 
default, then, being happier in their “old” gender. According to St. Jacques, these narratives 
are based on a misinterpretation in that the “post-transsexual” wishes to return to the 
“original gender” identity and sexed body. In many cases, however, the “post-transsexual,” 
in fact, wishes for a position beyond man or woman. These clinical misinterpretations are 
due to the framework used in medicine’s “cultural repertoire,” which only allows for two 
conceivable positions, male and female. There are no positions beyond the binary sex 
system. This secures two things: firstly, it preserves the pathologisation of transpeople by 
using the default genders, men and women, as the markers of truth, and, secondly, it 
secures the ongoing construction of “official” transsexual identities and, therefore, clinical 
intervention. Traditional sexologists need normative sexed cultures for their theories to 
retain any coherence, however, “post-transsexuals” pose immense problems for the 
diagnostic process and its reliability. 
 
As early as the 1970s, Kessler and McKenna (1978) suggested that the clinicians’ 
diagnostic process was not based, so much, within science, but was a highly subjective 
endeavour, which may depend on the aesthetic presentation of transpeople. They stated that 
one clinician: 
 
said that he was more convinced of the femaleness of a male to female transsexual 
if she was particularly beautiful and was capable of evoking in him those feelings 
that beautiful women generally do (Kessler & McKenna, 1978: 118). 
 
The clinician cited by Kessler and McKenna was not the only one who regarded aesthetics 
as important in the diagnostic process (see Zucker et al., 1993). Stoller (1985), who brought 
psychoanalysis into the therapeutic setting to try to establish the reasons for patients’ 
Gender Dysphoria, suggests that femininity is the “natural” disposition, rather than 
masculinity (as in Freud’s theory), and that it is masculinity which is harder to attain. 
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Stoller positioned transsexualism as the result of the unconscious nurturing of the child as 
the other sex. This theory is based on “family dynamics.” If a male child has too much 
contact with the “mother’s” psyche and body, and too little time is spent with the “father,” 
it is argued that the boy will “fail masculinity.” Furthermore, Stoller also suggested that if 
the boy was physically attractive, this would “spark” parental feminisation, especially by 
the mother. Commenting on the appearances of the boys in one of his studies, Stoller 
stated: “We have noticed that they [feminine boys] often have pretty faces, with fine hair, 
lovely complexions, graceful movements, and – especially – big, piercing, liquid eyes” (R. 
Stoller, 1975: 42). Rather than reading like robust scientific evidence, the bodily aesthetics 
seem to be paramount in Stoller’s analysis of “feminine boys” and provide reasons for the 
child’s treatment by his mother. Contrary to this is the female situation: here too much time 
spent with the father, and too little with the mother, will Stoller argues create family 
dynamics that encourage masculinity in girls. Given the Western pattern of childrearing, all 
children would be able to identify with the mother more often, and thus, attain femininity 
more easily, unless of course she found the child ugly. 
 
Despite the many problems of Stoller’s theory, masculinity and femininity are not as fixed 
in his view as they were in Freud’s (1905). Stoller (1985) suggests that masculinity and 
femininity are “a set of beliefs” fostered by the individual and are, therefore, not 
“unquestionable facts.” Because of this belief system, Gender Identity Disorder in children, 
according to Stoller, can be averted. Stoller’s “scientific” discourse, again, demonstrates a 
failure to fully establish viable sex differences based on ideas of “natural” masculinity and 
femininity. What Stoller unwittingly offers us though by theorising gender as a set of 
beliefs is that there are no fixed masculine and feminine criteria from which we can judge 
whether a transperson is a transperson. Furthermore, we may ask on what authoritative 
criteria anyone can judge the fate of being recognised as transsexual. 
 
Thus, the medical view of abnormal development implies that the profound conflicts 
experienced by the child are based on societal and familial pressures that occur prior to 
them attending the Gender Identity Clinic. Therefore, some clinicians’ attempted aversion 
of “inappropriate” “masculinity” or “femininity” is for the benefit of those who cannot cope 
with non-stereotypical behaviour and the social consequences that these may attract, such 
as violence, shame, and negative visibility. I agree with Hird when she shows, in her 
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contemporary analysis of a Gender Identity Conference (Hird, 2003), that children usually 
have no psychological or cognitive problems that can be ascertained by tests, and that it is 
usually parents, peers and doctors who find “feminine” behaviour in boys and “masculine” 
behaviour in girls problematic. Therefore, why change the child to comply with normative 
rules of society rather than changing the ideas of acceptable masculinity and femininity? 
 
 
 
Judging the efficacy of treatment 
Many authors have stated that psychotherapy has made little difference to the outcome of 
adult transsexuals’ gender dysphoria (Benjamin, 1971; Hoenig & Kenna, 1974; Hoenig, 
Kenna, & Youd, 1970; Pauly, 1969, 1981). Transsexuals’ transitions are successful so long 
as they have the “resourcefulness” required to adopt a new gender (Tully, 1992). Moreover, 
transitioning comes about not solely because of the medically ascribed label, but due to the 
person’s strong and persistent desire to have surgery and cross-sex (1992). With this in 
mind, it would seem that the only real “cure” for transsexualism is to go down the 
hormonal and “surgical route” (Pauly, 1968), which many transsexuals desire in varying 
degrees. This view of surgery as successful treatment took relatively few years to be 
accepted. However, it has only been a somewhat short time since extensive follow-up 
studies have taken place, where post-operative transsexuals have been assessed for the 
efficacy of SRS (Lawrence, 2003; Ross & Need, 1989). 
 
Post-operative evaluation studies are based on a number of criteria, which leads to 
methodological problems in comparing them. Some are based on improvement in 
employment opportunities, economic status, housing, education, and marital stability 
(Meyer & Reter, 1979), which may have little to do with psychological well-being and can 
be regarded as “objective” criteria (Cohen-Kettenis & Gooren, 1999). For example, 
transmen may fair better in the job market as males than they did as women. Moreover, we 
cannot be sure if there are other sociological variables that are taken into account in these 
studies, such as race (Schilt, 2006), age, disability, or being able to pass, which may 
adversely affect employment chances, housing, and education. Contrary to this, 
transwomen may actually be worse off in the workplace because of their gender. It is 
widely accepted that women, in general, still earn about 20% less than men (Eurostat, 
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2002) and many “female” jobs have less status. These studies, then, tell us something more 
about society’s prejudices and gender stratification than whether or not the transsexual is 
happy with the outcome of SRS or their trans-sex status. 
 
Studies that focus on mental health as the main criteria, which can be seen as subjective, in 
so far as the transsexual self-reports their own situation, found that SRS does improve the 
mental well-being of the transsexual (Kuiper & Cohen-Kettenis, 1988) and as such full 
adjustment to their new gender role is usually accomplished within a year (Tully, 1992). 
Nonetheless, there are some who regret the surgery (Meyer & Reter, 1979), as I illustrated 
above, and it is advised that psychotherapy is continued after sex reassignment in order for 
“sex roles” and “gender identity” to be actualised in line with current social norms (Cohen-
Kettenis et al., 2004). I suggest that these objective and subjective studies do not fully 
encompass the various contexts that illustrate the aesthetic dimensions of transpeople’s 
lives. I propose that a phenomenological study would provide a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of the efficacy of such treatment. More recently, in the UK, there has been a 
move away from the traditional models of GID by some clinicians and it is to these I now 
turn. 
 
Queer(y)ing the clinical gaze 
In The Birth of the Clinic (Foucault, 2003 [1963]), Foucault suggested that medicine was 
founded on the perceptual gaze of doctors: 
 
[T]he gaze dominates the entire field of possible knowledge; the intervention of 
techniques presenting problems of measurement, substance, or composition at the 
level of the invisible structures are rejected. Analysis is not carried out in the sense 
of an indefinite descent towards the finest configurations, ultimately to those of the 
inorganic; in that direction, it soon comes up against the absolute limit laid down 
for it by the gaze, and from there, taking the perpendicular, it slides sideways 
towards the differentiation of individual qualities. On the line on which the visible 
is ready to be resolved into the invisible, on that crest of its disappearance, 
singularities come into play. A discourse on the individual is once more possible, 
or rather, necessary, because it is the only way in which the gaze can avoid 
renouncing itself, effacing itself in the figures of experience, in which it would be 
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disarmed. The principle of visibility has its correlative in the differential reading of 
cases (Foucault, 2003 [1963]: 206). 
 
In the Parisian clinics that Foucault was writing about, symptoms were observed and  
diagnoses offered based on how a disease presented itself on the surface of the skin, in 
other words, doctors incorporated “medical aesthetics” as a fundamental medical enterprise 
(Hick, 1999: 135). This worked to taxonomise multiple diseases that were presenting 
themselves. Foucault theorised this as an “artistic practice” (Foucault, 2003 [1963]). Hird 
(2003), more recently, has highlighted the outdated “artistic practice” of determining ideas 
of masculinity and femininity. In her analysis of the Gender Identity Conference, attended 
by many of the leading psychotherapists in the field of transsexualism who I have 
previously mentioned, Hird states: 
 
[Psychiatrists] adhere to gender identity as both ‘real’ and fixed. This adherence 
then facilitates the continued use of highly stereotyped notions of gender to 
provide the framework for assessing and treating transsex […] individuals (Hird 
2003: 183). 
 
To add weight to her criticism, Hird asked at a conference workshop why boys should be 
more aggressive, play at rough and tumble and only have male friends, and why girls 
should only play at house, and dress in skirts and dresses? Hird then asked, why are the 
majority of female psychiatrists in the room wearing trousers, with minimal use of make-up 
and no high heels? Following this we might ask: do these female psychiatrists have gender 
dysphoria (Hird, 2003)? Hird is implying that traditional therapeutic models are based on 
aesthetics which are culturally ordered, and not based on scientific models of “natural” and 
dichotomous genders. 
 
Some gender identity clinics continue to ignore the differentiation of individual qualities of 
gender, what Judith Butler calls “queer crossings” (Butler, 2004), that happen in both 
heterosexual and queer lives, and which problematise binary configurations of masculinity 
and femininity. In a reflective article, Kathryn May (2002), a practising psychosexual 
therapist working in the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), suggests that there has been 
a shift in thinking about what constitutes masculinity and femininity, and the aesthetic 
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signifiers that help sustain them. May recognises her bias against stereotypical gender 
configurations when they are presented to her by her transwomen clients. She openly 
admits that the rigidity of heterobinarisms – dominant cultural standards of heterosexuality, 
hegemonic masculinity, and hegemonic femininity – that are maintained in traditional 
therapeutic and medical discourses in relation to Gender Identity Disorders do not fit 
satisfactorily with her own images of femininity. 
 
Informed by feminism and queer theory, May (2002) highlights the tensions between her 
perspective and the old models of transsexuality. The traditional medical framework 
requires the transsexual to become “true” and “real” based on a stable socially acceptable 
gender. The sex change “metamorphosis,” as May calls it, is highly problematic, as insights 
from both feminism and queer theory suggest that gendering is a fluid process and “trial 
and error” is therefore a part of acquiring normative femininity or masculinity through the 
play of aesthetic signifiers and bodily aesthetics. Put more simply, feminine and masculine 
embodiment is always in a state of flux and will never become stable.  
 
Furthermore, May (2002) states that transsexuals are now becoming a fundamental 
challenge to outdated medical models because individuals desire different stopping points 
with regard to SRS. Reasons are numerous for the different stopping points, such as 
unsatisfactory aesthetic and functioning outcomes of surgery, the dangers involved, age and 
disability. Or, it may be because transpeople may only require social “passing” and so the 
focus is not on the genitals but on other parts of the bodily aesthetic (Griggs, 1998). It is no 
longer deemed necessary by some transsexuals to have full SRS – and this generates a 
problem, not only for diagnosing, but for the “cure” as well. In addition, this increasing 
bodily agency of transsexuals threatens to shift the power relations between patient and 
doctor. 
 
Bernadette Wren is a Consultant Clinical Psychologist in the Child and Family Unit at the 
Tavistock Clinic in the UK, where gender dysphoric children and adolescents are “treated.” 
Wren (2005) also highlights problems that arise when psychiatrists accept an 
“unambiguous developmental story” as the basis for diagnosis and treatment, as this model 
is dominated by an idealised and normatively defined endpoint, that of a stable gender, with 
the appropriate aesthetic expression of femininity or masculinity. In so doing, Wren 
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highlights that heterosexuality and heterobinarisms are the organising principles in 
traditional models of transsexualism. Wren (2005) calls for a “postmodern way” in the 
clinical setting and for the psychiatrist to recognise gender as a creative and strategic 
compromise in an endless negotiation with the self. There are critics of the “postmodern 
way,” who claim that its proponents appropriate transsexualism for their own 
 
intellectual project through presenting transgendered experiences as chimera, play, 
performance or strategy. It does so at the expense of investigating the actual lives, 
political demands or feelings expressed (MacDonald, 1998: 4). 
 
However, bringing this “postmodern way” into the therapeutic office would allow children 
and adolescents to “play” with aesthetically gendered signifiers without imbuing them with 
intrinsic gendered meanings, and fixing them to judgments of gendered authenticity. This 
would enable a gender identity that could serve many diverse psychological needs and 
functions (Wren, 2005). 
 
To summarise, the psychologists, psychoanalysts, feminist and queer practitioners seem to 
offer scientific solutions to the “biological,” “psychical,” “bio-psychical” and “social” 
anomalies of transsexualism. Knowledge about transsexualism is derived from naturalistic 
observations which are tainted by the partiality of the psychiatrist and surrounded by what 
both Porter and Rose (Porter, 1995; N. Rose, 2005: 20) understand in other contexts as “an 
aura of objectivity provided by numbers.” I read “numbers” here as a metaphor for 
scientific studies, not necessarily statistical ones). Subsequently, key medical protagonists 
are awarded prestige and status for the sterling work in which they partake. Citation is the 
catalyst for this prestige. However, it is not any old citations that are awarded this 
reputation, as the sociologist Roy Boyne suggests: “when it comes to citation, there is an 
order of priorities, with scientifically established credentials appearing toward the top” 
(Boyne, 1999;  see also Stacey, 1997). Even so, there is evidence to suggest that Hird 
(2003), May (2002) and Wren (2005) greatly mistrust of the main protagonists, Money, 
Stoller, and Green, their theories, and their institutionalised procedures within the GICs.  
 
Although armed with “scientific knowledge,” medical researchers have not yet found a 
biological, or any other form, of unified model to account for transsexualism (Fausto-
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Sterling, 2000; van den Wijngaard, 1997). This is demonstrated by the abundance of 
different theories of the “condition.” What is clear is that theories about transsexuality are 
based on aesthetic configurations of masculinity and femininity, which are interpreted 
through the theorists’ own gender belief system. There is a possibility that stereotypical 
aesthetic signifiers (Hird, 2003) will be disrupted if the feminist, postmodern, and queer 
theorists (Hird, 2003; May, 2002; Wren, 2005) make headway in influencing treatment and 
diagnoses in therapeutic sessions. As I touched on earlier, this is dependent on the support 
of like-minded colleagues through networks and through citation (Boyne, 1999). 
Nonetheless, the new models are queer(y)ing masculinity and femininity in the traditional 
psychiatric models, and also highlighting the phenomenological diversity of transsexual 
patients. These contemporary influences could allow transsexuals to have multiple bodily 
aesthetics and styles. I suggest that this queers the past and present diagnosis of GID – that 
is challenges the theoretical applications of a dimorphic body system upon which 
masculinity and femininity rest. 
 
The medicolegal alliance: Or, does “biological” sex equal legal sex? 
Intersexed people, known historically as “(pseudo) hermaphrodites,” are intimately linked 
to the medicolegal construction of transsexuals in various ways. Broadly, intersexuality, in 
its many forms, is defined as congenital aberrations of biological sex in sexological 
literature, which often “requires” medical attention and surgical intervention to modify 
genitals in line with a binary sex/gender system (Money, 1975; Money et al., 1955). This 
constitutes the intersexed person as a casualty of nature gone wrong. Transsexuality 
however, is represented mostly as a psychological disorder, as I illustrated above, where 
development into an “original” sex/gender within a binary sex/gender system is thwarted3 
(Benjamin, 1966; Money & Ehrhardt, 1972). In all the sexological perspectives concerning 
transsexuality, except maybe those that are based in psychoanalysis (Rekers et al., 1976; R. 
Stoller, 1975) and the reparative perspectives (Zucker & Bradley, 1995), the “anomalies” of 
embodiment should/could be rectified with surgical procedures (Pauly, 1981). The way in 
which the intersexed and transsexuals are marked differently in the medicolegal context is 
through the “discursive gymnastics” employed by doctors and judges when viewing the 
                                                 
3 Transsexuality is thought of as an intersex condition by some theorists (see Diamond, 2000). 
However, most biological accounts of transsexuality as an intersexed condition are inferred from 
brain studies, which do not have medical consensus (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). These studies also 
imply that brain functioning operates within a binary system of sex differentiation. 
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sex/gender system (Hird, 2000), where the same types of surgeries are viewed as essentially 
different in their intention and deployment. 
 
The “Optimal-Gender” policy (Money et al., 1955) is one of Money’s best-known theories. 
Money and the paediatric endocrine group at Johns Hopkins in the 1950s started to assign 
infants born with ambiguous genitals, known as “(pseudo) hermaphrodites” (now 
“intersexed”), an “Optimal Gender.” Assignment decisions for these infants were based on 
the expected “optimal” outcome in relation to future psychosexual and reproductive 
functioning, which included a stable gender identity. Money et al (1955) proposed that 
newborns who have an intersex condition are psychosexually neutral. If for any reason the 
newborn is genitally and thus, “sexually ambiguous,” this need not be a problem, for when 
the “Optimal Gender” assignment is decided, surgical procedures performed, and the 
gendered rearing commences the infant will automatically assume the gender of assignment 
as well as heterosexuality (Money, 1975). Money (1975) argued that gender becomes fixed 
in the first three years of a child’s life, through the gender rearing and socialisation of the 
child, usually resulting in an appropriate gender identity, gender role, and the social gender 
of either masculinity or femininity. Money’s theory was applied to all newborns.4 
 
Medical and legal models incorporate only two sexes. Hester (2004) suggests that the way a 
doctor determines the sex of an infant is by regarding the aesthetic arrangement of their 
genitals. If the arrangement of the genitals is in anyway ambiguous then the doctor may 
require additional information in order to extract the “authentic” sex of the infant. 
Additional information could consist of phenotype, chromosomal make-up, hormonal and 
gonadal tissue, which would be considered along with the morphology of the genitals. 
However, as Dreger suggests: 
 
in the late twentieth century [doctors] do not search deep into an intersexual’s 
body in the hope of finding a material marker of an ontologically “true” sex. 
Instead, doctors today see their approach as pragmatic and primarily attentive to a 
                                                 
4 For evidence contrary to Money’s theory see John Colapinto’s (2001) book about Money’s 
“experiment” with a child who’s circumcision went wrong. Following laser treatment that burnt the 
child’s penis, a neovagina was constructed and the child’s parents were advised to commence the 
rearing of the child inline with a female social role. Money’s research records have been criticised 
for being misleading and, by some critics, as having been falsified (2001). 
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psychosocial gender identity theory rather than a biomedical-materialist 
philosophy of sex identity (Dreger, 1998: 181). 
 
So the data deemed necessary by the paediatric team for a diagnosis of intersexuality would 
be considered against the back-drop of Money et al’s psychosocial developmental “Optimal 
Gender” policy (Money et al., 1955). The experts’ decisions would result in the assignment 
of an “Optimal Gender” that the child would be socialised into and, moreover, they would 
determine which sex should be placed on the birth certificate, which is a legal document 
that transmits many social, medical and legal significations. The birth certificate is an 
ontological claim, which organises many aspects of civil life (Whittle, 2002). In law the 
birth certificate affects a number of areas where men and women are distinguished, for 
example, in relation to some sexual offences, marking who can marry, deciding which 
sports someone can compete in,5 and so on (Chau & Herring, 2002). The bodily sex of the 
infant, initially pursued by the doctor through the “art of perception” (Hick, 1999), is taken, 
in most cases, as both a routine medical and a legal truth. As Judith Butler (1993) asserts 
experts lay claim to ontology, and distribute ontological effects, which is an instrument of 
power. Ontological claims also affect recognition and exclusion, which Butler suggests 
produces domains of “unthinkability.” What is excluded from medicolegal ontology, and 
remains “unthinkable,” is intersexed embodiment. Legal theorist Andrew Sharpe (1998) 
suggests that in a legal context biological determinism is a prerequisite for having a legally 
sexed body. Biological determinism is, however, based less on internal chromosomal, 
hormonal and gonadal biology than on bodily aesthetics and the presence or absence of a 
penis. According to Chau and Herring (2002: 349; Meyers-Seifer & Charest, 1992): 
 
The accepted approach was that the penis of less than 2 cm should be removed, as 
should a clitoris greater than 1 cm. It was felt that boys with such short penises 
                                                 
5 After much wrangling within the House of Lords and the House of Commons about transsexuals 
competing in ‘sport,’ the UK government bowed to the sporting lobbyists while constructing the 
GRA. In Section 19 of the GRA, which attends to sporting bodies, it instructs that transpeople can 
be banned from competing in ‘sports’ on safety grounds or on grounds of competitive 
(dis)advantage. The International Olympic Committee (IOC), however, removed restrictions with 
regard to transsexual participation in the Olympics in 2004 (Cavanagh & Sykes, 2006). There are, 
however, restrictions on certain bodies in the IOC’s rulings. The IOC state that competitors must 
have surgical anatomical changes, must have received appropriate hormone therapy for a specified 
length of time to minimise gender-related advantage, and must have their sex change recognised in 
their host jurisdiction (International Olympic Committee, 2004). 
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would suffer from low self-esteem and that girls with a large clitoris would feel 
unfeminine. 
 
Children born with variations in their chromosomal, gonadal, and hormonal make-up could 
be classified as either male or female through a glance at the present or absent penis, except 
for when the doctors’ suspicions are aroused by aesthetically ambiguous and therefore 
“inauthentic” genitals. The socio-legal theorist Greenberg (2003) suggests that when these 
suspicions are aroused a “complimentary” set of standards come into play in the pursuit of 
finding the “authentic” sex of the infant. The “Optimal Gender” policy dictates that 
penetration and procreation are the institutionalised goal, and is alluded to in some medical 
prognoses, but not fully adhered to in practice: 
 
[t]his penetration/procreation gender stereotype is further reinforced by the 
medical community’s emphasis on the need for a female to have an acceptable-
looking clitoris over her need for sexual satisfaction. Creation of a sensitive clitoris 
and a vagina that properly lubricates during sex are not the primary concerns 
during female genital modification surgery. A successful surgical modification of a 
female is not defined as one that will likely result in her ability to achieve sexual 
pleasure; instead it is defined as one that results in the creation of a proper-sized 
clitoris (that may not be as sensitive as the unaltered clitoris) and a vagina that will 
allow penetration by a penis (J. Greenberg, 2003: 278 emphasis added). 
 
There were instances in Money’s work where babies appeared otherwise “normal” except 
for a “micropenis of clitorine dimensions” (Money, 1975: 65). This was regarded as an 
anomaly and “rectified,” by surgically creating a neovagina, and assigning the child as 
female in order for the parents to commence “appropriate” rearing in the female role. If the 
child was left as male, it was assumed that the small penis would negatively affect his life 
chances, reducing his self-esteem. The assignment of the child as female would save “the 
individual feel[ing] like a freak” (Money, 1975: 66). Moreover, doctors in both the US and 
UK have been accused of creating “female” genitals out of ambiguous “male” genitals and 
pressurising parents into rearing the child in a “female role,” based on the (unfounded) 
notion that the aesthetic dimension of genitals is the most important factor for future 
psychological wellbeing (Kipnis & Diamond). It is more likely that this decision was, in 
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fact, based on the notion that it is technologically easier to construct a neovagina than it is 
to construct a neophallus (Intersex Society of North America, 2004). However, there are 
now some Eastern European doctors who believe that functionality and sexual pleasure 
should be the surgeon’s objective (see Krstic et al., 2000). 
 
Writing on the sociology of intersex, Hester suggests that the objectivity of science is 
underwritten by a hierarchy of subjective values, which are premised upon the location and 
history of a discipline (Hester, 2004). At the turn of the 21st Century in the UK and US, 
when “inauthentic” genitals were categorised as either “too small to be a penis or too large 
to be a clitoris,” surgeons started bringing genitals surgically inline with, what they 
perceived as, the statistically (and aesthetically) normative (Hester, 2004). This resulted in 
diagnoses that appeared bizarre to the individuals involved. For example, Cheryl Chase 
(2002: 207), herself intersex, explained: 
 
From my birth until the surgery, while I was Charlie, my parents and doctors 
considered my penis to be very small […] Then at the moment the intersex 
specialist physicians pronounced my “true sex” as female, my clitoris was 
suddenly monstrously large. All this occurred without any change in the actual 
size or appearance of the appendage between my legs. 
 
The cessation of “gendered” medical intervention in childhood, unless it is life threatening, 
has become the focus for political activists from the intersex community. Activists argue 
that people should be able to consent to medical intervention themselves and, because much 
intervention is performed during childhood, that doctors disregard intersex people’s human 
rights (Hester, 2004). Furthermore, activists suggest that medical intervention is 
unnecessary and based on arbitrary, aesthetic reasons. The spokesperson for the 
Organisation Intersex International – UK, Sophia Siedlberg (2006), suggests that use of a 
“phallometer test” by surgeons to determine whether the phallus should be extended with 
phalloplasty or reduced to produce a “normal” sized clitoris is also wrong. Dreger’s (1998) 
historical account of intersex management also highlights other aesthetic factors that have 
been considered in scientific theories of sexed bodies. What, by some doctors would be 
seen as labia majora would be classed by others as a “bifid (divided) scrotum.” In some 
cases the growth pattern of pubic hair was observed and influenced the identification of a 
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“true sex” (1998). After all these deliberations and subsequent surgeries, the modified 
genitals are finally considered “natural” and “normal” (Hester, 2004). The authenticity of 
sex is ordered by literally cutting away the ambiguity and, in many cases, denying it ever 
existed (Chase, 2002). Dreger (1998: 187) notes: 
 
Medical paternalism grew powerfully in the late nineteenth century and continued 
for much of the twentieth century; doctors assumed they knew what was best for 
patients and society and that therefore they should make the primary decisions 
about a patient’s care […] paternalism marked cases like those of Louise-Julia-
Anna (in which the patient was told she was a man and told the doctor would 
refuse to repair her hernia if it meant she would keep having sex with “other” men) 
and of the Middlesex widow (whose surgeon removed her testicles without ever 
telling her what he had found). 
 
Euphemisms were sometimes used by doctors to conceal from parents the truth about their 
child’s surgical procedures, as a post on the Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Internet 
Support Group website suggests: 
 
it was not until I was 17 that medical examination and subsequent surgery took 
place. My parents were told that my internal organs had not developed properly 
and that two “hernias” had been discovered and removed (Rosemary). 
 
These “hernias” were in fact gonadal tissue. The doctors’ paternalism was meant to save 
the family from stigma and shame (Intersex Society of North America, 2004). This, then, 
should help foster family stability and be conducive to the formation of the child’s stable 
gender identity and complimentary heterosexual orientation (Money et al., 1955). In legal 
terms the “authentication” process of surgical assignment provides an unambiguous sex for 
the birth certificate. 
 
In 2000 a Home Office publication stated: 
 
The law provides for an entry in a birth register to be corrected at any time if it can 
be shown that an error has been made. This includes the circumstances where a 
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newborn baby was not in fact of the sex recorded in the register (Home Office, 
2000: 6). 
 
 It continued: 
 
If the sex of a child is not evident at birth, parents are advised to delay the 
registration until medical investigations have been completed to determine the sex 
(Home Office, 2000: 6). 
 
Although there is medical recognition of the “grey areas” of body aesthetics, for intersexed 
people, there is only partial acceptance of this in the law. UK law, as it stands in 2008, is 
willing to wait until doctors have decided upon an “Optimal Gender” (male/female) for 
those who do not “naturally” fit the system. However, doctors cannot contradict the binary 
sex of the birth certificate even though, more recently, there have been changes in the 
medical management of intersexuality. Even though surgical intervention and classification 
have begun to be questioned (Chau & Herring, 2002; Krstic et al., 2000) there is no legal 
space for intersexed people. 
 
As was reported in the British media, a child named Joella, who had been assigned  male at 
birth, could not have her birth certificate changed, even though doctors had subsequently 
created a “female” body (G. Finn, 1998). In this particular case her modified body did not 
adequately signify her “true” sex in law. Legal sex was determined in law by a ruling from 
Judge Ormrod, which stated that chromosomes and body morphology at birth were the 
deciding factors in the “true sex” of a person. Ironically, it was the case of a transsexual, 
April Ashley, which set the precedent for what “true sex” was. April Ashley and Arthur 
Corbett wanted to annul their marriage. At the time, the UK legal system did not recognize 
a mutual consent agreement between two parties as reason enough to grant an annulment. 
Judge Ormrod ruled, that because of this, the case’s primary focus had to be the validity of 
the marriage between Corbett and Ashley. Ashley was known to be transsexual. The 
divorce, then, came to depend upon the “true” sex of Ashley, because if, through medical 
testing, she was determined to be male, the marriage would be void. Determining the “true” 
sex of the person was based on four factors. (1) Chromosomal factors. (2) Gonadal factors 
(i.e. the presence or absence of testes or ovaries). (3) Genital factors, which includes 
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internal sexually dimorphic organs. (4) Psychological factors. Ashley had XY 
chromosomes and, therefore, was of male chromosomal sex; originally she had testicles 
and, therefore, was of male gonadal sex prior to sex reassignment surgery; had male 
external genitals without evidence of either internal or external female sex organs and was, 
therefore, of male genital sex. Psychologically, she was diagnosed as transsexual. These 
factors are (in)significant in relation to Joella. Following an eight year court battle, a ruling 
by the Office of National Statistics stated that Joella, the intersex child who had XY 
chromosomes and had had gender reassignment surgery, could have her birth certificate 
changed to female (G. Finn, 1998). This decision meant that chromosomal tests were no 
longer regarded as definitive in determining a person’s sex. Christine Burns, of the 
transsexual advocacy group Press for Change, said: 
 
In law, there is no difference between Joella and a transsexual woman and in 
practice the only actual difference is that gender reassignment surgery was 
inflicted upon her by others, whereas transsexual people are in the position of 
trying to get surgery. She has XY chromosomes, just like transsexual women and 
is sufficient to invalidate her marriage under the ‘test’ devised by Justice Ormrod 
(Press for Change, 1998b). 
 
After this case, transsexuals were urged by community groups to apply for amendments to 
their birth certificates on the basis of this ruling. The law, however, still considered intersex 
and transsexuals differently, one as an authentic sex, created by a surgeon, and the other as 
inauthentic simulacra6 created by a surgeon. The “inauthentic” transsexual was still defined 
in terms of the sex ascribed to them at birth, as someone who had psychosocial gender 
problems (gender dysphoria), in opposition to an intersexed person who had physiological 
(biological) “problems.” This division can be seen, then, as the consequence of the 
privileging of certain corporeal and psychological relationships over others. By giving 
importance to purely psychological factors, without any definitive tests to confirm them, 
Chau and Herring (2002: 349) suggest that this may lead to self-defining intersex people 
considering “themselves as neither male nor female, but intersex (or some other 
designation).” This would create a legal precedent that would undermine what, over thirty 
                                                 
6 April Ashley was called a “pastiche of womanhood” by Judge Ormrod during the hearing 
(Sandland, 2007). 
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years ago, Gayle Rubin called, the last bastion of heterosexual kinship systems, marriage. 
Marriage continues to have colossal relevance for the political economy of sexual systems 
(G. Rubin, 1997 [1975]) and sexed bodies, both in the UK and around the world.7 
Nonetheless, it was not until the implementation of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 that 
“authenticity” was legally granted to transsexuals in the UK. Legal recognition however, is 
premised on a number of criteria, such as a diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria and other 
“significant psychological factors,” alongside the will to surgically alter (sexual) bodily 
characteristics. Legal authenticity for transsexuals is premised upon medical experts’ ability 
to determine whether someone is gender dysphoric or not, which assures medicine’s 
ongoing centrality to the construction of official transsexual identities (Sanger, 2008). 
 
Recognising gender and the changing medicolegal gaze 
Perceptions about discursive constructions of and acceptable bodily aesthetics of GID do 
not have medical consensus, as I explored above. In this section, however, I aim to show 
which of these assumptions are used by the law to constitute transsexualism. New legal 
precedents have come into force because of the implementation of the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004. Currently legal scholars are debating the theoretical importance of the Act 
(Cowan, 2005; Sandland, 2005; Sharpe, 2007b). It seems that GID is the only 
“psychological problem” that advances debate in the institutional domains of critical 
academia, medicine, and law. This is because of its potential to disrupt normatively 
structured genders (Sandland, 2005, 2007), which could have far reaching legal 
consequences. 
 
The Gender Recognition Bill was introduced in response to the judgement from the 
European Courts of Human Rights (ECHR) on Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom8 in 
the hope that it would provide legal recognition for people who are transsexual. The bill 
was presented by the government as part of their grand programme of “social 
inclusionism.” Following a report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights of 11th 
December 2003, a government spokesperson introduced the second reading of the Gender 
                                                 
7Religious and Conservative objections to the GRA were defamatory during the parliamentary 
debates. Marriage as a social institution, it was argued, should be guarded against transsexualism at 
all costs. Lord Tebbit suggested that the government would, if the legislation went through, be 
denying the reality of biology (Sandland, 2005). 
8 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (Application no. 28957/95) [2002] I.R.L.R. 664. 
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Recognition Bill in 2004. He said: “[this is] possibly the most progressive system of gender 
recognition in Europe” (David Lammy MP cited in Sandland, 2007: 1). It has been argued 
that it was, in fact, various highly publicised legal battles at the ECHR that were at the 
forefront of the government’s decision to look at the legal plight of transsexuals in the UK 
(Sandland, 2007). A number of cases were taken to the ECHR with the support and expert 
backing of Press for Change, a prominent trans advocacy organisation. Christine Goodwin 
v. United Kingdom, in 2002, is one such case. Here a transsexual woman successfully 
argued that her rights were breached by the UK government’s failure to provide legal 
recognition of her change of sex. This was by far the most often cited legal and political 
victory over the government’s feet dragging in relation to legal change for transsexuals 
(Sandland, 2007).9 
 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 has recently become law in the UK and enables 
transsexuals to apply for gender recognition. This means that transsexuals who wish to have 
all their personal documentation changed to their acquired gender may do so, as long as the 
Gender Recognition Panel is satisfied with the evidence supplied.10 At first this only 
applied to people who had been living in their “new” gender for more than six years. This 
time constraint was reduced to two years in April 2007. The GRP began work on 1st April 
2005 deciding who could, or could not, gain recognition. The law does not force 
transpeople to apply for recognition. Thus, even if a transperson has had all the necessary 
surgery for them to successfully pass as the gender of choice, there is no mandate for them 
to change their documentation. Another interesting aspect of the law is that transsexuals do 
not have to have genital reconstructive surgery to attain their “acquired gender.” Those who 
do not have the surgery, however, have to “face” a panel with information about which 
surgical operations were planned but unable to be actualised, in order for the transsexual to 
be assessed according to their new gender. Although this has been heralded as a success by 
                                                 
9 Prior to the implementation of the consultation process and the implementation of the GRA 2004, 
the UK along with Albania, Andorra, and Ireland were the only countries in Europe that did not 
recognise transsexuals’ acquired genders. 
10 According to Schedule 1 of the Act, the panel must consist of legal and medical members 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The legal member must be a solicitor or a barrister with at least 
seven years experience. The medical members must be a chartered psychologists or registered 
medical practitioner (Schedule 1 para. 1(2) (b)). The panel must also have a President, or Deputy 
President, or the legal member to preside over the proceedings if the others are not available. All 
proceedings must be in private. 
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many transpeople in the UK, granting transsexuals legal and citizenship rights, the newness 
of the law has yet to make visible any unforeseen problems. Prior to the GRP commencing 
their deliberations, Press for Change, the political group, which has influenced the passage 
of the Act at all stages, circulated some correspondence. It stated: 
 
this is entirely new ground for everyone. It's a new law. Nobody has ever run a 
process of this type before. The panel hasn't yet sat and it hasn't established its 
own ground rules for how much detail it needs in medical evidence. Therefore the 
staff are being prudent and offering applicants their own best guess about where 
the panel may want to draw a line (Press for Change, 2005 emphasis added). 
 
 
The law offers two main paths that the transsexual may travel to gain acceptance from the 
GRP: having been diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria, and having had, or planning to have, 
surgery that changes “sexual characteristics.” The information provided by doctors is 
judged by at least one medical practitioner in the field of Gender Identity Disorder plus a 
legal expert. Firstly, then the surgical path: if the transsexual can show confirmation of 
surgical treatment for the purpose of modifying sexual characteristics, for example genital 
modification SRS (vaginoplasty, orchiodectomy etc), this is by far the easiest way to apply. 
A General Practitioner should be able to certify this, by looking at the patient’s notes and 
correspondence in the individual’s medical record. It is not yet known, however, how much 
of a challenge to traditional sex/gender dimorphism the panel will allow in relation to 
bodily aesthetics. 
 
The second way in which the law allows an application to be accepted by the panel is 
through evidence of person having been diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria. This evidence 
needs to be given by a qualified practitioner from a Gender Identity Clinic. The Gender 
Dysphoria option allows someone who has not undergone genital surgery to obtain 
recognition. The UK parliament went further than was expected after the ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights on Goodwin v UK. Other European countries, such as 
Sweden and France, insist on sex reassignment surgery as a condition of recognition 
(Sandland, 2005) while countries, such as Germany and Portugal, require sterilisation 
before recognition will be granted. Legal scholar, Sandland (2005: 51), has argued that this 
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part of the UK law constitutes a “shift from gazing at bodies to accepting that things are 
(not) what they seem.” Because genital reconstructive surgery is not necessary in the UK, 
he suggests that the possibility of authentication within a legal binary subject-position that 
is removed from the normal mode of categorisation, i.e. penis, or not, at birth, represents 
“moments of beyondness” (2005: 54). These “moments,” Sandland suggests, illustrate the 
fluidity and malleability of the terms “female” and “male.” Rather than the legal precedent 
functioning as an opening up of how gender identity can be constituted in law, it reifies 
sexed identities through the authority of medicine. Sandland (2005: 47) argues rightly that 
gender, in the GRA, is not a “subset of sex: [where] “sex” defined the parameters, gender 
was the free play within those parameters.” He uses Butler’s assertion that gender has come 
to be seen as a “subset of sex,” suggesting that the law has shifted its focus on 
transsexuality from a biologically determinist position to a psycho-social one. So, the law 
now focuses on gender rather than on sex. By showing that “orthodox” gender is so easily 
manipulable through (medicolegal) discourse and that gender – man and woman – is 
socially constructed, it allows for the potential of queer gender recognition through non-
normative bodily aesthetics. Sandland fails to acknowledge that recognition is restricted to 
those who wish to change their sex from one to the other rather than the removal of the 
binary system all together. 
 
In a later article, Sandland (2007) recognises these limitations of his theory and calls the 
GRA both a story of desire – desire of  unambiguous sex/genders in law – and a story of 
denial, where “imaginary” or ambiguous sex/genders, such as transgendered people must 
continually be denied by the law. Sandland theorises this denial in law as a disregard for 
anything that may challenge the binary sex/gender system and make the law unreadable. 
Denial, then, is denial of the ambiguous and “inauthentic” “Other” sex/genders that always 
threaten “to exceed the either/or of the male and female” (2007: 3) divide in the law.  
Excess, here, is exposed as an embodied potentiality – similar to intersex embodiment – 
and must continuously be denied authenticity by the law and, thus, any possible 
deconstructive power. Whilst this may be true on one level, in that some bodies may be 
denied recognition, the decision to grant people a sexed status different to that on their 
original birth certificate would not be based on ambiguous bodies, but instead on the 
intentionality “behind” those bodies. Intentionality would require a submission to medical 
authority in order to obtain the diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which would give 
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“legitimate” meaning (in the eyes of the law) to any sartorial or body modification practices 
of trans-sexing. 
 
"Gender Reassignment" (GR) is a general term in the transgender literature for a number of 
surgical and hormonal body modification measures (Cohen-Kettenis et al., 2004). GR can 
include those operations that we do not necessarily think of in relation to transsexualism, 
such as hair transplants, and practices based on gender presentation, such as aesthetic 
surgeries to feminise, or masculinise, facial and bodily features. The panel does not yet 
have criteria that can be examined.11 Therefore transgender community groups currently 
advise people who wish to apply to list all the surgeries they have had, or plan to have 
(Press for Change, 2005). It seems that the panel requires evidence of an actual, or 
intentional, aesthetic commitment to a particular gender. Transsexuals must have good 
medical reasons not to have hormone therapy or have surgery that changes sexual 
characteristics. One such reason is the inability to have surgery. This may be due to a risk 
to health and well-being. It is assumed, however, that the transsexual would have surgery if 
it was possible.12 Doctors and surgeons would need to provide confirmation that the 
candidate for recognition satisfies this premise of wanting surgery and a letter indicating a 
refusal to perform surgery due to its potential dangers. This can only be obtained by 
acquiring a referral from a clinician specialising in Gender Identity Disorder. Confirmation 
would also have to be provided to show that the candidate has gone through the clinical 
process and been given the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria.  
 
The introduction of the GRA 2004 in the UK has been heralded as a success by transgender 
community groups. However, the success is only for those who can convince the panel they 
are the gender they say they are, while for those who are refused gender recognition more 
evidence will be required. At present the panel has no strict guidelines to adhere to. There is 
                                                 
11 The president of Press for Change and World Professional Association of Transgender Health 
(WPATH) Stephen Whittle, said that he had sat in on some of the panel’s sessions, as an invited 
guest, in order to oversee proceedings and comment on any of the procedures, in an attempt to make 
the system as fair as possible. 
12 In section 9(1) the Act states: “the person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender 
(so that, if the acquired gender is the male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if it 
the female gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a woman).” In section 20, a person can still be 
charged with a sexual offence in their assigned sex at birth. For example, in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland rape is still considered only possible by a man/male. 
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no research to date into who has, and who has not, been awarded recognition. This is not to 
say, however, that the Act is not progressive for transsexuals. It has progressive potential 
insofar as it removes the, once quite stable, legal precedents about men, women and 
transsexuals’ bodies. The precedent of what constitutes a man or woman was legally 
stabilised in the case of April Ashley, which stood for over 30 years. The law rested on the 
notion of “biological authenticity” that could be found in and on the body, which, in turn, 
according to Hird: 
 
rest[ed] upon three inter-related assumptions: that sex and gender exist; that sex 
and gender constitute measurable traits; and that the ‘normal’ population adheres 
to the first two assumptions (Hird, 2002a: 581). 
 
The biological and bodily aesthetic evidence in the Ashley case – and only in relation to 
transsexuality – cedes to the new formulations of authentic psyche and/or aesthetic 
signifiers that are produced by the psychiatrist and transsexual through the notion of gender 
(dysphoria) and which are anchored in and on bodies (Hird, 2002a). Therefore, 
prescriptions by the medical authorities, using “authentic” evidence from their self-styled 
scientific models of “natural” signifiers, that are “able” to “measure” dichotomous genders, 
are still in play. Bodies are required to produce masculinity and femininity on “wrong 
bodies” respectively, in order to receive the “diagnosis” of Gender Dysphoria. So, it seems 
that the law has surrendered the “authenticity” of sex to the performativity of gender. 
However, medicolegal discourse concerning transsexuality has, in fact, surrendered a 
performative sexed body based on biological markers and bodily aesthetics for another 
performative based on the intentionality behind sartorial and bodily aesthetics and the will 
to be scrutinised by doctors who have the authority to diagnose Gender Dysphoria. The 
medical scrutiny in the gender clinics may vary and is dependent upon the paradigms and 
gender models the psychiatrists are most comfortable with and, thus, dependent upon a 
postcode lottery of “taste” and aesthetic judgement (Bourdieu, 1984). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated that “masculinity” and “femininity” are fluid aspects of 
gender aesthetics rather than being biologically determined. And, because medical models 
each advocate different “causes” for the “biological nature” of transsexualism, this reveals 
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that they are applying, what Cromwell calls, “default assumptions” (Whittle, 2002: 72-73) 
about masculinity and femininity. I have demonstrated that the gender belief systems that 
traditional practitioners apply when diagnosing their trans patients are influenced by 
hegemonic and stereotypical cultural ascriptions of masculinity and femininity. I have 
argued that the dominance of the medical “founding fathers” of transsexualism, the 
aetiology, and the standards of care and practice surrounding intersexed and “gender 
dysphoric” people, is being challenged. These models are being contested by feminist, 
queer, and postmodern understandings of gender, both within and outside the medical 
profession. Because traditional psychiatric models of masculinity and femininity are 
structured around heteronormative values there is much mistrust from contemporary 
perspectives. These novel contestations do not deny the ontological claims that there are 
(trans) men and (trans) women, but the emphasis has shifted from a biological model of 
bodily aesthetics to a psychosocial model of bodily aesthetics, which has the potential to 
undermine much traditional medical theory regarding transsexuality. 
 
Nonetheless, the ontological claims which are made by doctors are also used by the law 
too. This affects notions of hierarchy, subordination, and exclusion within civil life, as 
Butler (2004) suggests, this produces domains of “unthinkability.” What is excluded from 
medicolegal ontology and thus remains “unthinkable” (at present) is the intentionality 
behind intersexed and transgender (as opposed to transsexual) embodiment and bodily 
aesthetics. This is because these identity positions have the potential to disrupt the binary 
gender legal order. I have discussed the medicolegal constructions of transsexualism and 
the legal preferences for bodies and “gender” which authenticate transsexuals in law. I have 
suggested as there is no true consensus in the diagnostic process and that this demonstrates 
that the decision to grant legal recognition to transpeople is based on subjective, aesthetic 
evaluations by experts. The chapter has suggested that medicolegal approaches to 
transsexualism are influenced by wider cultural and academic aspects of embodiment and 
bodily aesthetics and it is to these aspects this research now turns. 
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Chapter II: Theorising Trans Embodiment and Bodily Aesthetics 
 
Introduction  
This chapter starts with an exploration of radical feminism’s understanding of 
dichotomously-situated “good” and “bad” (trans)women’s bodies. I start here because 
radical feminism was an academic field that responded negatively to transgender practices 
of embodiment. This strand of feminism, and their dominant position in second wave 
feminism, has considerably influenced how transsexual bodies are viewed. Much of this 
literature has been hostile towards transpeople (Jeffreys, 2005; Raymond, 1980). However, 
it was arguably the response by trans academics towards radical feminist hostility, which 
was the catalyst for the emergent field of transgender studies in the academe. In this chapter 
I consider how radical feminist perspectives fall too simplistically into moralising views of 
transgendering. Dichotomies run through this chapter, which, whilst extending our 
understanding of the bodily aesthetics of transsexuals, in various ways seem to repeatedly 
come down on an either/or or both/neither position (Roen, 2001) of “good” and “bad” 
intentions toward the representations of trans bodies. 
 
So, I look at the Cartesian split between body and mind, and utilise Elizabeth Grosz’s 
(1994) interpretation, which, she suggests, often assumes that there are two distinct, 
mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive substances, mind and body, each of which 
inhabits its own self-contained sphere. She also points out that this duality favours the mind 
as the superior partner that dominates the body. In relation to transsexualism, this 
interpretation would firmly, but paradoxically, emphasise the transsexual mind as 
outweighing the “unruly” body through the “wrong body” trope. Here I develop a critique 
of the perspective that suggests the mind as being more important than the body and 
suggest that bodily aesthetics are intrinsic to transsexuals’ embodiment.  In the next two 
sections I consider trans body projects as a form of body management as well as the 
feminist responses to cosmetic surgery, because such theorisations reinforces the 
dichotomy of “good” and “bad” practices, and thus restricts our understanding of diverse 
practices in the trans community. Whilst this literature has the potential for answering 
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questions about embodiment and bodily aesthetics, I question recent work on transsexual 
bodies because it generalises, rather than particularises, what it means to be transsexually 
embodied. However, “body projects” do allow us to consider agency as an aspect of 
transgendering. To consider agency in all its complexity, McNay’s assertion will be 
applied, by understanding: 
 
on the one hand, for the process of normalisation to be efficacious, it is assumed 
that individuals are not free to choose to accept whatever normative images are 
presented to them. However, on the other hand, the idea of resistance implies they 
are able to stand outside these same norms in order to reject them. This, however, 
undercuts the argument about the efficacity of norms resulting in an aporetic 
understanding where they are both insidiously inculcated and freely adopted. The 
complex dynamics of psychic investment are simplified by being reduced to the 
dichotomy of rejecting or mirroring prevailing social norms (McNay, 2000: 120-
121). 
 
As I will explore, this opens up new ways of exploring the trans body as a potentiality. 
Next I consider the “passing” and “non-passing” body, which develops the ideas that we 
are a body and have a body that is judged in social interactions. This leads on to the final 
two sections, where I consider phenomenological insights of embodiment and body 
image(s) in transgender studies, where, in varying degrees, identity formation involves both 
a negotiation with social and symbolic norms and agentic aspirations for (sex) change. I 
also draw on the phenomenological concept of “intentionality,” where subjects illustrate 
productive ways of challenging dichotomous theorising about trans bodily aesthetics and 
embodied practices and, in so doing, highlight the diverse phenomenology of trans subjects. 
 
Radical feminism and trans embodiment 
In the 1960s, the development of a second wave feminist political agenda shaped the 
context in which women were encouraged, through conscious-raising activities and self-
help groups, to reclaim their bodies: 
 
Learning to accept and love our bodies and ourselves is an important and difficult 
ongoing struggle. But to change the societal values underlying body image, we 
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need to do more than love ourselves. We need to focus our attention on the forces 
that drive wedges between us as women: racism, sexism, ableism, ageism, and our 
national obsession with size and shape. To truly create change, to create a world in 
which all women can make choices about our appearances for ourselves and not 
others, we must incorporate all women into the heart of how we see ourselves 
(Boston Women's Health Book Collective, 1975: 37 emphasis added). 
 
Focussing on the multidimensional facets of patriarchy that defined and organised the lives 
of women (Raymond, 1980), feminists started illustrating the ways in which social systems 
placed unequal values on male and female bodies. Extending this work, more elaborate 
theorising took place, which opened up our knowledge of the female body in relation to the 
different socialisation of men and women (Oakley, 1972), women’s bodies and medical 
services, especially with regard to reproduction (Martin, 2002 [1991]), and the 
commodification of the female body, through research on prostitution and pornography 
(Singer, 1989). Intrinsic to this work was the re-evaluating of the (natural) (white) female 
body and highlighting the experiences (white) women faced in a sexist society, both of 
which were seen to be rooted in heteronormativity. 
 
Radical feminists have argued that transsexuals and their aesthetic surgery choices 
denigrate women through their performance of normative femininity, which is endorsed by 
the heteronormative hegemony. In these writings, transsexuals are often viewed as 
demonstrating fetishistic idolising of patriarchal ideals of femininity or masculinity, which 
is accomplished through body modification. Much critical work on the Gender Identity 
Clinics (Billings & Urban, 1996; Hausman, 1995), which carry out SRS and aesthetic 
surgery, suggests that these institutions form part of a monolithic system that (re)produces 
stereotypical men and women by mutilating healthy bodies. As recently as 2005, Sheila 
Jeffreys (2005) makes the claim in her book Beauty and Misogyny, that transvestites and 
transsexuals are dupes of western cultural principles of femininity (and masculinity), 
referring to them as “male-to-constructed-females.” Some radical feminists (Jeffreys, 2005; 
Raymond, 1980) also claim that gender identity clinics aid patriarchy by changing those 
“men” who do not attain “true” masculinity – through the oedipal drama – into women 
(Millot, 1990). Doctors stand accused of conspiring with transwomen to prop up patriarchy, 
by surgically and hormonally transforming them into “pseudo-women” (Jeffreys, 2005), 
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who may therefore duplicitously infiltrate womyns’ (especially radical lesbian feminist) 
spaces by “pretending” to be lesbian women and thus subverting feminism (Daly, 1978). 
By utilising a simplistic notion of social constructionist critique, Jeffreys positions 
transpeople as holding essentialist understandings of masculinity and femininity that help 
secure male supremacy and female subordination. 
 
In addition to these debates, some polemical works regard GID and transsexualism as 
pathological, whilst others tend to trivialise sex change surgery as only an aesthetic make-
over, (based on a masochistically perverse sexuality) (Jeffreys, 2005). In the imaginings of 
some commentators, SRS may suggest the amputation and mutilation of an otherwise 
healthy body, rather than its “enhancement” perceived by transsexuals themselves. 
 
Jeffreys (2005) ardently questions the biological basis of (trans) gender and positions 
transgender practices of femininity as being about sexuality rather than bodily aesthetics 
and gender identity. However, her argument is contradictory, stating on one hand that the 
doctors who “treat” transgender people are adding to the social stratification of males and 
females by relying on hierarchal, socially constructed ideas about masculinity and 
femininity. Whilst, on the other, they use medical research to posit that transpeople are 
delusional and want to become “constructed-women” and dominated as (pseudo) women 
(2005). Jeffreys’ reading of transwomen seems to be very close to a patriarchal medical 
conception of “sexual pathology. Jeffreys’ illustration of transwomen is of a group of 
people who all “fetishise” having sex as women or who are sexually aroused by the 
thought, or image, of themselves as women. This “pathology” is known as autogynephilia 
in sexological texts (Bailey, 2003; Blanchard, 1991; Lawrence, 2004). Feminists, who 
come from this perspective, then, retain the medical discourses of pathologisation, but 
reject surgery as a satisfactory remedy. They also accept the aesthetic judgement of one set 
of doctors, who claim the ability to assign sex, based on the visual bodily markers present 
at birth, but dismiss another set, whose aesthetic judgements diagnose transsexualism and 
transgenderism. Furthermore, such debates are based on scant empirical evidence. 
 
The accusation of “deception,” borne out by the use of body modification by transsexuals, 
is the fundamental idea, which runs through radical feminist criticisms about transsexuality. 
Through an unwitting essentialism, Mary Daly (1978) suggests that transpeople deceptively 
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violate bodily boundaries of men and women, which allows them to infiltrate spaces not 
created for them. Raymond (1980: 125) argues: “the transsexually constructed lesbian-
feminist may have renounced femininity, but not masculinity and masculinist behaviour 
(despite deceptive appearance)”, in order to insert themselves into positions of importance 
within the feminist movement. 
 
Shepherdson (1994) evokes Catherine Millot’s (1990) feminist psychoanalytic treatise on 
transsexuality, Horsexe, to “reveal” that doctors are unethical when they ignore the 
difference between transsexuals’ demands for surgery and their “true” desire, which is, to 
deconstruct the “real,” this being the symbolic meaning of “original” (natural) bodily 
materiality (Shepherdson, 1994). Millot (1990) suggests that transsexuals have an 
“impossible” psychic ideal – to change the body, but not the mind – which denies the 
symbolic meanings of oedipalised bodily materiality (Shepherdson, 1994). Transsexuals’ 
deception here is couched specifically in what the transsexuals’ demands evade. The reason 
doctors acquiesce to transsexuals’ demands for body modification according to Millot is to 
bolster the doctor’s own “phantasy” of scientific omnipotence (Millot, 1990) and to aid and 
abet, a false fantasy that positions transpeople “outsidesex.” In (Lacanian) feminist 
psychoanalytical accounts, then, it is only the analyst who fully understands the “true” 
meanings of the cultural and linguistic aspects of bodily aesthetics, and both the doctor and 
transsexual patient are duped by their own pathologies. 
 
The radical feminist objection to “misguided” and “deluded” (trans)women, who are 
encouraged by the medical establishment to undergo cosmetic surgery, is a polemical attack 
on (trans)women, which (at the level of “women”) renders the radical feminist perspective 
paradoxical. As Sandra Bartky (1988: 78) suggests: 
 
to have a body felt to be “feminine” – a body socially constructed through the 
appropriate practices – is in most cases crucial to a woman’s sense of herself as 
female and […] as an existing individual […] The radical feminist critique of 
femininity, then, may pose a threat not only to a woman’s sense of her own 
identity and desirability but to the very structure of her social universe. 
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The self-confirming logic of radical feminist writing on transsexual bodies is based on 
moralising dichotomies that foreclose who, and how, (trans)women should be i.e. “good 
(real) women”/“bad (trans)women”; “natural women”/“constructed (trans)women,”; having 
“authentic agency” (women who exercise the same choices as radical feminists)/being 
“dupes” ((trans)women who make (pseudo) choices directed by patriarchal forces) (Felski, 
2006 my insertions in parenthesis). These dichotomies simplify what we (could) know 
about trans bodily aesthetics. Furthermore, as Rita Felski warns us: 
 
[t]here is something troubling, both ethically and politically, about a view that 
would deny any genuine insight or agency to those with whom one disagrees 
(Felski, 2006: 274 emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, as Colebrook points out: 
 
[t]he question for feminist politics then is not so much moral – is beauty 
[aesthetics] good or bad for [trans]women [and transmen] – but pragmatic: how is 
beauty [bodily aesthetics] defined, deployed, defended, subordinated, marketed or 
manipulated and how do these tactics intersect with [trans]gender and value? 
(Colebrook, 2006: 132 my insertions in parenthesis). 
 
Transgender talking back 
The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto (Stone, 1991) directly takes radical 
feminist writings about transsexuality to task. Not only did transwoman Sandy Stone 
counter Janice Raymond’s personal attack on her, which had claimed that Stone had 
duplicitously presented herself as a woman in a women-only feminist recording collective, 
but she also developed a poststructuralist critique of transsexual identity. Stone’s (1991) 
article addressed representations in (auto)biographical accounts of transsexualism and 
suggested that these had been coerced by powerful medical discourses. Her goal was to 
encourage new forms of trans self-expression, which highlighted the multifaceted aspects 
of transpeoples lives. Stryker and Whittle (2006: 221) suggest that Stone’s “Manifesto” was 
the “protean text from which contemporary transgender studies emerged.” Over the last few 
decades a significant number of transsexual and transgender writers have employed 
poststructuralist, postmodern, and queer gender theory to highlight the multifaceted aspects 
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of living non-normatively gendered lives. The methodologies employed in these 
transgender studies texts (see Stryker & Whittle, 2006) are also diverse, from 
(auto)biography aligned with political activism and commentary, qualitative empiricism, to 
the theoretical and the subjective (S. Hines, 2007). 
 
There are noticeably distinct political positions between transsexual and transgender 
theorising about bodily aesthetics, or rather, theorising is mostly about distinctive aspects. 
Roen (2001) calls this the either/or (transsexual) position and the both/neither (transgender) 
position. Transgender and transsexual theorists are far from analogous in their personal and 
political deployment of gender theory, which highlights the instability and “inhabitability” 
of simplistic binary gender models.   
 
Transgender theorising has since the 1990s been more concerned with critiquing the 
meanings surrounding masculinity and femininity (Bornstein, 1994; Butler, 1990). 
Transgender theorising and politics are informed by postmodern subjectivities, queer 
understandings of sexuality and gender, radical politics of transgression, and the 
deconstruction of binaries, such as nature/nurture, man/woman, and mind/body (Stryker, 
2006). From a transgender perspective bodily aesthetics are utilised to mix and match 
gendered signifiers in order to deconstruct and disrupt binary orders of gender. There are 
sometimes cross-overs within these positions. Kate Bornstein, for example who at one time 
saw herself as transsexual but who now identifies as an “out” “Transgender Warrior,” 
suggests that she has been looking for a definition of woman, and a sense of what a man is, 
but concludes that she has found neither, and has instead only seen “fickle definitions of 
gender [that are] held-up by groups and individuals for their own [political] purposes” 
(Bornstein, 1994: 57). The temporal aspects of embodied experience, illustrated by 
Bornstein, show how meanings surrounding her own bodily aesthetic are not only 
intentional but are politically flexible too.  
 
Stone (1991) observes that a liberal transsexual politics may direct its energies towards the 
human rights of transsexuals rather than, for example, at psychomedical constructions of 
transsexuality, for strategic reasons. Because of the psychomedicalisation of transsexuality 
and the need to engage with the medical system in order to secure body modification, these 
practices are often viewed as citizen rights in this literature. Transsexual writer Claudine 
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Griggs suggests in S/He: Changing Sex and Changing Clothes (1998), that she produced 
her “core gender” – a medical term – by appropriating body modification technologies, 
gendered clothing and feminine style. However, Griggs also tells a story of meeting a man 
in a bar who thought (at first) that she was a man, he said: 
 
Gee, I’m sorry […] I feel terrible. […] Now that I see you, I don’t know how I 
could have possibly thought [that…] But maybe you shouldn’t sit so rough, […] 
Like you have a beautiful figure […] a little makeup would soften you up […] you 
could fix your hair (Griggs, 1998: 221-22). 
 
Griggs’ gender is premised upon her performance of femininity, which is subsequently 
judged. For Bornstein (1994) the imperative to pass as a woman for Griggs, and those she 
interacts with, would not be based on what Griggs presumes is her “core gender,” but 
judged instead on her bodily aesthetic, which has no intrinsic meaning, only personal and 
social meanings. Furthermore, to have a “core gender” suggests that it is something natural, 
which is yearning for representation through body modification and sartorial practices, 
rather than a socially constructed aesthetic. Twenty years ago, in, In Search of Eve, Anne 
Bolin (1988) observed that transsexuals have individualised clothing and bodily styles, 
which were dependent on their intentionality toward the world as well as their social 
context. For example, Bolin (1988) suggested that “Rosemary,” who was an ardent 
feminist, would wear clothing such as jeans and tee-shirts, whereas “Tanya” was ultra-
feminine. Butler (1990) suggests that diverse performances of femininity (and masculinity) 
can masquerade as essences, but that it is in fact the “mask” of masculinity and femininity 
that constitutes gender and sex, from which men and women are then judged and valued. 
Butler developed the concept of performativity to show that “there is no gender behind the 
expression of gender” (1990: 25) and that it is the repetitive and compulsive embodied 
actions and adornments that produce the impression of a naturalised gender. Using the 
practices of Drag, Butler (1990) highlights how the naturalisation of gender may be 
challenged. However, in Butler’s work, and in other queer perspectives (Bornstein, 1994), 
there is a lack of consideration for the subjective experiences of having, and being, an 
aestheticised body. Butler (1990, 1993) only considers gender markers, such as clothing, 
make-up and styles of behaviour. Whilst these aspects are important in revealing some of 
the contingencies of aesthetic bodies and gender identity formation, it misses out on how 
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such bodily aesthetics are lived, felt, and understood. 
 
Griggs would certainly disagree with gender being a masquerade, as she rebuffs the 
“postmodern” and Butler’s performative theory of gender (Griggs, 1998). However, Griggs 
relies on unsubstantiated polemics that seem to come straight from sexologist John 
Money’s book, Gendermaps (1995) and a single trans-medical “brain size” study (Zhou et 
al., 1995). Furthermore, it seems that Griggs is saying: I know this is the way it is, because 
I am transsexual. This does little by way of convincing anyone. Whilst it is unethical for me 
to deny Griggs’ personal story, she does not account for many of the diverse practices in 
the trans community. I do suggest, though, that for both the transsexual and transgender 
positions the judgement of bodily aesthetics is intrinsic to people’s perception of their 
gender and intrinsic to their presentation of gender at a phenomenological, sexual and 
social level, which Griggs aptly highlighted in her anecdote. 
 
The breaking down, or propping up, of binary gender cannot account for the intentionality 
behind transgender practices, either, when wanting a gendered “home” (Prosser, 1998), or 
when not wanting one (Bornstein, 1994). This dichotomy is based on bodily aesthetics 
having either essential meanings or arbitrary ones. Nikki Sullivan (2006) calls for an ethics 
of “transmogrification” as a way of engendering a non-judgemental attitude to body 
modification practices. Furthermore, Leslie Feinberg (1998: 1) wishes for a more inclusive 
body politic, which celebrates bodily differences and suggests that “we are all works in 
progress.” Setting up dichotomised ways of looking at transsexual body modification and 
transgender modification as “good” and “bad” practices, based on conformity and non-
conformity, Sullivan suggests, sets up a false opposition between the “normal” and the 
“strange.” She understands all bodies as intertwined, or chiasmatic, where the boundaries of 
the body are neither “normal” nor “strange,” but are all different, unstable, and have many 
meanings. This position is significant for my research, which explores the situated aspects 
of trans body modification and the judgements that follow from them. 
 
Cartesian thinking and the “wrong body” trope 
The power of mind over matter (commonly known as Cartesian dualism), is an influential 
aspect of Western thought (Burkitt, 1999), which involves a splitting of two distinct 
“substance,” mind/self and matter/body. “Wrong body” rhetoric follows the Cartesian 
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juxtaposition of an outer body with an inner self, as well as a hierarchy in which the body 
follows the mind’s will. In relation to transsexuality, the goal for those seeking surgery is 
not to find a way to accept their bodies, but to make their bodies more acceptable. Many 
transsexuals argue that although they are comfortable with their inner self and feel 
psychologically stable, their outer body gives a false and harmful impression to others and 
threatens their emotional health. The matter of the body is relegated to a problematic aspect 
of lived relations, whilst the mind is elevated to the level of the “soul,” which continues to 
think, reflect, and be. Transsexuality has been theorised as “the mind trapped in the wrong 
body” (Prosser, 1998), which is an inverted manifestation of Cartesian dualism. In early 
sexological writing, the invert’s mental disposition was said to be on a continuum of 
psychical inversion (H. Ellis, 1942 [1905]), which could be read as the precursor of modern 
(medicalised) transsexuality. The mind is of one sex whilst the body is of an other 
(irrelevant) one. Through the power of Enlightenment medicine the invert was 
pathologised. The mind, in much sexological writing, is only considered rational if 
“inversion” does not take place. Medical experts were (and, to some extent, still are) at 
liberty to “purge” what was perceived as irrationality from the invert’s mind through 
reparative practices (Zucker & Bradley, 1995). In Cartesian inflected thinking, then, 
paradoxically, it is the invert’s body that is the site of truth and importance, rather than the 
“diseased” mind. The medicalisation of “inverts” meant that only certain 
heterosexual/gender normative subjects had rational minds and orderly bodies. 
Nonetheless, the common sense appeal of Cartesian dualism (Gatens, 1995) for 
transsexuals, it is claimed, allows for a distancing from the body’s materiality while 
retaining a focus on the mind. Within some “subaltern” transgender literature, concerned 
with the “disembodied” psyche of the transsexual (Prosser, 1998), the mind is considered 
separate from the body and as such, compliments theories of transsexual Cartesian 
(dis)embodiment insofar as the mind as “master” outweighs in importance the abject 
“wrong body.” Wilton notes that: 
 
It is whatever inhabits the transsexual body that matters […] The surgeons act on 
the body to ease the pain of the dys/embodied self ‘inside’. Cartesian dualism 
haunts every turn of phrase here (Wilton, 2000: 240). 
 
Cartesian theorising of transsexualism, however, cannot maintain any coherence when the 
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theory of the diseased mind and (wrong) body is utilised, because, firstly, Descartes thought 
that the body was distinct from the mind and renders the body invisible (M. Finn & Dell, 
1999). Secondly, the “wrong body” of transsexualism is a precondition for thinking about 
transitioning from one sex/gender to another even if no surgeries are undertaken. Therefore, 
it is the mind that “follows” the body and not the other way round. As Didier Anzieu states: 
“the skin is so fundamental, its functioning is taken so much for granted that no one notices 
its existence until the moment it fails” (Anzieu, 1990: 63-64). Thus, the body is at the very 
basis of transsexualism, as we can see writ large within the trope of the “wrong body.” It is 
present in that the very subject matter of transsexualism is embodied and shaped by the 
constraints that follow from having, and being, a (wrong) body. Cartesian dualism refuses 
to focus explicitly on the body, which cannot therefore tell us much about the aesthetic 
body, except, perhaps, that it is viewed as superficial or abject and is deemed too unruly for 
research. 
 
The “wrong body” trope is a well recognised transsexual narrative and tends to position the 
transperson as a victim of a cruel and aberrant nature. According to Prosser (1998), the 
“wrong body” signifies exactly what the transsexual feels about his, or her, body. This 
perspective, in general, lacks the ability to shed any light on the “right body” and how these 
“right bodies” are phenomenologically and somatically understood and experienced. In her 
critique of the “wrong body” trope, Halberstam asks: “who, we might ask, can afford to 
dream of a right body? Who believes that such a body exists?” (Halberstam cited in S. 
Hines, 2007: 65). These rhetorical questions are utilised by Halberstam to critique Prosser’s 
(1998) metaphor of “migrating” to a new body, which is constructed as the “new home” for 
transitioned transsexuals, suggesting that these “new bodies” are unproblematically 
actualised. This metaphor is also critiqued by Sally Hines (2007) in relation to accounting 
for transgender embodiment constructed at the “borderlands of gender.” At what point does 
the body feel right? Does it ever feel right? It is these questions, in addition to 
Halberstam’s, that this research attempts to answer. This is because descriptions and 
theories of “right bodies” have been shied away from in much transgender literature, 
perhaps for fear of accusations of narcissism (Chiland, 2000) and body fascism (Kaveney, 
1999), or mere simulacra (Gilman, 1999). 
 
It is useful, here, to draw on some aspects of Stryker’s critical queer theory ( 2006). For 
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Stryker, there are no right bodies per se, just bodies of difference. While Stryker is 
permitted distance from the restraints of her birth-assigned sex through the technology 
imparted by medical “experts” and legal recognition, her social body is not awarded the 
same human recognition and value as gender normative people. She writes: 
 
Like the monster, I am too often perceived as less than fully human due to the 
means of my embodiment […] my exclusion from human community fuels a deep 
and abiding rage in me that I […] direct against the conditions in which I must 
struggle to exist (Stryker, 2006: 245). 
 
Through her writing Stryker attempts to subvert the standards of the normative body, if 
only momentarily, through her “transgender rage” and her position as an academic. 
However, the social hierarchies through which bodies are judged tasteful and beautiful 
(Bourdieu, 1984) are difficult to challenge. Stryker’s body is invigorated through 
subversive action but continues to be cast by others as monstrous. Nonetheless, Stryker’s 
“monstrous body,” she states, assumes an affinity with Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein’s 
monster (1888), as a participant in doctors’ fantasies about mastering the limits of 
(gendered) life. Both the Shelleyian monster and Stryker’s monstrously queer body stand in 
resistance to the “stylised” transsexual body and the gendered heterosexual order that 
doctors aspire to. Stryker argues: 
 
As we rise up from the operating tables of our rebirth, we transsexuals are 
something more […] than the creatures our makers intended us to be. Though 
medical techniques for sex reassignment are capable of crafting bodies that satisfy 
the visual and morphological criteria that generate naturalness as their effect […] 
Transsexual embodiment, like the embodiment of the monster, places its subject in 
an unassimilable, antagonistic, queer relationship to a Nature in which it must 
necessarily exist (Stryker, 2006: 248). 
 
Stryker (2006) attempts a resurrection and revaluation of the “monstrous body” that, she 
hopes, will become a politically lucrative way of disrupting the “naturalised” “order of 
things” (Foucault, 1996). She wishes, further, to open up the possibilities surrounding 
gender, sexualities and styles, following Sandy Stone’s (1991) groundbreaking “call to 
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arms,” which summoned multifaceted (auto)biographical accounts of transsexualism to be 
articulated. Stryker also desires the truthful specificity of transsexual embodiment and 
intentionality in relation to novel modes of self-expression through bodies of difference 
(Spade, 2006; Stryker & Whittle, 2006). She does not, however, make bodies of difference 
“appear” in her own work and leaves them as literary metaphors. Nonetheless, I agree with 
Stryker, when she suggests, by making the bodies of difference appear and by making them 
a focus of research and discourse it will highlight the pervasive but unpredictability of 
bodily aesthetic orders within society.  
 
Post-feminism, reflexive agency and financial considerations 
One of the most developed ways to situate the issue of agency and structural forces in 
relation to (trans) bodily aesthetics has been within Michel Foucault’s ideas concerning 
embodiment, that is, the material aspects of the body that are continuously processed 
through a “microphysics of power, bio-power or as the technology of the self” (Braidotti, 
1994a: 17; Butler, 2004; Foucault, 1995, 1996; Morgan, 1991; Negrin, 2002; Spade, 2006). 
Foucault’s (1991) concepts of “bio-power” – the “machinery of power,” which manipulates 
bodies through disciplinary regimes, such as medicine and law, to produce “docile bodies” 
– and “reverse discourse” – the possibility of political agency through the manipulation of 
the very discourse that constitutes the (deviant) subject – have been employed often by 
many scholars, especially feminists, to theorise gender and the surgical body and the power 
relations that constitute an aestheticised body (Bartky, 1990; Bordo, 1993; Negrin, 2002). 
Aesthetic (cosmetic) surgery in relation to women (and, to a lesser extent, men) and 
transpeople has been a much contested ground in academia. 
 
The cosmetic surgery debate that has taken place between feminists has been, on the one 
hand, concerned with women as “docile” and being duped by patriarchal beauty and 
cosmetic surgery/medical industries (Morgan, 1991), and, on the other hand, focuses on 
calling for these surgical technologies to be used as a site of resistance to normative 
femininity and masculinity and to destabilise “beauty” ideals of white, Western culture(s) 
(Balsamo, 1996; Morgan, 1991). For instance, Morgan (1991) and Balsamo (1996) suggest 
that cosmetic procedures may be used to destabilise current hierarchies of femininity and 
masculinity and their prominent positions within patriarchal structures. Both advocate using 
surgery as a critical feminist tool, on the one hand, to create “ugliness” as a benchmark of 
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value and, on the other, to show the cultural construction of the body in general and, 
beauty, in particular. This, they propose, will show them as patriarchal laws rather than 
being determined by universal laws of nature. We can see similarities here with Stryker’s 
(2006) position, discussed above, in calling forth monstrous bodies. Balsamo and Morgan’s 
position contends that: 
 
the ‘natural body has been dramatically re-fashioned through the application of 
new technologies of corporeality […] the merger of the biological with the 
technological has infiltrated the imagination of Western culture where the 
‘technological human’ has become a familiar figuration of the subject of 
postmodernity….This merger relies on a re-conceptualisation of the human body 
as a ‘techno-body’, a boundary figure belonging simultaneously to at least two 
previously incompatible systems of meaning – the organic/natural’ and the 
‘technological/cultural’. (Balsamo cited in Negrin, 2002:30). 
 
Alternatively, Kathy Davis suggests that when women consider having cosmetic surgery 
they do so with reflexive agency. Davis observed women who recognise cosmetic surgery 
as their “best option” under the circumstances (Davis, 1997), and she sees it as a more 
complex dilemma than feminists have usually granted it (Davis, 1994). Cosmetic surgery is 
seen as a problem and a solution, a symptom of oppression and an act of empowerment 
(Davis, 1997). In Davis’ (1994) study, she claimed that her participants were not having 
surgical procedures because of their male partners, but to feel at home in their bodies. 
There is an uncanny resemblance to transsexual stories of the “wrong body” in the 
narratives of Davis’ participants, where the surgical procedures are set up to dispel the 
notion of a sick body. The participants had cosmetic surgery because their bodies did not fit 
their sense of who they were (Davis, 1997). Davis claims that some feminist objections to 
cosmetic surgery are premised on the understanding that women are misguided and 
deluded, encouraged by the medical establishment to conform to the ideals of the beauty 
system. Whereas the women she interviewed maintained their own personal agency and 
suggested that they were well aware of their choices, which were undertaken with 
knowledge of both the drawbacks and the benefits of surgery (1997). Nonetheless, Negrin 
(2002) critiques Davis’ analysis because there is no deep consideration of why these 
women felt unhappy with their bodies in the first place. Other scholars highlight that the 
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women’s ability to act as fully active “consumer-citizens” is negated because they 
surrendered their stable subjectivity to the “pathologising” medical discourse of 
“psychological distress” in order to attain their ideal body (Holliday & Sanchez Taylor, 
2006). 
 
The relatively recent development of women as consumers of aesthetic surgery, and the 
correlative liberal feminist and post-feminist discourses, which examine neo-liberal 
subjectivities in relation to constant self-improvement, do, however, problematise the 
purely “docile body” and “women as victims” position. Instead, the emphasis in post-
feminist discourse is on women’s agency, whilst still not forgetting that relations between 
people are anything but equal (Holliday & Sanchez Taylor, 2006). Similarly, in transgender 
studies literature, Califia (1997: 224) positions transsexuals as informed consumers of 
healthcare and surgery by stating: 
 
Transsexuals are becoming informed consumers of medical services; they want 
more control over what they receive from their healthcare providers, and more 
accountability. 
 
Rather than understanding transsexuals as the docile recipients of surgery, uncritically 
consuming these services, it may be better to recognise that the agency integral to 
consumption also acts as an indicator that the person can do as s/he pleases with her/his 
body. That is, of course, dependent on technological limitations and those of economic 
capital too. The aspect of finance has been one of the main critiques of liberal theorising of 
body modification, where the economic possibilities are anything but equal (see Feinberg, 
1998; Halberstam, 1998a). Positioned between those transpeople who can financially attain 
body modification and those who cannot, there appears an obvious insight into structural 
inequalities based on class, race, age, and (dis)ability, which may affect bodily aesthetics. 
Whilst the lack of economic capital limits the scope of action it does not necessarily 
foreclose agency. Most of this literature is from the US, where it is much more difficult to 
access body modification due to the restrictions placed on health insurance payments in 
relation to (elective) (sex change) surgery. In the UK, although the system is not perfect 
and the waiting lists for sex reassignment surgeries, mastectomies, and so on have been 
critiqued as unethical (West, 2004), there is a system that provides free surgery to those 
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who can satisfy the NHS Gender Identity Clinics’ modus operandi of Gender Dysphoria. 
As I will illustrate in Chapter VII, due to these restrictions, many transpeople seek their 
gender reassignment and aesthetic surgeries from the private health sector and through 
medical tourism. I propose that to research trans bodily aesthetics within these contexts 
(alongside legal and personal ones) contributes to a richer understanding of the experiences 
of transpeople in the UK. 
 
Transgender body projects from inside out and outside out 
Body maintenance, with an emphasis on the connection between the internal and external 
body, is not a new phenomenon (Featherstone, 1982). If we are to believe Freud, we need 
to remember that in his understanding the: 
  
ego is split between two extremes: a psychical interior, which requires continual 
stabilization, and a corporeal exterior, which remains labile [and] open to many 
meanings (Grosz, 1994: 43). 
 
As Jay Prosser (1998: 82) observes in relation to transsexual bodies: 
 
the realization of identity hoped for and/or brought about as a result of the 
manipulation of the material surface of the body can be substantial; skin is 
anything but skin deep. 
 
The emphasis on this connection between the “outer” and “inner” in sociological and 
philosophical theories of the body has added another dimension to the way we understand 
bodily aesthetics. The legacy of Nietzsche’s insight of the body as incomplete and in need 
of adaptation in line with our sense of a (desired) self has fuelled a comprehension of the 
body as a “potentionality” (Turner, 1992), which can be elaborated on, manipulated, 
adorned, fed, loved, and desired and consequently given value (or not), by ourselves, 
others, and (sub)cultures. What “potentiality” also establishes is that agency is possible 
within both micro and macro social relations. The bodily aesthetic in this formulation 
continues to be a basic feature of social taste and distinction, of which, the organisation of 
bodily aesthetics becomes part of important qualities of cultural, physical and gender 
capital (Bourdieu, 1984). The functioning of cultural, physical, and gender capital takes 
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place within the subject’s habitus according to Bourdieu (1992), which: 
 
locates agency in the context of material and social forces but, in so far as it 
expresses a principle of differentiation, it replaces a uni-directional determinism 
with a generative and refractory logic (McNay, 2000: 162). 
 
The “generative and refractory logic” that functions in the habitus emerges temporally 
within the “field” (sub cultures, social arenas, sexual spaces, and so on), where the 
individual tries to maximise their social worth, which can help explain the emergence of 
trans agency within gender orders (McNay, 2000). Moreover, because these qualities may 
become generative they may transform social relations. It is my contention, then, that it 
would be more helpful to think about the aesthetics of gender – femininities and 
masculinities – as central to transpeople’s “habitus” and “fields” and as a form of 
generative cultural capital.  
 
In Finn and Dell’s (1999) social psychological study of transgender body management, 
“(re)embodiment” is shown to be positively experienced by transpeople. In this study, 
pleasurable, and potentially positive, mental health outcomes, derived from body 
management practices, are interpreted as symptomatic of choice. However, Finn and Dell 
(1999) divide “transgender” and “transsexual” as sites of “production” and “consumption” 
respectively. Transgender “production,” on one hand, is viewed as a positive “non-
distressed” self-production in which prescribed meanings of gender attributes are creatively 
contested and produced by the body without constraining choice. Transsexual 
“consumption,” on the other hand, is taken as a negative aspect of transgendering, because 
transsexuals apparently consume their body parts based on gender norms, which are 
constructed through medical discourses of “distress.” Here the transsexual is a 
“(consumptive) pathological individual” (1999: 466), whose  
 
gender role comfort[s] are portrayed as commodities, available through 
medicine…[pushing] patients towards an alluring world of artificial vaginas and 
penises rather than towards self-understanding (Billing and Urban cited in M. Finn 
& Dell, 1999: 465). 
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Finn and Dell’s materialist analysis is founded on an arbitrary separation of transgender 
“production” from transsexual “consumption,” which is problematic because it forecloses 
intentionality and agency on the part of the transsexual. Finn and Dell concede that the 
“distinction between transgenderism and transsexualism is not an easy one to make” (M. 
Finn & Dell, 1999: 465), thus undermining their conceptualisation of “production” and 
“consumption.” Moreover, because they do not develop diverse “categories” of trans 
subjects and contexts, they weaken their analysis by not acknowledging those transpeople 
who do “produce” their bodily aesthetic in many ways.  As is illustrated by those 
transsexuals who refuse or aspire to normative bodies, and those who reject surgery, or by 
people who do not have access to the body modification technology they desire for health, 
or financial reasons, but continue to produce their gender presentations in creative ways 
(See Chapter IV and Chapter V). Moreover, what the notion of the habitus teaches us is that 
all consumption can be seen as a primary context of self-production, even though choices 
may be circumscribed by the limitations of technology (Smith Maguire & Stanway, 2008), 
by the lack of economic capital, or due to social relations. Transgender subjects are not 
situated outside their habitus anymore than transsexuals are, and both are analogously 
situated as social beings with the potential for circumvented agency. Finn and Dell’s (1999) 
dichotomy cannot account for the diversity of trans subjectivity, and body modification, 
choices. Nonetheless, their ideas concerning agentic self-production and socially 
constructed bodies, in theory, allow subjects to reconfigure values. These insights are 
relevant for my research, which explores the transsexual diversity when accessing or 
rejecting body modification practices and personal and public understandings concerning 
the value placed on passing and non-passing trans bodies. 
 
Symbolic interactions: passing and non-passing bodies 
Much early transgender literature was concerned with the notions of “passing” and “non-
passing” bodies in the clinical setting (Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 1978), as a 
“rite of passage” into femaleness (Bolin, 1988), in relation to how transsexuals manage to 
minimise stigma through their gender presentation in social and familial settings (Garfinkel, 
1967; Kando, 1972). Other work is concerned with the divisions between some transpeople, 
who find it easier to pass in their acquired gender, and some who do not (Whittle, 2001). In 
some transgender literature, “passing” refers to the process of fitting in as “unremarkable” 
men and women (Cromwell, 1999). Sociologists, more generally, have treated passing as a 
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singular “movement” from one identity to another (Kando, 1972), which relies on symbolic 
verbal and non-verbal cues of bodily aesthetics. Some have suggested that these symbolic 
cues are accompanied by “biographical editing” in an attempt to hide any signs of male or 
female history (Bolin, 1988).  
 
One important insight from Kando (1972) is that passing for transsexuals is an ongoing 
process. However, Kando argues that passing is premised on different groups of people 
knowing about the transsexual’s history. According to Kando (1972), some transpeople will 
be able to pass in their acquired gender with new friends and colleagues after transition and 
body modification. Problematically, however, he also suggests that passing is impossible 
with older friends and family members, because they tend to “read” the transsexual in 
relation to their “original” gender, or as transsexual. According to Bolin, there is a price to 
pay by transsexuals if they interact “with a knowing or sensitized audience […,] a knowing 
audience has the ability to imprison them in the category transsexual” (Bolin, 1988: 136) 
and therefore discredit their identities as women (or men). I suggest that this is dependent 
upon the bodily aesthetic of the transperson and upon who is judging, as to whether 
transpeople are recognised as men or women or transsexual. It is generally thought that 
passing is easier for transmen than transwomen, because of the aesthetic outcomes of 
hormone therapy (Whittle, 2001). Transmen, who take testosterone, can grow a beard, have 
their voices break and pass “anywhere, anytime, with great success” (2001: 158). However, 
relatively few transmen have phalloplasty, yet they are still considered men by their 
partners, friends, and family. For transwomen, again, I argue that it depends on the judge. 
However, I suggest that these judgements of transwomen are dependent on different bodily 
aesthetics than transmen, such as a lack of a penis. Moreover, in my study non-passing is an 
accepted situation for some transpeople however, “looking good,” as opposed to 
surreptitiously passing, is viewed as more important, as I will explore in Chapter V. 
 
Early theorisations about “passing” in Bolin (1988) and Kando’s (1972) work is a top down 
affair, where social roles are considered dominant enforcers of gender presentation 
conformity. Social roles are predicated upon social modes of control. Whilst there is no 
doubt that there are structural sanctions at work in modern society and that governments 
both past and present take great interest in legislating on, and thus, influencing our 
understanding of gendered, sexual, unruly, pathological, and healthy bodies, (Foucault, 
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1991, 1995, 1998 [1976]) this perspective does not adequately cover a micro analysis of the 
aesthetic body, which may affect the structural parameters of symbolic social control. For 
example, according to Schrock et al (2005), the “retraining,” “redecorating,” and 
consequent change in subjectivity that transsexuals seem to undergo during, and after 
transition, where transformations of their bodily aesthetic shape “role taking” and “practical 
consciousness,” secured a certain amount of “bodily sovereignty.” This draws attention to 
how bodily aesthetics “inhabit” the social world and, simultaneously, how institutionalised 
gendered aesthetics “inhabit” bodies. Thus, cultural artefacts, such as symbols and language 
and relationships with specific bodily aesthetics, are important to consider, as we apply 
various standards of value, (aesthetics/ethics) and potentialities to them, depending on our 
specific perceptions. Perhaps it is the popularity of Lacan’s work (1977) for gender studies 
and in certain feminist readings (Kristeva, 1982; Millot, 1990), that has given credence to 
claims about the submissive subject “trapped beneath the oppressive weight of political and 
social institutions that maintain their force at the level of the psyche” (McNay, 2000: 140) 
and which awards the socio-symbolic aspects of social life such great importance. McNay 
(2000) calls this the “negative paradigm.” The importance awarded to the socio-symbolic 
order, as McNay (2000) identifies, misses out the possibility of agency, where subjects can 
rewrite ideology and change experiences within social fields because of the indeterminacy 
of subjectivity itself. The symbolic “order,” then, may be noticeably diverse for different 
people, because people navigate institutional and cultural symbolic codes on the basis of 
their embodied experience of them. 
 
From the late 1950s through to the 1970s, the sociologist Erving Goffman provided a 
serious look at, what, up until that point, had been regarded as the mundane aspects of the 
everyday social world (Goffman, 1953, 1963, 1967, 1969, 1976). It is important to draw on 
Goffman’s critical symbolic interactionism, because for him, society is contextual and not a 
homogeneous whole, and he suggested that people act differently in different settings. The 
context then to be considered is not “society at large,” but the specific one(s) in which 
people find themselves (Goffman, 1969). Goffman (1969) argues convincingly that people 
rely on a multitude of mechanisms to (re)present themselves in order to, for example, strive 
for honour and reduce stigma in everyday life. He grounded these observations in an 
eclectic mixture of empirical material. “Mechanisms,” for Goffman, were not objective 
“facts,” but rather actions, and the reasons for them that may be interpreted in many 
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different ways. 
 
Goffman’s methods and interpretations paid direct attention to the necessity of presenting 
“correctly” (passing?) in social situations and the consequences that came of these 
successful or failed performances. Along with this, we can see how some bodies may end 
up being viewed as stigmatised, through other’s negative judgements of their bodily 
aesthetics, particularly by those in positions of power. Goffman’s work allows us to analyse 
various social, spatial, temporal, and intercorporeal situations in minute detail. His micro 
analysis details how people use body techniques – a term attributed to Marcel Mauss 
(Crossley, 1995) – to negotiate everyday situations, within which he offers ways for us to 
consider the roles of bodily form, actions, and symbolic codes. Symbolic codes reflect 
types of verbal and non-verbal communication we employ in everyday life. These 
communications use codes, which often reflect and reinforce stereotypes. The codes may 
also act as “shortcuts” that allow the “maker” of the symbolic code to communicate 
background information in the most efficient way. With a few exceptions, such as laughing 
and crying, symbolic codes for Goffman are specific to a (sub)culture. Commenting on 
Goffman’s work, Bourdieu suggests that it grasps “the logic of the work of representation; 
that is to say the whole set of strategies with which social subjects strive to construct their 
identity [and] shape their social image” (Bourdieu, 1983: 113). 
 
“Normal appearances,” read as “passing,” aid the person in attaining social normativity and 
social standing. These symbolic appearances, or what Goffman calls “body glosses” and 
“body techniques,” help make meanings “clearer” to others, assuming that there is a 
consensus on what the symbolic codes mean. For Travers (1991), symbolic codes of 
“normal appearances” neither have intrinsic properties nor are they static. These “normal 
appearances,” then, can act as indicators of social identities, producing bodily techniques 
and body glosses that orient individuals toward an “agreed” cultural and moral order, which 
they both value and duplicate (Crossley, 1995). However, orientation is neither automatic 
nor is it always desired. Whilst this reading is valuable for this study, I think that it does not 
go far enough in relation to explaining what the aesthetic or symbolic means 
phenomenologically. Nor does it show how aesthetic values are considered intercorporeally 
and socially in different spaces and times. This is because “appearances” also have the 
ability to spawn diverse meanings, and potentialities, depending on the situational aspects 
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of the interaction. Travers observes that: 
 
Since they [normal appearances] are animated by selves whose every interactional 
self-definition requires more such definition, normal appearances are constantly 
evolving, and in the evolution of normal appearances the idea of the self also 
evolves (Travers, 1991: 298). 
 
Shilling’s understanding of Goffman, in this respect, is accurate when he states:  
 
the notions of social classifications and shared vocabularies of the body idiom are 
simply too vague and abstract […] we have little idea how they originated and 
how they are sustained or challenged (Shilling, 1993: 88 emphasis added). 
 
Ekins (1997) succeeded in addressing some of these problems in relation to transgender in 
the UK in answering where, when, and how transpeople aesthetically constituted their 
identities through time and space. The concept of “male femaling” emerged from an 
extensive study that took many years to accomplish. Transpeople’s behavioural patterns, in 
Ekins’ study, were regarded as biological males doing “femaling” in “various ways, various 
contexts, at various times, with various stagings and various consequences” (1997: 2), thus 
illustrating the diverse phenomenology of transpeople. The modes of “femaling” that 
“emerged” from the grounded theory methodology were “body femaling”, “erotic 
femaling”, and “gender femaling.” These were looked at through the broader concepts of 
sex, sexuality, and gender. However, he suggested that the few transsexuals who “moved 
from less serious to more serious involvement in femaling” (Ekins, 1996: 47) did so within 
transvestite sub-cultures, where bodily aesthetics were practiced permanently, through 
technology, or intermittently, with clothing. As my research will show, there are 
transsexuals who do have a “transvestite career” path prior to the decision to trans-sex, 
while, there are also many others who do not follow this route, as Ekins permits for in his 
concluding remarks. Also, Ekins’ study did not consider transmen, who are a challenge to 
“normal appearances” due to the difficulties with, and aesthetic outcomes, of surgery. 
Furthermore, in Ekins’ study we get little sense of the participants-lived-world experiences, 
when trans aesthetics are “tested” in non-fetishistic cultures, which will affect their sense of 
social, sexual, and phenomenological aesthetic worth. There is too much emphasis, then, on 
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social symbolic norm-internalisation in this perspective. Whilst understanding “symbolic” 
performances alongside embodiment paves the way for a social analysis of trans bodily 
aesthetics we can still not fully understand the values and potentialities of aesthetic bodies 
through symbolic hierarchies alone. This is because phenomenologically, socially, and 
sexually there are multiple aesthetic hierarchies present in all manner of situations, and 
which are employed by all manner of transpeople. Furthermore, these approaches to 
“passing” can be critiqued for negating the aspects of transsexual lives that may not be 
considered within the restraints of social roles, such as transpeople’s phenomenological and 
sexual bodies and relationships. 
 
In later work, Ekins and King (1999, 2006) develop a narrativised sociological analysis of 
transgendering in the UK. Drawing on Plummer’s (1995) narrative methodology in Telling 
Sexual Stories, they suggest that there are various modes of transgendering, which include 
migrating, oscillating, negating, and transcending stories, and which transpeople utilise to 
build up a picture of their gender identity. This approach is useful insofar as it highlights 
some of the incipient processes that transpeople may practice, encounter, and pursue in 
their transgendering. It also shows how transwomen build a “female world” and female 
identity.  I suggest this is useful for developing an analysis of transpeople in contemporary 
Britain. However, inner conflicts and tensions with regard to the transperson’s embodiment 
and bodily aesthetic might perhaps be better served through a phenomenological study of 
trans embodiments and bodily aesthetics, which incorporates socio-symbolic aspects that 
are meaningful to its participants. 
 
Interacting with Garfinkel 
Whilst it is important to understand the symbolic aspects of bodily aesthetics for the 
transperson - how they are formulated, understood, and how they might challenge 
categorisations - we must not fall into the trap of giving emphasis to those categories 
important to us at the expense of those which are meaningful to the participants. Garfinkel 
(1967), who was a contemporary of Goffman’s, reported on the gender presentation of the 
infamous transsexual Agnes based on thirty-five hours of interviews and “conversations.” 
Garfinkel worked with the sexologist Stoller and the psychologist Rosen, who had 
previously diagnosed Agnes with Testicular Feminization Syndrome, albeit that Agnes 
apparently had an unusual case of it. Testicular Feminization Syndrome – known more 
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often, now, as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome – is classified as an intersex condition, 
which causes XY foetuses to feminise in uterus. Agnes was thought to have feminised at 
puberty (1967). 
 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological description of Agnes was premised on the notion that she 
was “passing” as a “normal” woman. Noting Agnes’ “vital statistics” of 38-25-38 twice in 
the opening paragraphs of his report, Garfinkel suggests that these were important 
indicators of Agnes’ “true” (inter)sexuality and were crucial in his analysis of her gender 
presentation. Garfinkel went into great detail about Agnes’ aesthetic presentation, which 
was the primary gauge of his “common sense” analysis. However, this “common sense” 
analysis fails to acknowledge both his position as a white Western male and the gendered 
social experiences he encountered throughout life.  
 
Agnes’ facial and bodily features and sartorial presentation were described as unremarkable 
when compared to women of her own age and class, illustrating that she was measured 
against and successfully “passing” the aesthetic criteria derived from Garfinkel’s “gender 
belief system” (R. Stoller, 1985). As Rogers (1992: 207) argues it shows that, like other 
(sexological) scholars, Garfinkel drew upon contemporary sociocultural values, most 
crucially ones concerning normative femininity and masculinity. The bodily aesthetic 
markers that Agnes’ was compared to, in order to distinguish her from “sexual deviants,” 
such as transvestites, was based on the assumption that all transvestites wear “garish” 
clothing and are “exhibitionistic.” A reference to Agnes’ voice in relation to “feminine 
appearing male homosexuals” was the closest Garfinkel got to aligning her bodily aesthetic 
to the “pathology” of the homosexual or transgender subject. Agnes was not thought of in 
these ways because she did not look out of the ordinary when compared to her 
contemporaries, at least according to Garfinkel. This highlights the immense influence that 
aesthetic signifiers play in the acceptability, categorisation, and recognition of transgender 
in researchers’ reports in relation to normative bodies and their default sexed positions. 
Garfinkel constantly falls back into an intrinsic biological binary sex model. His account is 
intimately enmeshed in biological understandings of what constitutes a “normally sexed” 
and “natural” body, upon which femininity is represented as the appropriate gender 
expression. This analysis is theoretically limited because it does not take account of the 
diversity of trans bodily aesthetics that are recognised today. What if Agnes’ presentation 
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had been of a non-normative femininity? Would Garfinkel’s analysis have been the same? 
Would her “true” gender have changed? 
 
Phenomenology in transgender studies 
Henry Rubin’s (2003) acclaimed study of transmen and FtMs claims to illustrate his 
participants’ phenomenological experiences situated within genealogies. He clarifies how 
his research participants construct meanings within historically specific sets of categories 
and structural conditions (2003). Drawing on Sartre’s theory of the body, Rubin provides a 
phenomenological analysis of transmen as situated within “overlaid” bodies. These bodies 
can be described as follows: the “body-for-the-self,” which is the site from which the world 
unfolds for us, from which a point of view is established. The second is the “body-for-
others,” an object, which can be seen and touched and so on. It is a corporeal reality for 
others and is also the “alienated body,” where the subject is “vividly and constantly 
conscious of his [sic] body not as it is for him [sic] but as it is for the Other” (Sartre quoted 
in H. Rubin, 2003: 27). Rubin suggests that transsexuals are positioned in this second 
alienated body. He observes that Sartrean phenomenology has: 
 
split levels of bodily ontology [which] provide a particularly apt system for 
describing transsexual experience. Transsexual men have a body consciousness, a 
body image that is at odds with their second-level bodies, their physical bodies. 
They are in Sartrean terms alienated bodies. “[T]he existence of my body for the 
Others” (Sartre 1956, 353) sounds like nothing other than a transsexual’s painful 
realization that his flesh, his body-for-others is female, and not what he sees in his 
body image (H. Rubin, 2003: 29). 
 
However, to buttress this abstraction, Rubin teams it with a pair of Merleau-Pontian 
concepts in order to explain the alienation that transmen feel. He uses “agnosia” – the 
inability to recognise familiar objects – where the transman fails to recognise his female-
bodiedness, and the phantom limb” – which is supposed to account for the “fantasization of 
a penis and a scrotum” (H. Rubin, 2003: 29). According to Rubin, agnosia allows transmen 
to have a body image consciousness that does not directly correspond with their physical 
bodies. In his 1927 meditation on ego formation, Freud (1960 [1927]) also insists on a 
distinction between the body’s real surface and one’s body image, as a mental projection of 
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this surface. The projection may create a discrepancy between corporeal referent and 
psychic projection. Freud notes: 
 
A person’s own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which both 
external and internal perceptions may spring. It is seen like any other object, but to 
the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to an 
internal perception. […]. Pain, too, seems to play a part in the process, and the way 
in which we gain new knowledge of our organs during painful illnesses is perhaps 
a model of the way by which in general we arrive at the idea of our body (Freud, 
1960 [1927]: 19-20). 
 
Rubin claims that the space between consciousness and the physical body – the “psychic” 
and the “physiological” – is bridged by the transman finding “a means of linking the 
“psychic” and the “physiological,” to each other to form an articulate whole” (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002 [1962]: 77) via the body-for-itself project of transitioning. This “whole” is 
theorised as “body imaging” (Prosser, 1998), which I will explore below. 
 
Rubin maintains that FtM transitioning is a situated, contextual project of “authenticity” 
based on principles and demands of gender recognition from others. Gender recognition by 
others is, for Prosser, 
 
in both its medical and its autobiographical versions […] depend[ent] upon an 
initial crediting of this feeling as generative ground. It demands some recognition 
of the category of corporeal interiority (internal bodily sensations) and of its 
distinctiveness from that which can be seen (external surface): the difference 
between gender identity and sex […] serves as the logic of transsexuality (Prosser, 
1998: 43). 
 
Whilst the Sartrean dimensions of the body are useful in understanding the various 
situational aspects of bodies-in-the-world in Rubin’s work, the aspects of (mis)projection, 
agnosia of the surface of the body, and the phantom limb (the “opposite” pathology to 
agnosia), are less convincing. Agnosia is “the absence of ability to recognize the form and 
nature of persons and things” (translators note in Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1962]: 145 
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emphasis added). Agnosia, as Rubin notes, is not a conscious decision, but a phenomenon, 
which somehow results in the refusal to acknowledge body parts, which, thus affects body 
imaging. Rubin, echoing Prosser’s analysis, claims that many transsexuals in his study did 
not acknowledge aspects of their post pubertal bodies, and thus asserts that these were cases 
of agnosia. However, I argue agnosia is rarely experienced as this would inevitably 
undermine the concept of “betrayal,” which Rubin utilises to consider the experience of 
when a transman’s body feminises at puberty. If the transman suffers from agnosia then 
there would be no feelings of “betrayal” by the body because those body parts that aid in 
the development of body imaging would hold no significance. Furthermore, in relation to 
Prosser’s (1998) suggestion that agnosia helps explain the “wrong bodied” feelings of 
transsexual embodiment, I suggest that it would actually undermine, rather than 
“underline,” any sense of a “wrong body” due to non-acknowledgment of body parts. In 
fact, acknowledgement of the body by the transperson is paramount otherwise there would 
be no intention to change it. Ignoring body parts until it is possible to reconstruct them – if 
this is what the transperson intends – is not the same as agnosia. 
 
Moreover, the phantom limb in Merleau-Ponty’s (2002 [1962]) work, is conceptualised in 
relation to severed/amputated body parts and the repression of the feelings about the loss of 
the limb. He states that this  
 
repression is […] the transition from first person experience to a sort of abstraction 
of that existence, which lives on [in] a former experience or rather the memory of 
having had the memory (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1962]: 96). 
 
It is not that all transmen do not fantasise about acquiring a penis (H. Rubin, 2003) that I 
take as misleading in Rubin’s account as this is a minor point of refutation. The most 
fundamental mistake in Rubin’s analysis is that the transman can not repress feelings about 
a lost limb, because he never had the penis to begin with. “Phantom limb” suggests an 
ongoing “natural” psychic malfunction rather than a metaphysical problem. By using this 
concept, Rubin unduly pathologises the transsexual subject. Whereas Rubin focuses on 
transmen only, Prosser (1998) uses this conceptual framework to consider both transmen 
and transwomen. Prosser suggests that: 
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[The phantom limb] in the case of the transsexual, the body constructed through 
sex reassignment surgery is not one that actually existed in the past, one that is 
literally re-membered, but one that should have existed; sex reassignment surgery 
is a recovery of what was not (Prosser, 1998: 84). 
 
Prosser is utilising the phenomenological concepts of agnosia and phantom limbs to 
perform “discursive gymnastics” (Hird, 2000) which make points about transpeople’s 
“phantasisation” and imaginative anticipations of surgery, rather than pathologising agnosia 
and phantom limbs as Rubin did. By utilising Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1962]) and Schilder’s 
(1935) understanding of body images as imaginatively anticipated scholars might begin to 
free the transsexual from this theoretical bind and pathology, and help to theorise the roles 
that desire, imagination, and agency play in trans bodily aesthetics. These body images do 
not, however, “appear” purely from the self but require social and, possibly, sexual 
interaction too as I will explore in chapters IV and V. 
 
Gender and transgender “body image” literature has been developed over the last few 
decades (Crossley, 2005; Fallon & Hausenblas, 2005; Featherstone, 1999; M. Finn & Dell, 
1999; Marone et al., 1998; Money, 1996; Yamamiya et al., 2005) and has often been 
understood in relation to psychological, psychiatric, and medical discourses (M. Finn & 
Dell, 1999). In the literature body image practices are often deemed problematic and 
disordered because they draw on “negative” types of body image management (1999), such 
as “body dysmorphia” (Phillips & Dufresne, 2000), anorexia nervosa (Bordo, 1993), and 
transsexual surgery (M. Finn & Dell, 1999). Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1962]) claims that 
subjectivity is only possible through the construction of a coherent body image (coherent 
does not necessarily mean normative). Using Schilder’s (1935: 174) notion of body image, 
which suggests that the image is built up to a whole only momentarily, through various 
developmental processes and stages, such as the “mirror stage” in childhood and 
subsequent intersubjective “intercourse,” Merleau-Ponty maintains that considering body 
image equilibrium(s) is necessary to overcome the problem of understanding how we know 
the world around us. Thus, body image is contextual and situational in its relation to the 
world and “to others and their iterations” (Salamon, 2002: 48). Merleau-Ponty’s 
interpretation is of a body that can 
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model itself on the other’s, and the subject projects himself [sic] or loses his [sic] 
separate reality in the other, becomes identified with him [sic], and the change of 
co-ordinates is pre-eminently embodied in this existential process. 
 
The transformations which body image undergoes in reaction to interactions with others, 
and the different situations experienced are not the only recognised processes and stages 
that sustain body image. Schilder (1935) and Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1962]) both suggest 
that body image can also be “corporeally anticipated” (Weiss, 1999). According to Weiss: 
 
while Merleau-Ponty is primarily thinking here about future actions and how they 
can be corporeally anticipated in and through the body image, Schilder emphasizes 
the role that fantasies and imagination play in constructing and reconstructing 
body image […] Indeed, Schilder goes on to claim that each individual has “an 
almost unlimited number of body images (Weiss, 1999: 9). 
 
This claim has not been developed in phenomenological studies of transgendering. I 
suggest that this framework can be utilised to incorporate the phenomenological, social, and 
sexual descriptions of (trans)bodily aesthetics. 
 
Leaning on feminist phenomenology 
Feminists following Foucault, for example, have illustrated that body image is not the only 
site to consider in understanding the body (Weiss, 1999). There is much to be gained from 
theorising the Merleau-Pontian concept “body image” in conjunction with experiences of 
hierarchal power relations, which differentiate between bodies on grounds of gender, race, 
morals, (technological) ability and disability (1999), to name a few. This allows us to 
interpret a subject’s gender identity as an effect of the value placed on bodily aesthetics 
rather than purely as an attribute related to “natural” dichotomised gender. 
 
Silvia Stoller (2005) uses a phenomenological approach to suggest that the asymmetry 
between the sexes constitutes the ontological categories of men and women. What she 
derives from this observation is that sexed, lived relations can never be symmetrical. 
Taking to task the vision of feminists who try to overcome political asymmetries between 
men and women in order to eradicate social inequalities (de Beauvoir, 1997 [1949]), Stoller 
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postulates that it is not the asymmetry per se that accounts for the “political, ethical and 
social” (S. Stoller, 2005: 8) inequalities, but the evaluation of differences, which affects the 
ensuing treatment of the sexes.  
 
Problematically, however, Stoller assumes that symmetry takes place between all men and 
between all women. In relation to transsexuals she suggests that: 
 
it remains questionable whether a complete change of gender identity can actually 
take place. Based on empirical data, sociological studies on transsexuality have 
shown that the identification with the new sex is not entirely unproblematic […] 
This means that the difficulties of living with a new identity cannot be eliminated 
once the transsexual has made use of all his or her technical, medical, and legal 
possibilities. Here studies on the phenomenology of temporality have shown that 
the past is retained in the present as a dimension of the past (S. Stoller, 2005). 
 
While I agree that this is paramount in understanding trans bodily aesthetics, I would like to 
paraphrase Dean Spade: Stoller (2005), who “picnics” 
 
on transsexual identity [in her] work to undermine transsexual alteration 
stabilize[s] exercises of normative gender production, even while they suggest that 
gender destabilization is their goal (Spade, 2006: 319). 
 
The fact that everybody has historically different lives to others would render everybody 
asymmetrical, not solely transpeople. Stoller’s (2005) assumption, here, is that transpeople 
discard some of their historical individuality in the construction of their gender identity and 
by default, therefore, become only an approximation of their acquired gender. I suggest 
instead that embodiment and bodily aesthetics are pursued precisely in relation to 
transpeople’s specific history and their particular habitus. 
 
Nonetheless, taking the idea that sex/gender differences can never be symmetrical 
(Braidotti, 1994b; Irigaray, 1985) because of the historical and material aspects of lived 
experiences – both economic and bodily – Stoller claims that this is the only conceivable 
way of understanding “the other” without reducing “the other” to the same (S. Stoller, 
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2005). Asymmetry also undermines the possibility that the standards of one person is, or 
should be, the goal of the other. These claims go unexplored in any great depth, which 
leaves a gap in knowledge about trans bodily aesthetics. For transgender studies we can 
utilise the phenomenological concepts of  “intentionality”  and “asymmetry,” which I will 
change to the less overstated concept of “difference,” in relation to trans bodily aesthetics 
to look at multiple subject positions and to renounce judging “right” and “wrong,” 
“passing” and “non-passing,” “beautiful” and “monstrous,” transsexual bodies. 
Difference(s) and intentionality can help convey the materialisation of difference by 
recognising the aesthetic tactics “deployed, defended, subordinated, marketed or 
manipulated and how […] these tactics intersect with [trans]gender and value” (Colebrook, 
2006: 132, my insertion in parenthesis) socially, sexually and phenomenologically.  
 
Conclusion 
This review explored key transgender, feminist and aspects of the phenomenological 
approach, to embodiment and bodily aesthetics. The purpose of this chapter was to 
highlight my analytical stance in the thesis. Questions concerning embodiment, bodily 
aesthetics, and beauty that have been previously debated have often ended up as 
dichotomous moral arguments based on what are viewed as “good” or “bad” practices. This 
was illustrated by my discussion of radical feminist theorising about transsexual practices 
of “duplicitous” embodiment, trans theorisation about Cartesian “right” and “wrong” 
bodies, and the dichotomisation of transsexual/transgender politics. All of which could only 
highlight two sides of the (political) divide in relation to intrinsic or constructed aspects of 
gender appearances. Moreover, I suggested that binary positions produce divisive and 
unproductive theorisations about trans embodiment and bodily aesthetics. However, I 
contend that if we assume diverse positions, and utilise the particular strengths of symbolic 
interactionism as well as the phenomenological aspects of embodiment and body images, 
we can ask productive questions concerning the tactics employed in attaining, subverting, 
or even enjoying bodily aesthetics. This will develop a more sophisticated understanding of 
transsexuals and their bodily aesthetics. 
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Chapter III: Methods, Methodology and the Research Process 
 
Epistemological and analytical approach 
The thesis draws on feminist and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology (de Beauvoir, 1997 
[1949]; Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1962]) that asserts that the basis of all meaning is first and 
foremost a bodily experience, which is engendered by an active relationship between the 
human and their world. A phenomenological study is a study of experiences, actions and 
practices and their meanings (Heinamaa, 1997). In combining the two definitions what this 
means is that this research is interested in the coexistence between the lived-body and its 
world, which allows an opportunity to develop conscious awareness and attitude – known 
as intentionality – and knowledge of the self through experiences. The body experiences 
and feels prior to articulating those feelings, experiences and knowledge. Thus, all 
knowledge is embodied and situated in the world that subjects occupy. Stoller ( 2005) 
suggests that the notion of asymmetry (difference) can account for the different social 
horizons that men and women encounter in their relationship to the world. She argues that 
asymmetry exists between the sexes, which is in some ways is understandable, in relation 
to various analogous social standards, discourses and life chances. However, her 
understanding of these differences is reductive in other ways, as, to suggest that men as a 
group and women as a group have similar experiences of the world, because of an 
analogous gendered history, this theoretical position assumes each man and woman 
experience analogous structures, bodies and so on in the same way (de Beauvoir, 1997 
[1949]; S. Stoller, 2005). Nonetheless, the concept of “difference” is utilised in this 
research to highlight the analogousness and diversity of queer horizons and intentionality, 
which acknowledges the historically similar connections and disjuncture between 
transpeople in this research – and is a useful analytical perspective from which to explore 
the phenomena of transsexual embodiment and bodily aesthetics. My analytic stance for 
this research then, comes from a queer phenomenological perspective (Ahmed, 2006), 
which acknowledges that the social world is actively produced through everyday 
experiences, understandings and practices, but “orientate” from different positions and 
“orientate” within different horizons. Thinking, active subjects construct their realities 
 79
through and within their lived-horizons (Shapiro, 1985). From this perspective, I can 
explicate multiple realities within the relationships between transpeople and their social 
world. I will explore aesthetic social practices (Burkitt, 1999) and experiences of 
transsexual subjects in the legal-horizon(s) and medical-horizon(s) (I have called the 
medicolegal) that the transperson experiences. 
 
This perspective is different from many of the transgender/transsexual studies as it moves 
away from the deconstructive and purely discursive accounts of transsexualism (Bornstein, 
1994; Butler, 1993; Prosser, 1998; Stone, 1991), whilst not abandoning the discursive fully. 
Deconstructive and discursive approaches have highlighted that experience is historically 
specific and discursively produced (Davies, 1992; Scott, 1992), which allows us to 
understand through the reconstitution of narrative accounts the recollections and 
experiential factors of lives. 
 
Although closely linked to the ethnomethodological studies (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, 
2000, 2002) of transpeople, my research features trans subjects as diverse phenomena, 
which questions the “medically constructed” theories (Hausman, 1995, 2001; Raymond, 
1980), which assert that the transsexual is purely a product of medical technology and 
medical language. I challenge sexological accounts using the phenomenological approach 
by de-homogenising the transsexual subject and exploring the lived world perceptions of 
diversely situated subjects. 
 
My epistemic view upholds the responsibility of knowing the subjects and because these 
are my epistemic responsibilities I must offer my own accountability to the reader (Code, 
1996). Following a phenomenological perspective my epistemological position stresses that 
knowledge should, primarily, be derived from people, actions, and the meanings of those 
actions to those people. However, it is important too, to stress that the research situation can 
be viewed as another specific intersubjective horizon, which may generate a specific kind 
of knowledge led by the design of the research and its focus. I acknowledge then that 
objectivity is impossible in the Enlightenment sense, of discovering data that is truly 
separate from the researcher who helps generate it; however, experiences and the recording 
of those experiences in the research setting are important sources of evidence. I saw 
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participants as “active co-participants in the relationship within which the interview data 
was produced” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000: 87). 
 
 
Designing the research and reflecting on methods 
The research covered three main themes. The first of these was to explore how transpeople 
understand and experience their aesthetic bodies. The sample was interviewed using life 
histories, which as Ken Plummer (2001) suggests can be a most effective method for 
eliciting details about subjective experiences. Connell (1991: 143) states that life histories 
have the capacity to reveal “social structures, collectivities and institutional change at the 
same time as personal life”, all of which is useful for this thesis. In addition, “because it 
[the method] emphasises the temporal and existential specificity of a person’s experience, it 
does not render such experience a mechanically determined outcome of social structure and 
culture” (Bryant & Schofield, 2007: 323), but allows for agentic aspects of lived relations. 
The combination of the life history method and the phenomenological approach helps to 
deal with all aspects of the dialectical interrelations between experience, memory and 
participants’ narratives in the research setting. In the research setting I requested that the 
participant speak on a theme until they had no more to say within this particular sequence 
then I asked questions about issues relevant to the research and that had been expressed in 
the sequence to gain a more in depth account surrounding the theme. From these responses 
more questions were instantaneously formulated and asked within the interview or in a 
follow-up interview by email. This method is premised on the narrator “telling it like it is” 
from lived experience and provides a way for evaluating the present, past and anticipating 
the future (Letherby, 2003). 
 
At the stage of choosing participants I asked whether they would talk about some 
photographs of themselves. All the participants I contacted to take part in the research said 
that they were willing to do this. In the research setting I requested that the personal 
photographs should depict different stages of transitioning/bodily aesthetics/ body parts in 
different spaces with friend, family and partners. This use of photographs in the interview is 
commonly known in the methodological literature as “photo-elicitation” (Collier, 1957; 
Emmison & Smith, 2000; Harper, 2002). Much of the literature surrounding photo-
elicitation suggests that the benefits are immense, for example, photographs are said to 
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generate responses that would have stayed dormant in conventional interviewing (Collier, 
1957). Submerged feelings and emotions may be stimulated by viewing a photograph not 
seen for a while. My feelings of the interview, whilst using this method, were that it 
completely changed the “colour” and structure of the interview, for the better. In my 
research, the photographs were a way of eliciting the metamorphosis of sex-changing, and 
the feelings of how bodily aesthetics (temporally and spatially) were recollected and 
contemporarily experienced. The initial reactions were telling of actual feelings about their 
bodily aesthetic in the photograph, which I noted in my research log book. The 
contemporary experience of the photograph was important in understanding how 
participants felt about their bodily aesthetics over time. Moreover, this visual method 
encouraged free floating narratives and shattered shielded replies about their bodies. 
 
Collier (1957: 859) suggested over a half century ago that a photograph is a “restatement of 
reality; it presents life around us in new, objective, and arresting dimensions, and can 
stimulate the informant to discuss the world about him [sic].” The rationale behind this 
photo-elicitation method in my research was a simple one. At some point in the interview – 
in this research it was when the interview was “slowing down” – I asked the participant to 
choose the photographs they would like to talk about. I had not previously thought about 
the problems that would amount if they only talked positively about aspects of their bodily 
aesthetics – for instance, wanting to only talk about themselves in a good light – however, 
luckily this was not the case. It was surprising to find that most participants spoke about the 
photographs in both positive and negative ways. Nonetheless, even if the narratives were all 
positive it would have still allowed the dialogue to be primarily generated by the participant 
rather than led by the researcher.  All of the participants explored and elicited various 
stages, spaces and intersubjective accounts of bodily aesthetics within the photographs, 
with little prompting. 
 
The use of this interview technique yielded several more benefits, firstly participants 
responded often without hesitation. Moreover, by providing participants with a task similar 
to a naturally occurring conversational event, the peculiarity of the interview situation was 
circumvented to a degree, allowing it to become more spontaneous and conversational as 
well as more directed toward bodily aesthetics. 
 
 82
This visual method encouraged diverse personal narratives as opposed to what has been 
called “rehearsed narratives” (S. Hines, 2007). “Rehearsed narratives” are perhaps more 
likely to appear in the stories told by people who have knowledge of theoretical debates and 
concepts about their (usually) non-normative lives, for whom reflection on the concepts and 
debates are an important process of identity construction. Whilst these aspects are 
important phenomenologically and were generated in the research setting; I wished for, in 
the words of Stone (1991), “truthful specificity.” By using the photo-elicitation method, it 
generated wide-ranging explanations of lived world experiences. 
 
The second theme of the research was concerned with how transpeople differed in their 
understanding of body modification practices and aesthetic bodies. I used the same 
biographical narrative method and photographic visual stimuli. This part of the research 
uncovered how hormones and surgical interventions are experienced by the diverse sample 
of transsexuals and how this affects their lived experience. Through this theme participants 
explored the extent to which understandings of masculinity, femininity and sexuality 
impact on them, relative to body modification and bodily aesthetics.  
 
Finally an investigation in to how transsexuals fostered relationships and negotiated their 
subject positions within the political groups and their discourses and medicolegal 
institutions and their discourses, such as clinicians and the GRP and how these affected 
understandings of their bodily aesthetics and gender identity – again using the same 
interviewing methods. I looked at the negotiations between transpeople and politics, 
doctors and law when considering body modification and bodily aesthetics. This garnered 
significant personal understandings of structural constraints and freedoms in relation to 
political affiliations, medicine and the GRP and GRA. Furthermore, to be true to the 
phenomenological approach, I can not assume ideology and structure within the 
medicolegal and political relationships and must be informed by the experiences of 
participants in relation to the relationships fostered. Ideology and structure are only “there” 
if the subject reflects on experiences of them being “there.” I wanted to find what 
transsexuals, political groups, medicine and the GRP, consider an adequate commitment to 
a gender identity in relation to bodily aesthetics. With a focus on these factors I explored 
evidence of whether the GRA 2004 queers the past and present diagnosis of transsexualism 
– that is challenges the medicolegally ascribed dimorphic body system. 
 83
 
Access, sampling and selection 
There were some access issues that needed addressing. Although I felt confident that my 
access to a wide ranging sample from the transsexual population would not be a cause of 
concern due to my existing knowledge of the transgender community (I have worked 
independently on political issues that Press for Change have circulated as politically 
relevant, such as local legal and health forums and petitions to members of parliament). I 
was, however, aware of the fact that the transsexual population are researched repeatedly, 
by journalists, television shows and so on. However, in light of my focus on aesthetics and 
the newly implemented GRA, this I assumed would offer a range of topic areas that has not 
been talked about in research by transsexuals, thus, reducing the possibility of participant 
refusal on the grounds that it had been covered before. 
 
I used purposive sampling, which originated from a snowballing technique where 
sometimes participants suggested other participants from their own networks of friends and 
colleagues. The snowballing strategy commenced through some personal contacts, 
transsexual organisations and forums. I placed a “Call for Participants” (see appendix) on 
Press for Change’s e-mailing list, which generated over a hundred responses and 
information requests about the research. Following up on all the responses, I requested a 
Participant Information Sheet (PIS), (see appendix) to be completed. The returned PISs 
were then used to contact people from all over the UK to arrange interviews. My sampling 
strategy tried to include a diverse range of ages, gender, sexuality and race, but did not 
expect it to be representative of the UK trans population. 
 
I used a sampling strategy in order to explore the diversity and commonalities of the 
transsexual community. As the interviews with transsexual subjects were between one and 
two and a half hours long, I had a small sample of twenty three. The sample specifically 
focused on those whose have had or plan to have surgeries and use body-modification 
technologies and those who do not or can not have surgeries or use body modification 
technologies. I made judgements about participants that were most relevant to my 
analytical considerations. For example, from the PIS, which potential participants had 
returned to me, I chose people who I thought would offer intimate details of their body 
modification practices and their understanding and experiences of aesthetic practices or 
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intimate details about not being able, for whatever reason, to modify their bodies. If the 
potential participant filled in extra information or said that they were willing to talk about 
personal photographs of themselves on the participant information sheet or responded 
positively through email I followed this lead and tried to arrange an interview. Also, I 
selected those who did not rely upon traditional technologies to express their bodily 
aesthetic and gender identity and instead relied upon other aesthetic practices, such as 
clothing. I made sampling judgements about participants on the basis of their transition 
status, for example whether the participants were post-operative, part-operative, pre-
operative or non-operative and tried to include people at different stages of transition. Age 
played another factor in my sampling choices and I tried to include a whole range of ages. 
These multifaceted choices I assumed would generate narratives, which would add to the 
differences between trans-sexing narratives. I also chose participants loosely on their class 
position. Social class was more difficult to evaluate, however, I did make some choices on 
the basis of career/ job/student and whether they lived in a village, town or city. The 
principles of “purposive” sampling employed in selecting participants helped me enhance 
my sample coverage and provided the framework of “difference” and multiple horizons for 
analysis, I did this to illuminate subtle but potentially important differences (Barbour, 
2001), rather than to generate a representative sample of the transsexual population.  
 
A follow-up email interview was conducted to develop the narratives provided and explore 
the meaning frames of the participants. Unfortunately only twelve out of twenty three 
participants responded to my emails. Nonetheless, of the twelve participants most added 
more in depth explication of experiences and clarified points of confusion I had had. I also 
offered participants the chance to read their transcripts and parts of the analytical chapters 
they featured in, to comment on or critique my analytical and theoretical points. One 
participant wanted to change some details in their interview transcript. None of the 
participants wanted to change analytical or theoretical points. 
 
The sample13 and other demographics 
                                                 
13 I have used the gender identification and other information as stated on the participation 
information sheet provided by participants. This also includes the “name of choice,” where 
participant chose their own pseudonyms. Some participants did not choose a pseudonym so I have 
created them myself in the name of anonymity. 
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I interviewed thirteen transwomen and eight transmen and one person who had had male to 
female SRS but had decided to live as transgendered with a more masculine aesthetic. The 
age range of the sample ranged from twenty two to sixty years old. 
 
 
AGE M2F (Transwoman) F2M (Transman) 
22-25 years old Anna-Marie (pre-op14/hormones) 
Emily (post-op15/hormones) 
Oscar (pre-op) 
Clifford (pre-op) 
26-35 years old Samantha (Post-op/hormones/AS16) 
Octavia (Post-op/hormones) 
Benjamin (post-op) 
36-45 years old Brian (post-op17/hormones) Jackson (part-op18/hormones) 
Gregory (non-op19/hormones) 
Kenneth (pre-op/hormones) 
Raymond(part-op/hormones) 
46-55 years old Courtenay (post-op/hormones/AS) 
Diane (post-op/hormones) 
Nancy (post-op/hormones/AS) 
Amelia (post-op/hormones) 
Penny (post-op/hormones/AS) 
Daniel (part-op/hormones) 
55+ Mariza (post-op/hormones) 
Jess (post-op/hormones/AS) 
Bernadette (post-op/hormones) 
Karen (pre-op/hormones/AS) 
Lesley (pre-op/hormones) 
 
 
Pen portraits 
Amelia: is a 52 year old white female who lives in a town. She is heterosexual and is 
married to her long-time partner. She is a self-employed historian and writer. Amelia has a 
Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) and amended birth certificate. 
Anna-Marie: is a 25 year old white female who lives in a large city. She works full-time in 
IT. She is single and describes herself as bisexual but more heterosexual. She is planning to 
apply for a GRC. 
                                                 
14 Pre-op refers to all those who have not undergone any surgery. 
15 Post-op refer to those who have had genital reconstructive surgery. 
16 AS refer to facial aesthetic surgery to the face or body. 
17 Brian was considering phalloplasty at the time of the interviews and had started taking 
testosterone by the time of the second interview. 
18 Part-op refers to those who have undergone double mastectomy to remove breasts. 
19 Non-op refers to those people who do not wish to or can not undergo surgery. 
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Benjamin: is a 26 year old white British male who lives in a town. He works full-time in 
retail. He is not in a relationship and describes himself as heterosexual. Benjamin has his 
GRC and amended birth certificate. 
Bernadette: is a 60 year old white British woman who lives in a village. She is retired but 
works as a magistrate. Bernadette is in a relationship and describes herself as lesbian. She 
has a GRC and amended birth certificate. 
Brian: had had MtF surgery when I first interviewed him as a transwoman. At the time of 
the interview he was thinking of beyond male and female with a more masculine aesthetic. 
In a subsequent email interview, Brian had started to live with a more masculine aesthetic. 
He is a 42 year old Scottish white bi-gender, who lives in a large city. He is an actor. He 
was not in a relationship and regards himself as asexual. Brian does not intend to apply for 
a GRC. 
Clifford: is a 22 year old white Scottish transgender male who lives in a village. He is 
volunteering after a long term illness. Clifford is in a relationship with a man and describes 
himself as pansexual. The GRC is not a priority at the moment. 
Courtenay: is a 48 year old white British female who lives in a city. She works full-time as 
a civil servant. Courtenay is not in a relationship and describes herself as Bisexual. She has 
a GRC and amended her birth certificate. 
Daniel: is 47 year old white British male who lives in a large city. He is a self employed 
sex worker. Daniel is currently not in a relationship and describes himself as “a bit gay.” He 
may apply for GRC. 
Diane: is a 51 year old white English post-op woman who lives in a city. She is long-term 
disabled. Diane is not in a relationship and describes herself as lesbian. She has a GRC and 
amended birth certificate. 
Emily: is a 27 year old British white transwoman who lives in a city. She works full-time 
as a civil servant. Emily is not currently in a relationship and describes herself as lesbian. 
She will apply for GRC if and when she decides to have a civil partnership. 
Gregory: is a 40 year old white British male who lives in a town. He is a student and has a 
disability. He is not currently in a relationship and describes his sexuality as genderqueer. 
Gregory has a GRC and an amended birth certificate. 
Jackson: is a 45 year old white British transman who lives in a town. He works full-time 
for the local council and is trying to set-up his own business. He is “sort of” in a 
relationship and describes himself as heterosexual. He plans to apply for a GRC. 
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Jess: is a 56 year old white Anglo Saxon transwoman who lives in a hamlet. She works 
pat-time, is a student and volunteers as a trainer on transgender issues. She is currently in a 
lesbian relationship but considers herself bisexual. Jess plans to apply for a GRC, but must 
annul her marriage to an ex-partner as part of the GRC process. 
Kenneth: is a 43 year old white British Celt who lives in a town. He works as a civil 
servant and a student. He is in a relationship and describes himself as queer. He plans to 
apply for GRC. 
Karen: is a 55 year old white European transgender female who lives in a town. She works 
full-time in social services. Currently she is not in a relationship and is unsure about her 
sexuality, but says she is probably a lesbian. Karen is not planning to apply for GRC at the 
moment. 
Lesley: is a 58 year old white British female who lives in a village. She is currently 
unemployed, but has trained as a librarian. She has divorced through mutual consent to 
apply for GRC and has received her birth certificate. 
Mariza: is a 57 year old white Slavo-Celt female who lives in a small city. She is a full-
time mature student. Mariza is currently in a relationship and now describes herself as 
heterosexual; she has been married to women in the past. She has received a GRC and an 
amended birth certificate. 
Nancy: is a 51 year old white European female who lives in a hamlet. She is looking after 
the home. Nancy is in a relationship and describes herself as probably bisexual. She plans 
to apply for a GRC. 
Octavia: is a 32 year old white female Goth and lives in a city. She is a full-time university 
researcher. Octavia is married to a woman and describes herself as Bi. She hopes to apply 
for GRC, but is presently going through a court case to have her marriage recognised. 
Oscar: is a 25 year old white British transboy who lives in a city. He is a full-time student. 
Oscar is in a relationship and describes himself as queer/pansexual. He may possibly apply 
for GRC in the future. 
Penny: is a 55 year old British white transwomen who lives in a large city. She work full-
time, but specifically asked me not to disclose her line of work. Penny is currently in a 
long-term relationship and intends to get married shortly. Pre-transition she described 
herself as gay/queer and is mainly attracted to males. She plans to apply for GRC. 
Raymond: is a 30 year old white transman who lives in a large city. He works as a teacher. 
Raymond is not in a relationship, but has sex with men. 
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Samantha: is a 32 year old white British post-op female who lives in a town. She is 
currently long-term sick and doing some voluntary work. She is not in a relationship at the 
moment and describes herself as bisexual. Samantha is planning to apply for a GRC. 
 
Pen portraits of Trans-Community Organisations (T-CO) 
GIRES was founded in 1997.  The membership consists of both transpeople and non-
transpeople. GIRES' approach is based on research into the aetiology of “atypical gender 
identity development” and transsexualism. One of its primary aims is to develop good 
practice guidelines, education programmes and literature for various professional audiences 
and transpeople. In addition, GIRES offer awards for research on aspects of gender 
variance and promote education about transgender. GIRES also offer bursaries for travel 
and grassroots educational work, in various locales that is taken on by transpeople on a low 
income. GIRES is a charity and is bound by charity law. GIRES’ mission statement states: 
 
GIRES’ first priority is to help those who are already experiencing some form of 
disadvantage, the charity intends to monitor very closely developments in the 
science relating to gender identity. GIRES recognises that identifying the 
biological determinants of gender identity and intersex conditions helps society 
generally to understand and accept that those they affect are naturally 
transgendered. The understanding that gender dysphoria is not a fantasy is 
especially important. However, the cost of research in this field is far too high for 
the charity to have a realistic possibility itself of obtaining the necessary funds. It 
therefore intends to keep abreast of the extensive research that other organisations 
are conducting in this field and produce papers that summarise and interpret the 
findings. GIRES recognises the risk that research into causality may lead on to 
searches for ways to prevent the conditions pre-natally rather than to make life 
better for those they have already affected. However, it is powerless to curb the 
intellectual curiosity of the scientists working in this field (Reed, 2006). 
 
Press for Change is an organisation with many members and is known worldwide. Prior to 
1996 Press for Change did not have a website. In the interim years the website has grown to 
what the organisers (justly) boast as a most “comprehensive” collection of information 
about campaigns, healthcare, politics, law, research, books and audio, press releases, media 
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coverage and archival materials about transgender and transsexualism. However, much of 
the organisations output is inn relation to law and social policy. Press for Change’s mission 
statement states: 
 
Why we are here: Press for Change is a political lobbying and educational 
organisation, which campaigns to achieve equal civil rights and liberties for all 
trans people in the United Kingdom, through legislation and social change. This 
site is here to explain our work, and to support all those who campaign with us to 
achieve full equality and rights for gender diverse people in modern society. 
Nowhere else in the world will you find such a comprehensive collection of 
information about the trans rights campaign, and details about the legal, medical, 
political and social issues surrounding the people it represents. If you’re a trans 
person, we aim to raise your consciousness. If you’re a researcher or a journalist 
we want you to have everything you could possibly want to report us accurately 
and fairly. If you’re a campaigner already, we want to provide you with the very 
best resources. And if you’re not, we’d like to show you what an astonishing 
challenge we continue to face even though many fundamental forms of protection 
are now in place through UK law (Press for Change, 2004). 
 
And Kaffequeeria is a DIY queer space where a number of events take place. Kaffequeeria 
focus on providing a safe space in which LGBTIQ people can experiment with 
representational work, and organise film, music, theatre and educational events. It is also 
used for engaging in non-mainstream politics, such as anarchism and queer. It provides 
information about events through the internet, such as through Yahoo groups and 
Facebook. Kaffequeeria’s website states: 
 
Kaffequeeria is a queer collective based in Manchester. Not wanting to buy into 
the commercial gay scene we are creating spaces to share with like minded folk, 
putting on the sort of diy non profit events we'd like to go to. Most of these are 
based round the wonders of music and food (Kaffequeeria, 2006). 
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Kaffequeeria is a group that co-operates with and promotes many (gender) queer events 
throughout Manchester and has links to Queer Mutiny and other queer DIY groups 
throughout the UK. My analysis, in this part of the thesis, also engages with a particular 
event called “GetBent,” which brought together an array of queer productions from 24th 
August and 1st September 2007. Its website states: 
 
Get Bent is a safe space for all genders and sexualities and seeks to engage with 
and foster the possibility of creating queer-positive spaces. Get Bent challenges the 
notion that you have to act or dress a certain way to be accepted. Get Bent follows 
a DiY ethic, creating wide variety of programming by supporting diverse people to 
create diverse events. Get Bent provides an alternative to commercial gay spaces 
by creating a queer autonomous space that is sex-positive without being sex-
centered, doesn't depend on alcohol to have a good time, and is unafraid to put the 
politics back into pride. Get Bent fosters a sense of community by being inclusive: 
all ages, all incomes, all abilities, all ethnicities and cultural backgrounds, 
regardless of HIV status, those who are comfortable in commercial gay spaces and 
those who aren't. Everyone is welcome to participate in this celebration of 
queerness! (GetBent, 2007a). 
 
Interviewing the participants 
Interviews were recorded with a digital recorder and transcribed verbatim. Despite this 
being time-consuming, there were a number of advantages; it allows repeated examination 
of interviews and is superior to simply relying on memory and notes, which can be patchy. 
Furthermore, without a recorder it is extremely difficult to recall every detail. The 
interviews were usually conducted in the participants’ homes; however, a few interviews 
were in public spaces, such as cafes, bars and an LGBT centre. The second interviews I 
conducted were done by email. 
 
Limitations of the research 
The primary limitation to the research is the sample size and the sample demographic itself. 
Whilst qualitative research seldom has a large sample, phenomenological researchers try to 
maximise the diversity of participants and understand the minutiae of their lived-world. I 
did seek to maximise the range of genders, races and ethnicity in the sample. Judging 
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whether I had achieved “diversity” within the sample was also problematic. The 
demographics of a trans sample are inadequately skewed towards advantaged transpeople, 
who have a financial status that can pay for their computers, where most of my participants 
were generated. The trans experience being reported here pretty much leaves out most of 
those I meet who have limited finances, who are from ethnic minorities, and older 
transpeople. My participants were however, drawn from an array of subject positions, in 
relation to employment status, gender, age, religion and trans trajectory; however, there was 
a lack of ethnic diversity within the sample. Generalisations to the whole population of 
transsexuals will not be possible. However, this was not a primary goal; my goal was to 
illustrate diversity within the trans community. 
 
Another demographical problem, which I considered a hurdle that was impossible to 
counter, was: How should I contact those who do not have political affiliations, those who 
do not identify with the label transsexual and so on, in effect those who are “stealth”? On 
reflection I think the “call to participants” may be a point of consideration. When 
advertising for participants it may have been better to place requests in non-trans spaces as 
well as written with non-trans language. The wording may have been problematic as 
Mariza pointed out in her interview, she stated: 
 
I do not understand people who are similar to me who talk in terms of being 
transsexuals. What I have done, I have done to be the woman I should have been 
born as. Words like transsexual are irrelevant to me. I have agreed to do this 
interview with you because I think that you will probably have a lot of people call 
themselves that and I think that it may be a good for you to meet somebody who 
just wants to be a woman (transwoman Mariza). 
 
In Mariza’s case I was lucky; however, we might want to consider using language in 
behavioural terms as opposed to identity-based language. For example, rather than a call for 
“transpeople,” I feel I should have considered: “ I am interested in people who were raised 
as one gender, but identify with another” or “were perceived and treated by others as one 
gender but identify with another.” This might allow for “stealth” people to realise they can 
contribute to a knowledge base that seems to include them, regardless of their current self-
identity label. 
 92
 
Feminist and postcolonial critiques of methodological processes suggest that knowledge is 
produced in specific circumstances, such as in the interplay between participants and the 
researcher, in the research setting (G. Rose, 1997). My role as the researcher is situated in 
the research generation, interviews, coding and eventual interpretation and representation of 
the interviews (Mason, 2002). Thus, it is often suggested in the methodological literature, 
for the sake of openness, that the researcher situate themselves in the writing-up and to shed 
light on the research process. 
 
In the past trans people have been understandably wary of non-trans researchers 
investigating trans issues and lives. Research has frequently been used to represent 
transpeople in ways that they have felt uncomfortable with (for example see Jeffreys, 2005; 
Raymond, 1980). In addition, non-trans researchers have used the accounts of transpeople 
from, for instance, autobiographies (see Hausman, 1995), and have not situated these in 
their appropriate historical context. This has resulted in them using these representations to 
talk about contemporary trans issues, when in effect they were written as long as 50 years 
ago, when gender cultures were somewhat different. The trans community responded to this 
by producing a number of texts and guidelines for non-trans researchers to follow in their 
research practice (see Hale, 1997). However, many trans people remained hostile to 
“outsider” research(ers).  
 
In more recent years a growing number of “out” transpeople have entered the academy and 
begun their own investigations of the trans community – myself included. It has often been 
assumed that “insider” research produces more accurate and more sympathetic accounts of 
its subjects. However, there have also been some problems with this. For instance, Kate 
Bornstein’s (1994) queer/ postmodern work has been celebrated by transgender people, but 
has met with some important reservations from transsexuals. I believe, therefore, that there 
are no guarantees that “insider” research automatically produces better results than 
“outsider” research but that research conducted reflexively with consideration for 
participant’s views is the most important factor. 
 
In my own research maintaining insider status had a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand, my membership of Press for Change afforded me 
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significant advantages in terms of access. I also used snowballing from a number of people 
in the trans community I already know. Securing participants, then, was remarkably easy, 
although, it is possible that the participants in this study were therefore skewed towards a 
more educated and politically active group than someone else may have found. On the 
other hand, however, there was a clear assumption by some participants that I would 
already know about and understand some elements of what they were saying without 
detailed explanation, simply because I was assumed to have identical experience – an 
assumption that was often incorrect. And this also often worked in reverse, when I had 
initially assumed shared experiences which sometimes turned out to be markedly different. 
In order to fully elicit their accounts, then, it was sometimes necessary to ask multiple 
questions on the same topic to ask them to explain things they assumed I already 
understood, and sometimes these accounts were quite different from my own experiences. 
 
One further and far less tangible issue was that at times I felt that my own appearance was 
quickly “evaluated” by some participants and that this coloured the research encounter 
somewhat. In some cases my appearance seemed to prompt an immediate affinity with the 
participant but at other times this was not the case. It is impossible to say exactly what this 
meant and it is likely that this takes place in all interview situations where the body of the 
researcher is “read” for signs of affinity or otherwise with the participant. One clear 
example of this “reading” of bodies occurred when I was interviewing Samantha. Although 
I was quite clear on my call for participants that I  myself am trans, during the interview it 
became clear that Samantha read me as non trans, on this occasion saying that I wouldn’t 
be able to understand some of the transitioning experiences she had had. In this case she 
seemed to disregard the statement on the call for participants in favour of her own reading 
of my embodied identity. To summarise, then insider research had advantages and 
disadvantages and was sometimes a profoundly slippery phenomenon, depending on how I 
was read by different people. 
 
Analysing the interviews 
I interviewed participants and analysed them concurrently. The analyses were conducted by 
using a computer software package, NVivo 7. I constructed a framework that identified 
themes within my own broader themes that emerged from the interviews. The thematic 
framework was then used and tested across the set of interviews and in a simultaneous 
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process in the follow-up interviews. The thematic framework was also set against 
theoretical frameworks that materialized from the literature review. Whilst the software was 
useful in many ways as an organisational tool, I continued to read the interview transcripts 
as a whole to get a feel for the whole narrative. From these re-readings I reviewed the 
coding and was then able to make queries through the software in relation to patterns and 
differences within the interviews. 
 
NVivo enabled me to include my reflective notes, memos and links to sources, which were 
also linked to the coding of the interviews, from these connections I was always aware of 
my situatedness20 in the research setting and thus, the influence I had during the interviews 
and research process. As my position is as an intermediary here, I take seriously my 
responsibility as a researcher. I wanted to minimize possibilities of distortion from personal 
bias and to make my own processes of investigation visible so readers can asses for 
themselves whether or not my interpretations are warranted. 
 
Bourdieu (1988) argued that it has been important for academics to distinguish themselves 
and their “ivory tower” from the “messy world of the streets.” The distinction of the tower 
and the street would help maintain pedagogical authority, which may falter if the academic 
tries to bridge the gap. In my messy world of the street, part of my life was taken up 
contributing to political praxis, in relation to trans issues, which were close to my political 
concerns. I wrote to Members of Parliament about the Gender Recognition Bill, marched in 
“Pride,” sat on legal and healthcare forums fighting the “visibility” corner for transpeople 
in policy documents, attended and delivered workshops on trans issues at equality and 
diversity conferences and so on. These issues of bridging my politics with my research 
were at the forefront of my mind on numerous occasions during the fieldwork. My position 
as an activist undeniably affected the initial stages, process and outcome of the research. It 
is not possible to measure how much, in a positivist sense; however, one thing is sure, the 
project as a whole was guided by my involvement and knowledge of the social and political 
climate of the time concerning transpeople. 
 
                                                 
20 NVivo 7 has many functions. For example, if I had made notes on part of the interview (an 
annotation) this would be highlighted, I was quickly able to see my initial ideas and thoughts and 
any subsequent ideas and thoughts on that part of the interview, which captured my changes in 
analytical and theoretical approaches (see Richards & Q. S. R. International, 2002). 
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It is possible to situate this research as an “ethics of struggle” (hooks, 1994), which tries to 
bridge the distinction between research and activism on one level – the level of knowledge 
and theory, which can hopefully aid in some emancipatory work, from the clutches of the 
powerful who wish to erase or at best pathologise trans subjectivity – and be open and 
honest enough to not shave of the edges in order to “cleanse” the representational work that 
the research may do. Bridging academia and activism is nothing new in transgender Studies 
(see Stryker & Whittle, 2006), in fact I believe without activism there would be very little 
contemporary academic work on trans. Following Gayle Letherby I suggest our work 
should not just be about the Other, but about the interplay between the researcher and 
participants. I wanted to both 
 
enable the voices of Others to be heard, and to create social and political change 
for or on behalf of those Others […] This creates a dilemma and involves us in a 
struggle between acknowledgement of the impossibility of full representation and 
the assertion that our work makes a difference. This leaves me then supporting an 
approach which may possibly involve a less than complete representation of the 
other, but I suggest that this is better than no representation at all (Letherby cited 
in Letherby, 2003: 119). 
 
Ethical considerations 
I was aware that there were ethical issues involved in a research such as this, as with all 
research, but due to my existing knowledge of the transgender community I feel confident 
that I conducted my research with sensitivity and care. In addition, I employed modes of 
professional conduct devised by academic institutions specifically in relation to ethical 
guidelines. In particular, the ethical statement by the British Sociological Association was 
employed (British Sociological Association, 2002). 
 
Many of the debates surrounding ethics and research participants have stemmed from the 
feminist sensibilities of consent, deception, privacy, issues of harm and confidentiality 
(Punch, 1994). I would like to pull out some of these points, which I feel are intrinsic to my 
research design. Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) ethical principles for researching 
psychosocial subjects are honesty, sympathy and respect. I feel these aspects are central to 
my research design. The issue of honesty that is, telling the participant what the research is 
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about, what the possible consequences are if the work is published or presented at 
conferences or indeed available for inspection within the university library, by assessors, 
supervisors and students, in fact all who will actually see/hear the work. This principle of 
honesty will allow the participant to ponder on other related issues of anonymity and 
recognisability, which are usually regarded as fundamental principles of research ethics 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Sympathy can relate to authenticity in this research. I noted 
previously there were contentions within the clinical setting as well as within transgender 
politics about the subject’s authenticity. On account of this I went into the research setting 
with openness, putting myself “alongside them” and used the self-knowledge I possess 
about the trans community and some of the concerns that have come to the attention of 
researchers through online forums, e-mailing lists and academic sources (Hale, 1997). In 
relation to respect, I felt the participants should be portrayed as the participants intended 
and not as fragmented pieces of information that fits nicely with the intended theory of the 
researcher. These sensibilities were adhered to at all times. 
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Chapter IV: Recognising the Self: Transmen’s Body Projects 
 
Introduction 
It is my argument that transmen’s commitment to a male identity is corporeally and 
discursively constituted in different ways to transwomen’s commitment to a female 
identity. This may sound like an obvious claim but it is one that needs clarifying in relation 
to bodily aesthetics. Traditional medical and sexological literature exemplifies genitals as 
fixing sex and, consequently, suggests that transsexuals’ commitment to a male or female 
identity is genitally focussed (Benjamin, 1966). The “true transsexual” is often seen to be 
one who demands genital surgery (1966). This genital focus also influences the various 
perspectives held by the sexological and medical literature concerned with transsexual 
embodiment and whether bodies should be orientated to a specific gender identity (Pauly, 
1981), or whether the psyche should be “brought in line” with bodies which already have a 
(medically) ascribed sex (Levine & Lothstein, 1981; Lothstein & Levine, 1981). This focus 
has implications for, and influences, the transperson within the clinician’s office, where the 
individual commences their official trans-sexing, and where a diagnosis of Gender Identity 
Disorder or Gender Dysphoria is sought. 
 
The genital focus can also ultimately affect the citizenship rights of a transperson who lives 
in their preferred gender, when a “secure” diagnosis is not attained. However, in the 
“subaltern” transgender literature and within transgender politics, such a focus on the 
genitals is a contested area (Griggs, 1998; H. Rubin, 2003). Nonetheless, in transgender 
studies of embodiment, research rarely focuses on the various processes used in order to 
attain acceptable bodies by transmen and transwomen prior to, during, and after 
transitioning. No argument has been made regarding bodily aesthetics within transgender 
studies because the differences that come into play have been understood through a “gender 
identity” frame rather than through a consideration of the body. Bodily aesthetics, in most 
studies, act as “default” markers of “core” gender identity relying on “gender” being clearly 
understood and clearly demarcated into “core” binary characteristics. This research 
suggests bodily aesthetics are paramount in experiencing, presenting and being looked upon 
as a specific gender. I suggest further that whilst genital surgery is important for some, 
“body projects” are, in fact, realised in many ways. The (desired) bodies of transmen are 
not uniform. The aesthetics of transmen’s bodies are orientated and produced, interpreted 
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and negotiated at the intersections of class, sexuality, medical opportunities and 
interventions, limits of the body, length of transition, and life histories. As such there is a 
complex interplay of sociological aspects, demographics, and aesthetic signifiers of gender 
which I aim to illustrate. Moreover, trans bodies are socially, sexually and intercorporeally 
“produced”, that is, they are dependent on the intersubjective nature of lived life 
experiences with other significant bodies and inward reflection. 
 
In this chapter, I look at transmen’s “body projects.” I consider “body projects” in relation 
to three organising themes (Attride-Stirling, 2001), “social bodies,” “sexual bodies,” and 
“phenomenological bodies.” These “bodies” are not separate, but come into play at certain 
times and in different spaces. Moreover, “social bodies,” “sexual bodies,” and 
“phenomenological bodies” are aesthetically judged by the self and others. This chapter 
aims to help us understand how participants are creating new standards of being (trans) 
men, as they disrupt the old, by illustrating how transmen negotiate their bodily aesthetic. 
This chapter will also illustrate how hormonal technologies affect the aesthetic and 
psychological positions of transmen. Idealised bodies are considered in relation to the 
limitations of technologies, such as aesthetic surgeries. These focal points will illustrate 
both the similarities and the diversity of transmen’s “body projects.” 
 
Childhood, puberty and sex differentiation 
When relaying memories of childhood, the phrases, “being different” and “knowing 
something was wrong,” were frequently voiced in the narratives of the transmen I 
interviewed. These specific, and widely recognisable, transgender discourses (see Kane-
DeMaios & Bullough, 2006), were not explained to me in the interview and required in 
depth questioning on this topic. Clifford stated: 
 
[Throughout childhood] I guess I was just trying to figure out what it was; there 
was just something not right at all (transman Clifford). 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter III: Methods, Methodology, and the Research Process, I 
revealed to the participants that I was a transwoman prior to interviewing them. This may 
have influenced some responses, insofar as that some participants may have assumed at 
certain times that I knew exactly what they were alluding to. However, I suggest that in 
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addition to this, that by not offering any indication of why they were “different” or “felt 
wrong” it indicates that “prediscursive” sense-impressions, experiences, and situations gave 
rise to disidentifications with their “phenomenological bodies,” which intensified, for most 
participants, during puberty. The concept of “disidentification” I am using here relates to a 
process of critically questioning, rehearsing, and then (re)articulating the position they have 
within the gendered ideology that permeates the binary gender system (Munoz, 1999). This 
finding compliments Henry Rubin’s US study (2003) and other accounts of transsexual 
men insofar as puberty, in most cases, marked an intensification of bodily awareness. This 
“disidentifying” awareness contributed to understandings concerning sex differences, as 
well as heightened feelings in relation to their “phenomenological (female) bodies.” 
However, in Rubin’s analysis he also argued that his participants suffered from agnosia, 
where they could not acknowledge certain aspects of their bodies. The pathology of agnosia 
does not appear in this research. My participants’ “phenomenological bodies” were often 
felt as sites of distress and their bodies were experienced as fundamentally a part of them. 
 
The feelings, expressed as “difference” by most of the transmen during the interviews, were 
clarified later in their narratives as experiences of incongruence between their sense of self, 
their “phenomenological” and “social body,” and their ascribed gender role. These 
incongruities ultimately led them to transition. However, at this point it was a change in 
their intentionality with regard to their ascribed gender, in an attempt to establish an 
understanding of their “gendered” expressions, which seemed to be out of sync with their 
“social” and “phenomenological” body. These thought processes and embodied intentions, 
then, were consciously moving from situations, which had queer beginnings toward a 
“straightening” of thought and towards securer sensations about their bodies, gendered 
expressions, and situations even though these were non-normative. However, as Sara 
Ahmed (2006: 36) suggests: 
 
The “intending” of the object [feelings] through which it becomes more than just 
one impression involves […] synthetic consciousness – that is, the connection of 
the new impression with what has gone before, in the very form of an active “re-
collection” or synthesis. Significantly, the object becomes an object of perception 
only given [by] the work of recollection. 
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Participants’ suggested that recollections about their lives offered significant moments of 
trying to understand themselves. As Gregory shows: 
 
When I was three years old I became aware people were using female gender 
pronouns and I couldn’t understand why, of course because I was in hospital, I did 
not have the same social experience as everyone else. When I was in there I did 
not hear how other people were spoken to, or about. So when I became aware that 
I had a girl’s name I wondered why and why I was wearing dresses, when 
obviously I was a boy. So I asked why and they thought I was retarded because of 
asking. I use the word retarded because it was the word used at the time, not 
because I believe that word is appropriate to use now. So I was treated as if I was 
stupid because in their view I didn’t understand that I was a girl (transman 
Gregory). 
 
Gregory was admitted to hospital and spent some time there, due to complications at birth, 
which left him with breathing and hearing impairments. Gregory’s experience of social 
processes of sex differentiation came much earlier than most of the transmen I interviewed. 
While those around him expected a default and coherent gender identity based on his birth 
sex, Gregory thought of himself as a boy. His socialisation, he states, was not the same as 
most children’s because of his spell in hospital. Gregory suggests that there is a need for 
socialisation to create a coherent gender identity, which undermines the notion of a 
biological basis to gender differences. Therefore, for Gregory, gender differences are only 
knowable through experiences of socialisation. 
 
In their interviews most transmen, however, mentioned puberty as the beginning of their 
transitioning narratives. This was also a significant time for many participants – since it 
was the period they first began visually witnessing and noticing culturally dominant 
ascriptions of sex differences, which added to their sense of being different. This was 
coupled with inflated familial and peer pressure that attempted to enforce heteronormative 
and gender normative ideals. 
 
Raymond: Appearances matter a lot, it is public school for girls and everything 
about it was training to be conformed, you know, this is how you are going to fit 
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into society, this is the role you are going to play and this is how it is going to be. I 
failed at every juncture. I started cutting myself from the age of eight. I didn’t 
know why, my mum said “stop being silly and you will have to hide it.” 
 
Zowie: Was that self-harming? 
 
Raymond: Yes and when I was fifteen, sixteen, I had a particularly bad cut, which 
stayed open for a year and that was on my appendix scar, literally I split it and 
overnight I must of scratched it, then over time I kept the scratch alive. It got a 
very, very deep infection in it. In hindsight I think, well my grandmother would 
always say my scar was the other way around – in the head. […] I would try have 
something out, if I dig around a bit, I can do it myself, or stop things like periods 
and I never put the two together until later until you can step back from it and see 
(transman Raymond). 
 
Intersubjective and social influences operating in relation to understanding sexual 
difference evolved in tandem with familial and locally dominant cultural and historically 
situated aspects of gender and sexuality. Raymond’s “phenomenological body” was 
obviously a target for his distress, however, he did not consciously identify as a boy at this 
time. The transmen in this research did not necessarily have a fixed and coherent 
understanding of their trans position during their adolescent years either. Although 
Raymond’s case of self harm is extreme compared to other transmen in this research, where 
feelings often manifested as “slippery” disidentifications with their “phenomenological 
bodies,” “social bodies” and expected social roles. The onset of puberty and adolescence 
also had an affect on participants’ “sexual bodies,” as the kernel of sexual identities began 
to formulate within heteronormative discourses. 
 
My interpretations of the interviews suggest that acknowledgement of the gender/sex 
differences through self ascription is not a sudden and singular realisation but an ongoing 
sensation of difference, as Benjamin’s account suggests: 
 
In terms of really realising around thirteen or fourteen when I was going through 
puberty then it became a very big issue and that is when I started to become 
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depressed but it wasn’t until I was about sixteen before I started seeing a 
counsellor […] So it was a long process in my head for me, but for an outsider it 
was from about fifteen onwards. I started seeing counsellors for that and went to 
[Gender Identity Clinic] at eighteen (transman Benjamin). 
 
Kenneth also suggests that puberty was a significant time, however, for him the body and 
gendered accoutrements played a prominent part in his understanding of sex differences 
and where he positioned himself within the binary sex system: 
 
[I was] betrayed by my body when I was twelve, when my chest developed. I 
suppose for a lot of that time I did cross-dress, which did make you stand out and 
that led to a lot of bullying but at the end of the day I wasn’t going to stop what I 
was doing because I felt comfortable (transman Kenneth). 
 
Kenneth’s story is similar to those of most of the transmen who were interviewed, where 
secondary sex characteristics induced through puberty, namely breasts and other 
characteristics, such as fat distribution and the onset of menses, were the cause of bodily 
disidentification. Many participants observed that the time around puberty was when their 
bodies started “betraying” them, which again compliments Rubin’s study (2003). 
 
In Kenneth’s recollections, wearing masculine clothing was a necessity because he was 
overweight as a child and the female clothing that was available did not fit him. 
Nevertheless, he felt comfortable in masculine clothing, which reiterated his affinity to a 
masculine identity. At the age of twelve Kenneth was bending rules that the sexual 
difference “body politic” was meant to enforce on his “social body.” The quotation above 
also shows the powerful intersubjective character of sex/gender, which was displayed by 
his peers at school when assigning his sex differently i.e. as female. The masculine clothing 
Kenneth wore drew reproaches from others because he was not conforming to the sartorial 
norms of femininity. These rules and social norms, however, were not as important to 
Kenneth as to those who had reproached him, although later this changed. Kenneth felt 
comfortable with the way he was expressing himself. This implies that the criticisms and 
bullying behaviour of others were not as traumatic as the disidentification he felt with his 
“phenomenological body” and his prescribed social role. 
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Nonetheless, when Kenneth was a teenager his clothing and gendered expression became 
more of a problem for his mother. Gender non-conformity at this age was seen to be a 
problem that required medical intervention.  He states: 
 
I had a major breakdown when I was fifteen and a half, because of all the pressure. 
If I didn’t wear female clothes my tranquilisers were increased. So it was aversion 
therapy. With the hormonal mood swings you went from being nice to horrible. I 
think if it was now instead of then, it would have been a lot better because my 
transgenderism was treated as schizophrenia. They got it so wrong. So my self-
image has always been quite negative. It has been wrapped around family 
(transman Kenneth). 
 
Societal institutions are prescriptive about certain aspects of masculinity and femininity, 
which act as both a restraint and a comfort as long as you can accomplish and produce the 
ideals “correctly.” Because Kenneth wanted to continue his “incorrect” expressions of 
femininity at home, he was reprimanded via drug induced pacification. In Kenneth’s case 
he was (mis)diagnosed with schizophrenia rather than what he calls “transgenderism,” 
because he wanted to continue to wear “male” clothing. 
 
Moreover, wearing feminine gendered clothing also caused concern for many participants 
and dresses were cited by almost all the transmen as the item of clothing that was the cause 
of their greatest disidentification. For example, Gregory said: 
 
When I started school my mum got me this evil pink gingham dress, which 
matched the kitchen curtains, I think it was the kitchen curtains [laugh]. I found 
that quite distressing and humiliating because obviously I would be seen in public 
wearing them clothes (transman Gregory). 
 
Gregory joked a little about how the clothes his mother made him wear to school looked, 
however, there were emotional costs for Gregory. These came in the form of “distress” and 
“humiliation” because he was seen by others in feminine clothing that he did not feel 
comfortable in and did not identify with. 
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Raymond’s chest was also a prominent feature of his disidentification through puberty.  
However, more emphasis was placed on the physical rather than the psychical, pain that his 
breasts caused. Nonetheless, the pain was represented both as physical and psychical. 
Raymond’s painful body “calls” him to consider it, with the goal of eradicating this pain. 
He says: 
 
Of course at puberty your body changes and there is no way around that. I was a 
double D chest, which was pretty painful. To lose that flat chest and slim figure 
was awful (transman Raymond). 
 
The pain brings into relief parts of his body that he once possessed. Absent body parts are 
reflected upon and puberty is seen as the event, which turned his prepubescent and sexually 
featureless body, into a distinctly female one. This generates a sense of “nostalgia” (H. 
Rubin, 2003) for his once sexually non-descript body. 
 
 
Daniel’s transitioning narrative did not start at puberty and was very different to most of the 
other transmen in the research. He observes: 
 
I had very long hair and before I transitioned I looked very female. I looked very 
Jaeger, Harvey Nichols with long blond hair and an Alice band sort of thing. I 
didn’t walk around looking butch or anything. I am looking for a photo to show 
but I do keep them hidden away, because I don’t want people to say: who’s that? 
Someone did once, they said oh who’s that it looks like you and I said it is my 
cousin, I lied massively. I was very glamorous and one of my gay male friends 
who thought I was this glamorous woman felt totally betrayed, we were talking 
about this the other day. He was very invested in me, basically I was his anima. I 
was very glamorous, big red lips, long blond hair, fur coat, big shades, I did really 
good drag. I really did like dressing up, almost drag queeny in a way (transman 
Daniel).  
 
He offers a psychoanalytical narrative to account for his decision to transition: 
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I first realised through a series of dreams also when I was about thirty eight, thirty 
nine [years old] I had done a workshop on anger, grief and fear, and anger was a 
particular issue. When I look back now, I thing that was the turning point, but I 
still did not know at that point that I was actually transsexual. It released 
something, something probably on a subconscious level that I wasn’t or never had 
been female despite having a female body. When the lights started to go on I 
started to have dreams that I had transitioned, I had dreams that I had attended an 
FtoM group, which at the time I did not know even existed and subsequently 
found out that they did. I was having all these dreams and suddenly the light went 
on and the subconscious became the conscious and once I knew, I had to do 
something about it. There was no way that I could live with that once I knew what 
I knew (transman Daniel). 
 
Nonetheless, the focus of most transmen’s narratives at the time of puberty centred on 
bodily change, which sharpened bodily awareness and, more often than not, extended 
understandings around sex differences in relation to correct “social bodies”. There were 
often overtones of “nostalgia” for a prepubescent body as well as resentment towards the 
pubescent one, which had gradually betrayed them, causing both psychical and physical 
pain. However, Daniel also illustrated a psychological change, introduced by dreams, 
which he saw as “subconscious” desires. 
 
Decision making and transitioning 
The processes of trans-sexing and of “body projects,” which I will take up below, start with 
feelings of difference, which initiate the questioning of identity, gender, and bodies. The 
empirical material that follows, from two pre-operative transmen, allows insights into 
various “phenomenological,” “social,” and “sexual” forms of reasoning prior to, and at the 
initial stages of, trans-sexing. Thinking the process through for these participants was about 
weighing up their feelings about corporeal requirements in relation to their sense of self, 
along with personal dynamics of bodily discomfort and disidentification. This was further 
combined with self-reflection, the consideration of social and medical limitations, and 
thinking about the views of significant others. 
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Initially, oscillations between what is personally right or wrong, in the process of decision 
making about trans-sexing, were pitted against what was deemed socially important. Oscar, 
who is a twenty-four year old student and is an active member in queer transgender 
community groups, suggested that the primary step of his transition would be hormone 
ingestion and talks about the processes involved through the lens of “expert” literature: 
 
Well, out of all the literature I have read on the effects of testosterone it would 
seem that it affects people differently. I have read that maybe you would get a little 
more aggressive, impatient and short tempered you do literally become a teenager 
and that there are fluxes in hormone levels, which is like going through puberty 
again and so I am trying to prepare myself for that. So I will try to enjoy that 
experience rather than be terrorised by it. It is a scary thing but I want those 
changes. (transman Oscar). 
 
Oscar’s knowledge about the hormone process allowed him insights into the multiple 
possibilities that may occur while taking testosterone. From this he was able to prepare 
himself for the many eventualities. Transitioning for Clifford needed much broader 
considerations. His account goes like this: 
 
Clifford: I am swaying more towards it [transitioning] and yes I probably would, it 
is a huge decision because it is obviously for a lifetime. 
 
Zowie: What kinds of things are you debating about with yourself? 
 
Clifford: I suppose it is about, is it right or wrong for me, not for other people but 
for me. Is this something I should fight against? Is this something that I should 
accept or should I just learn to accept it? […] 
 
Zowie: Have you researched into hormones and other transmen’s lives? 
 
Clifford: Well I belong to the group […] and there are a lot of people, so I have 
spoken to them. I think a lot of people find that there are a range of different ideas; 
some people feel that they have to have every possible option before they will be 
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happy. For me, if I do one thing, will that be fine for a little while? If it is not then 
you will have to go another step. I think there is a lot of dissatisfaction with 
phalloplasty for instance, and it is sad that people do not have enough information 
and feel that they have to go for that option. There are others that think that it is 
too risky and it is not satisfactory, so there is a range and I suppose you’ll do what 
is right for you (transman Clifford). 
 
Clifford’s and Oscar’s decision making processes are not at all, it seems, solitary 
endeavours. The decision making processes for them are restrained by the linkages between 
other transmen and knowledge of transgender literature as well as being understood through 
their own corporeal agendas. For Clifford, joining an FtM group in a city away from his 
home town allowed him to access a range of ideas, imagine diverse pathways, and, to 
understand risk factors that may be involved in transitioning from female to male. Both the 
“phenomenological body,” which imposes a focus on body imaging and the social body 
politic that attempt to restrict what a male body could be, along with the possibility of 
unsatisfactory surgical outcomes, for Clifford, and the unpredictability of testosterone use, 
for Oscar, are all factors that are taken into account. 
 
Oscar was also able to compare his bodily aesthetic and how he felt about it, to his friends’ 
experiences of body dysmorphia, in the transgender social groups he attended: 
 
I feel lucky in a sense because I have other trans friends, who really hate their 
bodies and want to change their bodies. So I feel privileged because for me, I am 
not that bad, it is bearable and I can live with it. I am lucky because I have a 
boyish frame and very small breasts anyway. Binding is not essential and I can get 
away with not binding sometimes. So I don’t feel obviously female with my body. 
[However,] I do feel disassociated with my sexual body (transman Oscar). 
 
What is highlighted in the extract above is Oscar’s tolerance of his personal bodily aesthetic 
due to his ability to present himself as a boy. He does, however, separate his feelings about 
his “phenomenological” and “social” bodies, of which he is tolerant, from those about his 
intolerable “sexual” body. Oscar’s disassociation from his female body, in sexual spaces, is 
intentionally redirected away from those parts of the body that are causes of concern. This 
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is not disembodiment (a phenomenological impossibility) but instead a shift in focus, which 
is triggered by the parts of the body that affront him. In this sense, it is the lack of 
acknowledgement of, or refocusing on, parts of the body in certain (“sexual”) situations, 
spaces, and times that this, and other participants, experience and understand rather than the 
denial of their material bodies. The disassociation the participants felt often lessened after 
hormone therapy and especially after surgical procedures were undertaken, as this changes 
the perception of the post-operative transmen’s discrepancy between their own body image 
in relation to their modified “social,” “sexual,” and “phenomenological” body and 
acceptance by others. This was illustrated by Benjamin, who stated: 
 
I have more confidence each operation I have been through, but basically the one 
just gone [a phalloplasty] has given me confidence yet again. When I look in the 
mirror I am a lot more happy to see what I see (transman Benjamin). 
 
To summarise, then, almost all the transmen had extracted information from trans groups 
and from sexological and transgender literature. Belonging to transgender groups allowed 
considerations to be made on the basis of the material bodies of others. Listening to 
anecdotal evidence, as well as utilising expert knowledge, also formed a large part of their 
understanding of what their future bodily trajectories could be. In addition, from these 
groups and from transgender literature transmen also understood that it was still possible to 
identify as male while not having genital surgery. Bodily aesthetics may, if so desired, be 
constructed with regard to personal bodily needs. There are a range of possibilities of what 
the constructed body can be in relation to becoming male, and the interactions in the trans 
groups and in the transgender literature make clear that there are no strict guidelines and 
that there are fluid notions of masculine bodies (albeit ones that are socially and medically 
restricted). 
 
Male identities and bodies are understood from other vantage points too. Oscar, for 
example, understands that his “transgender trajectory” is informed by variables such as his 
age and his experience: 
 
[my identity] well, it kind of shifts and I am [now] identifying as FtM transboy, a 
transboy rather than a transman. I have been playing around with that concept. So I 
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identify as trans rather than male or purporting to be a man because I see my 
identity as being quite fluid and subject to change and quite a transitional identity. 
I think it has a lot of scope to be able to get away from the category of woman 
because I don’t identify as woman either. I don’t recognise myself as female even 
though I don’t have the experience of growing up as a boy, so boy for me is the 
social experience of moving away from female into a male category. As I say, that 
could change, because I do want to take hormones. Eventually I want to have 
surgery and that experience may change how I identify as a transman and maybe a 
man but at the moment I am identifying as boy and still grappling with that. It has 
been a huge exploration and quite an adventure over the past five years. There has 
been a lot of processing and a lot of soul searching. I do feel very adolescent so it 
is not all about gender, my identity is very wrapped up with age, and I feel very 
youthful, also the problem[s] of youthfulness (transman Oscar). 
 
Oscar’s use of the term “boy” suggests the avoidance of a limited idea of masculinity that is 
wholly about male bodies. It is here that the phenomenological critique of bodies comes to 
bear. It questions intrinsically understood ideas about gender as a “core” aspect of 
experience. Oscar’s experiences are adaptively situated rather than developmentally 
situated. Whilst accepting that there may be a trajectory towards an unknown and 
unrealised masculinity, analogous to the trajectory from boyhood to manhood or, in this 
case, from female to boy and then on to man, Oscar is also working out his situatedness in 
relation to past and present dimensions of his life. Oscar suggests that he is definitely not a 
woman and that he does not (yet) identify as a man and therefore, settles on “boy” as a 
transitional identity.  
 
For Oscar and Kenneth there was no sense of urgency in confirming an identity either 
socially or personally. This allowed them time to work through the aesthetic desires of their 
bodies in relation to their sense of self. Nonetheless, social interaction always attracts the 
other’s gaze, whether this is wanted or not. Such interactions continuously bring the “social 
body” into relief. Across various social spaces “identity work” is performed by others on 
the bodies of all the transmen in the research. I asked Oscar: Does your body have any 
relation to your “boy” identity? 
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Oscar: That is a large part of it I guess and from a heteronormative reading I am 
presumably a young heterosexual boy of thirteen or fourteen. A boy who is just 
entering into puberty whose voice hasn’t broken yet. From appearances I am 
perceived as a young boy but when I speak there is another reading going on and 
then I am read as female and then interpreted as a boyish lesbian or butch dyke. Or 
sometimes I will be read as really young, eleven or twelve, when they hear the 
voice. So that is a big part of it (transman Oscar) 
 
Kenneth, narrative differed and said that he is perceived as male in most social situations: 
 
Everybody, image-wise, has taken me as male. It is only when I have chosen to 
walk into somewhere that is female that their perceptions have been scandalised 
(transman Kenneth). 
 
Whilst Oscar and Kenneth have very little influence on how they are seen, as this is 
dependent, for instance, on the context, “gender capital” (Bourdieu, 2001), and gender 
belief systems (R. Stoller, 1985) of the onlookers, both Oscar and Kenneth measured their 
personal bodily aesthetic, and consequent bodily requirements, against how others have 
perceived them. Therefore, there is a relationship between the body that is objectified and 
the gaze, which is instrumental to understand each transperson’s “social” bodily aesthetic. 
 
Sub-cultural ideals of masculinity are also important in this context, as the following 
quotation illustrates: 
 
Well last year at pride I was protesting, […] these gay boys came up to me and I 
thought I looked like a gay boy that day and they just started chatting with me. I 
was aware that one was flirting with me and I was interested in him. Then he got a 
little confused because he looked at me and looked again, and said “ooh, ooh you 
don’t have an Adam’s apple” and I was trying not to get too confused by it all, and 
he said that he had been reading me as male, but you don’t have an Adam’s apple 
so therefore you are a dyke. Oh my god I am attracted to a dyke. I said I am not a 
dyke. “Oh sorry have I offended you then? Well what are you then?” At this point 
I totally lost interest in him. I have stopped worrying about all this though, people 
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will talk to me and look for signifiers of masculinity such as the Adam’s apple or 
voice and not finding that then they would examine my face, “oh a pretty female 
face, oh it’s got to be female.” So yes [the photo] does capture male when it is that 
first impression that some people may have of me and then they look again. I don’t 
know. I find it really hard because I look in the mirror and I think I look male and 
wonder why people cannot get that. But then I sometimes get a glance of me and 
paranoia comes over me because I look female and of course this is what the 
others see. It is so dependent on context and I think class plays a part in that and so 
does Gaydar, especially in the [gay village]. I am being read as lesbian so I have 
been avoiding going there recently. It just got a bit annoying really. I mean I don’t 
mind really but I am trying to assert this transmale identity and it is just not getting 
read in those contexts. There has been a few times when I have been read as a gay 
male, which has been wow, great. I try to encourage that reading but it is very rare 
and outside a queer context I am read as a young male (transman Oscar). 
 
Oscar’s body takes on various aesthetic configurations in different “queer spaces.” The 
figurations are dependent on various dimensions in relation to the “gender capital” and 
“queer capital” of those doing the looking. On occasions these figurations, as the quotation 
above suggests, are formed by the “lookers” in contradistinction to how Oscar felt he was 
expressing himself. When the wrong reading of Oscar’s body is apparent, for example, 
when “one of them was flirting,” and “look[ing] for signifiers of masculinity” or when he 
was “being read as lesbian” it highlighted that he did not have a convincingly male look to 
those who had the “gender capital” to evaluate the potential possibilities of Oscar’s gender 
in that space. Rather than opting for transition by way of hormonal or surgical measures at 
this point, instead, Oscar removed himself from these “queer spaces.” Oscar preferred to be 
in non-queer spaces because he was read as a young boy. “Queer spaces,” then, do not 
necessarily provide a comfortable home for those who identify as trans. Halberstam 
(1998b) describes how in “queer spaces” butch and transmen’s bodies are always read 
against each other on an aesthetic continuum. People “in the know” search for 
differentiating aesthetics between the two. Halberstam suggests that “passing tips” are 
commonly shared between transmen on the internet and at conferences, because of the 
problems of non-visibility in the desired gender. In these instances, the aesthetic which is 
offered, often assumes a traditional middle class masculinity. A preppy, clean-cut look is 
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often suggested (Halberstam, 1998b). Transmen are warned to avoid “punky” hair cuts, 
black leather jackets, and other aesthetic signifiers sometimes associated with butch 
lesbians. The notion of “gender capital,” in the sense of being able to understand gender 
codes, is a precise tool, which determines clothes, clubs, and so on, and does much of the 
work in relation to gender presentation and how you carry yourself. A transman going to 
“queer spaces” has to be aware that “gender capital” can work to undermine the readings he 
wants to elicit, as well as to make him feel safer. The spaces and “lookers” vary from 
participant to participant, in the rest of this study. However, it is evident that the context, 
the “lookers,” and their “gender capital” play an influential part in the decision making 
process of each transman in relation to his bodily aesthetic. 
 
In addition to peoples’ perceptions of him, Oscar’s additional focus is on the effects that his 
transition will have on his family and partner: 
 
I suppose also that I am afraid of the changes and the impact on those who are 
close to me, family and my partner […]. I have told my parents that I want to start 
hormones but I have been introducing the whole trans thing quite slowly. I have 
just started seeing someone who is quite open minded and very accepting and 
reads me as male but at the same time someone who doesn’t trust drugs and 
someone who would go for more herbal remedies; so she is unaware of what they 
are going to do. So it is a way of making sure they are aware of the possible side 
effects and how relevant it is to my identity really (transman Oscar). 
 
Whilst in the following quotation, Kenneth’s decision making is related to his health. 
Kenneth has endocrinological problems that have influenced his decision making process 
about both hormones and surgical procedures. He says: 
 
I had to think about it a lot because my body is so damaged anyway, [even] before 
we get to the transition part of it. Then, am I going to be happy living my life with 
the way I am now? It was based on the experience that I was having at the time 
(transman Kenneth). 
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Kenneth’s ailing body hampers the possibilities surrounding his transitioning and as such 
he reflects on the pros and cons of having a normative male body and the problems, which 
that may bring, on the one hand, or living with a non-normative male body that he may not 
feel comfortable with, on the other. It is his bodily aesthetic then, which is of paramount 
importance rather than his gender identity. 
 
In this section I have highlighted only a selection of the possible intersecting circumstances 
that transmen review whilst considering procedures in order to trans-sex. Nonetheless, in 
this research, all the transmen’s identities and bodily decisions were made in relation to the 
degree with which they disidentified with their “phenomenological bodies.” The objective 
figurations of the body by others in the social world were revealed through random, 
coincidental experiences, such as meeting people in “trans spaces,” “queer spaces”, “sexual 
spaces,” and “social spaces,” as well as through reading literature about transitioning, and 
so on. The interrelational aspects of the participant’s life aided and, in some instances, 
hindered the individual in developing a sense of their body image(s). Personal 
understandings of their bodies’ social meanings were considered crucial, more so than 
normative expectations about bodily aesthetics. Participants’ decisions about surgery were 
made based on many factors, such as self-image and the various levels of disidentification 
with their bodies, the social, familial, and sexual interactions of the individual transman and 
the access to, and knowledge about, the technologies that are available. 
 
Hormones: masculinity from inside out and outside in 
After the decision making process, usually the next stage in the “body projects” of 
transmen is taking, and monitoring the effects, of hormones. These are usually medically 
prescribed, although by no means is this always so. Some transmen consider, and then 
utilise, the internet as a source for obtaining hormones. In some cases hormones are 
administered after taking into account other health factors, such as blood pressure, and 
glandular functioning. Initially small doses are taken or administered to measure the 
positive and detrimental effects to the body. If the dangers are deemed to be less than the 
benefits gained, a continuation of, or an increase in, the dose will be administered. This will 
quicken the masculinising effects on the body. However, for transmen, the aesthetic effects 
which result from taking hormones are much more apparent than they are for transwomen. 
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Once the decision is made to transition from female to male, a speedy transition is often 
desired. One of the benefits that taking hormones quickly achieves is aesthetic 
masculinisation, which can enable transmen to pass as men. This seems to have more 
benefits than genital surgery. Hormonal effects also dramatically influence the sense of self 
as masculine, as positive readings of the body through intersubjective experiences reiterate 
their masculine aesthetic, which subsequently contributes to the development of self-esteem 
on a “phenomenological,” “social” and “sexual” level.  
 
Hormone therapy, in relation to transmen’s trajectory towards possessing a male body, is 
widely regarded as the primary positive step in relation to transitioning. Although this step 
is of greater importance to the transman, compared to the transwomen in this research, it 
does present aesthetic and psychic challenges to them. Aesthetic benefits of taking 
hormones included masculine fat distribution, muscle density, facial and body hair, and, in 
some cases, contributed to male-pattern balding, which all created a masculine appearance 
very quickly. Taking hormones also incurs side-effects such as mood swings, acne, and 
depression, which, in this research, were considered manageable for all but one participant. 
Daniel suggested that there are drawbacks if hormones have to be stopped for any reason. 
For example, Daniel stopped twice because of problems experienced through taking high 
doses of testosterone He stated: 
 
I started to take testosterone in 2001 and perhaps not surprisingly with me; I had 
lots of problems with it. Basically I have tried every kind of testosterone that is on 
the market except for implants. I had problems with all of them in terms of side-
effects. Another thing with me is that I am hyper-sensitive with substances, food, 
anything. So, I would react more than some people might because of that 
(transman Daniel). 
 
Daniel continued: 
 
Sustanol that I began on masculinises people very quickly and very well if you 
take the maximum dose, it really works. Your voice will break, you will get facial 
hair, but as you can see I have very little facial hair even after five years. Then if 
you stop using it, well the medical professionals will say it is all irreversible, but I 
 115
beg to differ, even the voice loses some of its depth and resonance if you stop 
taking it. Facial features soften out quickly, so you get a feminine looking face, 
even if you kept the facial hair. You would also lose masculine muscle tone and 
body shape would go back to female. As far as I was concerned I would lose all 
that I had gained by not using it anymore and that happened twice in the last five 
years. I would go out there and had been passing pretty well most of the time to 
suddenly discover that I was getting so many more “loves” and “madams” that 
told me that suddenly I was not passing, well passing to some people but not to 
others. That would have got worse and worse and worse, if I had kept the dose low 
or not taken testosterone. That actually drove me on to find another way of taking 
testosterone (transman Daniel). 
 
In this instance, the continued use of testosterone was required to maintain [an] aesthetic 
appearance of maleness. The consequence of not continuing with the regime negatively 
affected Daniel’s “social body” and his visibility as a male. 
 
Daniel’s narrative highlights the difficulties that are encountered during the processes of 
attaining a masculine body through hormone therapy. In addition, aesthetic hormonal 
changes are not foreseen in their complete entirety. That is, participants’ aspirations to have 
a recognisably male body were thwarted by various hurdles. These hurdles affected the 
“social,” “sexual,” and “phenomenological” bodies of the transmen to varying degrees. The 
initial trials of hormone therapy are based on whether the body is able to cope with them in 
high doses. Jackson talked about his experiences alongside those of a friend, who had also 
taken testosterone. He said: 
 
He seemed to remain very calm when he had the hormones. I [on the other hand] 
have always been very easy going, a real softy, a pushover, [but] when I had the 
hormones it seemed to vamp me up a bit. I wasn’t how I used to be and I used to 
think differently but this was only initially and I think I am back to myself now. I 
suppose with all that going into your body it is going to have an impact but I think 
I am back to myself now. I got quite touchy at times, which I never was before 
(transman Jackson). 
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Jackson’s picture of taking testosterone illustrates that it was far from an easy option for 
him. The psychic upheaval plus the physical effects do, however, settle down in time: 
 
I think my body has got to the point where the hormones have stopped doing battle 
and I am just having top-ups now because there are no significant changes 
anymore in the last year or so I began noticing it was coming to an end, the 
transition period (transman Benjamin). 
 
Nonetheless, other mixed emotions and problems were reported: 
 
It was a strange experience having mood swings and hot flushes I remember 
feeling happy that I was on them but also quite depressed at first (transman 
Benjamin). 
 
Interestingly, for some interviewees testosterone provided a sense of relief by producing a 
masculine aesthetic, while simultaneously causing feelings of uncannyness and, in many 
cases, depression. For example, Raymond said: 
 
Ironically, the biggest thing I had when I had the first injection, was a really big 
depression. Nothing actually to do with the hormones themselves but I have been 
fighting so hard for this treatment, I had a doctor who struck me off because he 
couldn’t treat “something like you,” as he said, I’d had [psychiatrists] slamming 
me at every opportunity, [another psychiatrist] I felt had breached my 
confidentiality by phoning my parents, so having put in this big effort and fight 
about what I need, it is not a want, it is a need, I felt very suicidal at the end. I 
couldn’t get the viola out of its case; I couldn’t get myself out of the house, so I 
was really at that rock bottom place, where you think you have a choice, either you 
do something about this or you die, it is as simple as this. Because I think suicide 
is wrong when there is an opportunity to do something about it, you do the 
something else first and if it doesn’t work then you kill yourself. So when I started 
the hormones I felt this terrible sadness because I couldn’t make it work as a 
female, but it comes to the point when you need to say good bye to a whole load of 
negatives. That person has got you that far and you have to acknowledge that 
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somehow, because you can not just deny the whole being, because actually, it is 
quite important to understand that that person has actually got you there. So that 
was the first response really, the psychological drop (transman Raymond). 
 
This juxtaposition of a sense of achievement and failure was not apparent in most of the 
transmen’s narratives. However, it was a particularly poignant moment for Raymond when 
he reflected upon the sheer might of his fight against the self and the clinicians he 
encountered.  
 
Furthermore, “male” puberty was mentioned in most cases. Male puberty, following 
hormone use resulted in bodily effects that caused mixed emotions: 
 
I don’t actually feel anything now when I take them but when I first started taking 
[hormones] it was strange because I was aware that I was becoming a teenager 
again even though I was still only eighteen but I had been through the whole 
teenager phase before (transman Benjamin). 
 
The following extract illustrates the heterogeneous feelings experienced in relation to 
hormones. Nevertheless, both emotional and aesthetic dimensions of taking hormones 
amplified a sense of masculinity in various ways, for example, psychical and physical 
factors were highlighted by Raymond: 
 
The first thing that really showed up after the two injections was a massive bout of 
acne. I was affected on my face and it was absolutely awful. In one sense it didn’t 
bother me because in one sense I knew it was the side effects of hormones and that 
it would pass but I wanted it to hurry up a bit. The only thing my parents would 
comment on was the fact that I had awful acne. Not the fact that my voice had 
started to deepen. […] One of the first things that the testosterone does is give you 
a sex drive. I don’t know how they measured it but a biological male will have 
250mg in there body at the peak of each cycle at puberty. Transmen inject that 
every two weeks in the beginning so suddenly you have gone from normal female 
sex drive, or low female sex drive, or suppressed female sex drive, to massive [sex 
drive]. Your body is changing so your bodily feelings grow at the same time 
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because it is becoming what you wanted it to become at the same time. So you 
ask: how am I going to deal with this? And you often find transmen sitting around 
talking about sex (transman Raymond). 
 
Raymond’s stereotypical understanding of the sex drive, which is usually associated with 
masculinity and testosterone in Western society, functioned here as an intrinsic indicator of 
masculinity and, thus, of him becoming more male. The sex drive also coincides with a 
“return” to a male pubescent state. The onset of acne is often noted in the narratives and, 
again, is a phenomenon associated more with pubescent teenage males than females. There 
is a developmental discourse intrinsic to these understandings, which moves from female to 
boy, on a journey into manhood. This reproduces widespread cultural narratives about 
“uncontrollable sexual urges” brought on by “raging hormones.” All but one of the 
transmen in the research articulated heightened masculinity in stereotypical ways, in 
relation to the initial stages of testosterone taking. For example, one participant talked 
about being “able to talk about men’s things with men” due to other men now regarding 
him as male, another about becoming more “vigorous,” another about “becoming less 
emotional” and another about “losing empathy with people.” However, after the initial 
hormonal “shock to the [bodily] system” and having “got to the point where the hormones 
have stopped doing battle,” most of the transmen in the research suggested that there was a 
return to their normal selves and their normal temperaments, which did not come across to 
me as heightened masculinity (I take this analysis up in more detail in “Negotiating 
masculinities” below).  
 
Producing ideal bodies 
Not surprisingly, the focus of most of the younger transmen’s bodily aesthetics, in relation 
to their ideal body, was similar to a lot of younger men’s, where muscularity and toned 
bodies figured highly. Teenagers explicitly linked having a well-toned, muscular body with 
feelings of confidence and power in social situations (Grogan & Richards, 2002). Benjamin 
highlights that with the body hair that testosterone helped develop and some hard work at 
the gym he would be able to actualise his aspiration of his ideal body and express his 
masculinity. He said: 
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I think my favourite part was getting my stomach hair, I think it is because […I] 
didn’t have huge breasts so I could put my hands over my chest and when I looked 
in the mirror I had a male chest and when I would have that [mastectomy] 
operation the hair would help it look more male. I am aware that if I shave my 
stomach hair off I would still have a feminine looking belly because I am not very 
muscled at the moment, so the hair was really good […] I want the lines men have. 
I am aware that my stomach muscles need a lot more work, more than a 
genetically born male would have to do to get the same sort of muscle definition, I 
am obsessed with it to be honest I am the sort of person who will go to the gym, 
anything to make me look as masculine as possible (transman Benjamin). 
 
Benjamin “obsessed” about his male bodily aesthetic. He also checked on his bodily 
transformation regularly to monitor the amount of gym work that he required to attain the 
ideal body he envisaged. The gym also played a prominent part in masculinising for Oscar, 
following my question: 
 
Zowie: Do you have any other regimes that you do to change your body? 
 
Oscar: I am actually trying to build up muscle mass and I go to the gym, this is a 
funny thing, last year I went to the gym frequently and really trying to build up 
muscle and I have a really toned body and I am happy with that but more recently 
I have become involved with someone who is not so concerned with visual 
appearances, so I have stopped going to the gym so much. She has made me aware 
of the whole body culture and the whole fetishising of that and what you are doing 
to yourself or forcing yourself to have a good body, because at one point it was 
ridiculous as I was in the gym about four or five times a week. I was exhausting 
my body with weights trying to gain muscle and make it more and more male. I 
realised that I just need hormones for this. The pressure of all this has been lifted 
by having someone who sees me as having a male energy and getting my trans 
identity and saying that I don’t need to go down this route because it is how I read 
you anyway. So just keeping active now, going jogging, and just getting outside 
much more rather than going down to the gym (transman Oscar). 
 
 120
Oscar’s new partner influenced the way he looked at his ideal “sexual body,” by suggesting 
that she recognised his regime to attain a muscular body as “body fascism” and by 
observing that this would not ultimately enhance his masculine energy for her.  
 
Muscularity was also an important factor for Clifford, however, emphasis was placed less 
on the aesthetics of muscularity and more on the strength that muscles gave him prior to 
him stopping working-out.  He stated: 
 
I used to go to the gym quite a lot but I feel too self conscious to go to the gym at 
the moment. At the moment I suppose it is the changing rooms I cannot handle, 
the toilets I can just about handle, but the changing rooms are too much. I do 
sometimes do [exercise] at home. Something I have been quite conscious about is, 
since Christmas, I have lost quite a lot of weight and quite a lot of strength. Like, 
on the [training] course, I was trying to pull the cord to get the engine started and I 
just couldn’t, and they were saying just give it some beef. It just reminded me of 
me being a girl (transman Clifford). 
 
The strength Clifford felt he had lost became a social problem for him, owing to the fact 
that he felt emasculated in front of his peers. He was in a double bind, being unable to 
endure the interaction in the changing rooms at the gym, but, at the same time, needing to 
build up his muscles to feel masculine. 
 
The majority of transmen in the research mentioned height as part of an impossible ideal, 
which they could never fulfil. This affected them in different ways. For example, the 
problems with having a short body for Benjamin were both “socially” and “sexually” 
problematic, because it did not comply with his male ideal. However, Benjamin did 
acknowledge the heterogeneity of male bodies: 
 
Benjamin: I am obsessed with my height and I suppose if it wasn’t an incredibly 
painful operation […] that would be an operation that I would have just even if it 
added just another two or three inches on to my height. I think it’s partly vanity 
and because other people make fun of my height, I’m not a midget, I am a short 
bloke. 
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Zowie: Is it something to do with masculinity? 
 
Benjamin: Yeah I think men are supposed to be taller than women, again it causes 
me problems when I am meeting women because they want someone taller than 
them it is quite natural for a woman and a man to want a woman shorter than he is 
it is not essential but it is natural I think it’s a protective thing, I do feel a bit stupid 
if I am hugging a girl and she’s taller than me it doesn’t feel quite as normal that’s 
something I would like to change about myself but I can’t so I’m stuck with it 
(transman Benjamin). 
 
On both a “sexual” and “social” level, the expectation of males being taller than females 
was something that affected Benjamin’s interactions as a heterosexual man.  
 
Surgical outcomes and aesthetic conciliations in different spaces  
The belief that the body can be expressed in limitless ways with the aid of technology 
(Baudrillard, 1987; Kroker & Kroker, 1987) available in the UK and through surgical 
tourism is a myth. Accordingly, at the outset, transmen’s stories suggest that initially there 
was a “dream” of creating a body like those of biologically born males, however, this was 
rarely actualised. One of the themes to emerge from the interviews was what I have termed 
limits on/of the body in relation to bodily aesthetics. These limits were linked by the 
participants to various contexts and locations. In most of the transmen’s accounts, aesthetic 
constraints were highlighted after surgical procedures. Phalloplasty surgery offers the 
transman a neophallus that takes multiple operations to construct. Body tissue is taken from 
the forearm or stomach area and attached to the genital area, which leaves obvious scarring, 
either on the forearm or the stomach. Metoidioplasty21 is an operation through which the 
clitoris is extended and sculpted to give the appearance of a small penis. The decision to 
have phalloplasty for Benjamin, for instance, was because the “other option” 
(Metoidioplasty) would not be sufficient enough to make him look like a “normal male”. 
He said: 
                                                 
21 With testosterone the clitoris enlarges, over time, to an average of 4-5 cm. In a Metoidioplasty, 
the enlarged clitoris is released from its position and moved forward to more closely approximate 
the position of a penis. In some cases the urethra is lengthened to end at the tip of the neophallus. 
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Another option is for them to extend the clitoris which I know some people opt 
for. I just thought what’s the point? Because it is something like half an inch long 
or an inch long and it is very thin to me. That is not a normal male unless there is 
something wrong, so yeah size did matter it does to every guy (transman 
Benjamin). 
 
For some transmen, in order to have bodies that are characteristically male, such as, having 
a flat chest and/or a “normal” sized penis, aesthetic concessions have to be made. Benjamin 
continued: 
 
Benjamin: The first surgery was double mastectomy with nipple reattachment. I 
don’t think they have actually made them [nipples] smaller. They were going to 
but they have just reattached them so they are in a better place. […] There are 
several different ways of doing it. They’ve just taken out the whole of the tissue 
and gone straight across my chest. [I am] not too happy with the scaring, it’s very, 
very big. I was happy at the time but at the moment I am not happy. 
 
Zowie: For what reasons? 
 
Benjamin: I think I was happy at the time because I was just happy to get rid of my 
breasts, and the fact that I could just wear a T-shirt and not have to do all the 
binding. Now a couple of years later I am still not in a position to take my top off 
without people noticing that there is something wrong. The scar tissue is about a 
centimetre thick and still very obvious and my nipples aren’t quite normal. If you 
walked pass me in the street, if I had my top off, you would notice a huge 
difference, it may not be obvious what I’ve had done, but there is obvious surgery 
there, quite dramatic surgery (transman Benjamin). 
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A flat chest contributed to transmen’s sense of maleness and, in addition, permitted 
participants to wear a wider choice of clothing without the nuisance of binding22. But 
drawbacks were expressed for instance restricting the removal of clothing in social spaces, 
such as sporting venues: 
 
I am happy that I don’t have to bind anymore and [I can] wear a T-shirt and feel 
comfortable, but my dream is to go swimming and that’s my ultimate goal 
(transman Benjamin). 
 
The scarring that is visible on transmen’s bodies is obviously due to major surgery. These 
scars can fade or become concealed over time with body hair. The concealment is, 
however, contingent on the continual taking of testosterone. All but one of the transmen 
interviewed indicated that in public spaces scarring constrained their behaviour because it 
risked heightening other’s curiosity and triggering questions. It was not because people 
would automatically make assumptions and read the participant as a transman, in fact, most 
of the participants suggested that few people would recognise double mastectomy scars 
unless they knew them intimately or they were “in the know.” In addition to the restrictive 
nature of public spaces, the following extract illustrates how Jackson felt constrained in 
private sexual spaces: 
 
Zowie: How did you feel about your partner seeing your body prior to transition? 
 
Jackson: I didn’t mind before, but I don’t like it so much now. I feel a bit 
embarrassed, a bit like a butcher’s shop. I think I felt a lot more comfortable when 
we were supposed to be gay, as people saw us. I would often walk around with 
nothing on […] I would never do it now. I always shut the bathroom door now and 
I think I have become more private than ever (transman Jackson). 
 
Following chest surgery Jackson’s concern was centred on the detrimental effect that the 
disfigurement had produced in his relationship with his partner. His negative body image 
affected his “sexual body” and everyday private practices and his relationship. While poor 
                                                 
22 Binding is used by transmen to flatten the chest area to make it more in-line with a male chest. 
This practice is often experienced as restrictive and uncomfortable. 
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support from the family, and other people close to the transperson, is a documented 
prognostic aspect of a transperson’s experience of regret following “gender confirmation 
surgery” (Landen, 1999), in this case, the bodily aesthetic adds to the negative experience 
of shame. 
 
Benjamin had started procedures for phalloplasty at the time of the interview. He was also 
waiting for a pump to be fitted within his prosthetic testicles, which would enable him to 
have an erect penis. Benjamin was also waiting for a skin graft to the tip of the penis. While 
he was content with the aesthetic outcome of the penis that had been constructed, Benjamin 
realised that the operations still had their limitations. He stated: 
 
At the moment I can meet someone but I still can’t sleep with them, not really, 
fully as a man and I think that will make a big difference. Someone will still be 
able to tell, the surgery is brilliant, but it won’t be like that you won’t be able to 
tell, I don’t think so anyway (transman Benjamin). 
 
The potential of surgical outcomes, the dangers that are sometimes encountered, and the 
possible failure of the operations are all analysed by the transmen in relation to their 
“sexual body.” Alongside the restrictions imposed by the limits of the non/pre-surgical 
body, these are sometimes discursively and materially challenged by the participants. In the 
narratives that follow, the liminal “phenomenological body” does not simply stop at the 
surface of the skin (liminality is a stage of change, for the period of which your usual limits 
to self-understanding are relaxed, opening the way to something new); in these cases the 
“phenomenological body” and “sexual body” schema is extended psychologically and 
materially with the use of prosthetics. Kenneth stated: 
 
Phalloplasty is an operation that doesn’t work. It has a fifty per cent fail rate. 
Psychologically, by the time you have gone through the two years RLE, unless 
you have gone out and bought yourself a device that you can pee standing up, or 
you’re not comfortable with the strap-on that you use, I personally think that it is a 
lot of operation. In my case, and the reason I am not looking at it [phalloplasty], is 
not because my body is not robust but because it has a fifty per cent fail rate and 
the psychological implications of that not working and being left with something 
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that does not function and is not aesthetically pleasing. I think you have to look at 
the aesthetics and it is an interesting trade-off between the FtMs and the MtFs, the 
FtMs pass, the MtFs struggle and get harassment but the operation is a lot 
smoother, the other way the operation is not. To be honest with you being able to 
pass allows you to achieve more. If you are going through a phase where you look 
wrong you get marginalised. I think […] we are living in a materialistic world, and 
it is all about advertising, so when you go for a job you are advertising yourself so 
if you haven’t got the sort of balls, or background, or confidence to carry that off 
you are not going to get the job. So it is about image and perception so you can be 
really crap but give the impression that you are great. The phalloplasty for me is 
not the be all and end all of life. I function with a strap-on, I have a very realistic 
one, I don’t know if you have come across what they call a Doc Johnston, from 
America, it is very realistic. Being male for me is not phallocentric (transman 
Kenneth). 
 
Kenneth and Oscar distinguish between the social and sexual spaces where their extended 
body morphology is significant. Kenneth, for instance, raises the issue of passing as 
socially important in order to escape prejudice and thus allows him to accomplish more in 
his life. Here, the penis is less of a social requirement and emphasis is placed instead on 
other bodily areas, along with “correct” comportment and demeanour. Kenneth suggests 
that it is how these characteristics are perceived by those in positions of power, which is 
more important because it is those people who can award material benefits. Oscar suggests 
that by using “packing” to give the impression of male genitals provides him with a sense 
of security within a social setting. 
 
I sometimes use a sock and just that extra bit of padding helps me feel a bit more 
comfortable somehow (transman Oscar). 
 
The impression of a penis, rather than actually having a penis, is significant in social spaces 
and thus, for the “social body”. This further suggests that when these transmen considered 
transitioning and possible surgical procedures, it was not the genitals that were identified as 
the most important factor in the construction of a male body. The place, however, where the 
intimate bodily aesthetic is most likely to be seen by others is in sexual spaces.  
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Sexualised spaces, such as clubs, bars and homes, help to produce other narratives about 
the use of prosthetics as an extension of the body. Oscar stated: 
 
when I am going out and if there is more of a sexual energy, I tend to do that if I 
am feeling particularly playful, so I have packing or my soft dildo, which I am 
replacing at the moment […] I mean sex, it is important for me. To be wearing a 
dildo, that is when it really matters (transman Oscar). 
 
For Oscar the use of prosthetics contributes to his sexualised and masculine aesthetic while 
“going out” and procuring sexual partners. Kenneth, too, incorporates the use of a strap-on 
device while having sex with his partner. 
 
The Doc Johnston which feels real anyway, it is latex and because of the way it is 
worn and my clitoris is quite big it really connected and it felt as if I had a real 
dick. I do not like being penetrated but I don’t mind my clit or dickclit as we now 
call it, being played with. I like to give and she likes to receive so it works very 
well like that (transman Kenneth). 
 
A process of re-figuration is employed in this narrative. The clitoris, a “female” body part 
is discursively replaced by “dickclit,” which creates a new (queer) bodily meaning. While 
these narratives could be interpreted as “butch” lesbian sexual practices, the reference to the 
“dickclit” is a decidedly queer or transgender term, which undermines that reading. 
Furthermore, the bodily sensation created by the prosthesis touching Kenneth’s “dickclit,” 
while he is having sex, allowed him to articulate feelings of having an authentic penis. 
These discursive strategies arguably remind us of Butler’s (Butler, 1990) assertion of 
potential subversion of sexualised discourse. While Kenneth may be able to bask in the 
phenomenological subversion of his own (sexual) situation, by refiguring his “sexual 
body,” his intelligibility may still be ordered through the power of “social” norms that mark 
him as intelligible in other situations. 
 
The participants who use, or have used, prosthetics suggest that they can, in various 
contexts, extend the limits of their corporeality. The overarching claim of all members of 
 127
this group of participants is their ability to produce artful, playful, and sexual practices 
through discursive constructions that carve out a utopian space, which is relatively free 
from social determinations. In relation to the bodily aesthetics, after the union of artefact 
and body, the new form extends gender normative expectations and theoretical limitations. 
Furthermore, it is possible to understand that the union of the body and the prosthesis defies 
social categorisations in heteronormative discourse. 
 
In contrast to the narratives of extended corporeality and those of normative bodies, the 
limits of the body were an accepted factor in a few transmen’s stories. In the following 
narratives, participants’ body modifications stopped after hormone intake, mastectomy, 
and, in all but one case, hysterectomy or variations therein. Like many transmen in this 
research, the decision not to undergo phalloplasty was taken on the basis that the potential 
risks of multiple operations outweighed the potential benefits, when balanced with the 
“social” and “phenomenological” requirements.23 These decisions were also thought 
through alongside other factors, such as age and acceptance of their “sexual” bodies by 
significant others, especially sexual partners. This bodily acceptance was not automatic but 
came about through certain intersubjective and intercorporeal experiences, which then 
legitimated the “contradictory” body. For example, Raymond offers two diverse contexts in 
which his phallusless body had been phenomenologically and sexually validated, he said: 
 
When you go to a cruising ground, […] I thought well, it was a really challenging 
thing to have to do that. The first time I did it I was absolutely petrified. By being 
there you are consenting in a sense, so if someone happens to suggest something 
and you are not happy about it, don’t beat yourself up about it. The fact that you 
are going, take that out of the equation before if somebody wants to do something 
that perhaps you haven’t thought about don’t immediately say no. It is quite 
interesting how your horizons broaden. I did enjoy the fact that you could be a 
blank canvas. It was a nice space to be a part of that fantasy. I was open about my 
body. In other ways I have worked with a photographer […] At first I went along 
and she said nobody is going to know that you are trans, so I ended up taking my 
                                                 
23 I do not want to suggest that the penis is not important for all transmen’s sense of themselves as 
men. The aesthetic presence of the penis is, in some cases, very important, for example, see 
Benjamin’s accounts in this study. 
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clothes off. I had no intention of doing that when I went there. It led to a really, 
really interesting thing because there was something empowering about that. It felt 
more honest to do nude photographs than it did doing them with clothes on, 
because at least people could see the contradiction. Is it such a contradiction? Is it 
so bad? What is the problem? Let’s see it for what it is. Let’s not imagine there is a 
penis in there or a hand made penis (transman Raymond). 
 
Daniel was also a non-operative transman, who worked as a sex worker. His masculinity 
and (masculine) bodily aesthetic were validated by his clients. Following my question: 
 
You mentioned that you usually have sex with men, are you comfortable with your 
body in these sexual situations? 
 
He said: 
 
Generally yes, but I am a little self-conscious about the small dick and lack of 
testicles but these people I know accept me as a man and that is the important 
thing. If they didn’t I would feel like I wouldn’t want to get undressed in front of 
them. So again it is how people perceive me because we don’t exist in a vacuum. 
There is one guy who I have sex with on an irregular basis and I have actually 
asked him “do you feel like you are having sex with a guy,” and he said 
“absolutely.” So you know I know he is not lying. Unless he is doing it just to 
please me, which I know he is not, so that makes me feel good (transman Daniel). 
 
Gregory, a disabled transman, reiterated these sentiments in relation to how people 
perceived him and the importance this held to his sense of self as a man, but, at the same 
time, he was clearly upset at not being able to undergo surgical procedures. The probability 
of Gregory dying during surgery was too high. In this case, then the decision of whether or 
not to undergo surgery was out of his hands and was made by the medical team that he was 
under. I asked: 
 
Zowie: Can you talk about how you feel about your body in relation to your 
gender identity? 
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Gregory: Absolute repulsion; not because it is not perfect, just because it is the 
wrong one, basically. I was approved for all surgeries, but I was told I couldn’t 
have any because of the health risks. I expected that from the outset though 
because my airway was crushed when I was born, I have a high anaesthetic risk. 
When I have had to have surgery in the past I have actually been clinically dead on 
a number of occasions. I have virtually no airway and a cleft palate and damage to 
the vertebrae and underdeveloped jaw [...] it is not just normal risk, it is off the 
scale risk. It is a guaranteed killer. Well the whole point of doing this is to stay 
alive and what is the point in killing me in the process? However, when I first had 
that news I did feel suicidal, but actually to be fair I had anticipated this. So it 
wasn’t a total shock. [...] I thought, except for a partner, the only person who will 
see me and who would know I hadn’t had the surgery, is me. I can wear the 
painful chest binders, prosthetic dick, which is clearly not the same but to the 
outside world, they don’t know, so as long as I am seen as male and seen this way, 
that is the whole point of it anyway. I got to the point where I thought that I am 
male anyway. I live by ignoring it basically, it is obviously difficult when I am 
getting changed, having a bath, so I take quite a disassociated approach to it really 
(transman Gregory). 
 
Contemplations about having, or not having, body modifications are evaluated in relation to 
others and are intrinsic to the individual’s sense of self.. However, the outcomes and 
realisations of bodily aesthetics were based on “phenomenological,” “social,” and “sexual” 
body images and contexts that were particular to each individual transman. 
 
Negotiating masculinities  
Masculinity, in this research, was varied and depended on factors, such as, age, bodily 
aesthetics, temperament, life histories, and relationships. Transmen negotiated masculinity 
through their “phenomenological” and, inescapably, through their “social” and “sexual” 
bodies. While most transmen said they “returned to themselves” after initial testosterone 
ingestion and “shots,” this process was aided by the masculine bodily aesthetic that they 
produced. Hegemonic models of masculinity were not the only source of claims to a male 
gender. The shift from heightened masculinity was a result of their “social” body, which 
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was reflected through social and sexual interaction, which allowed a space to negotiate and 
redefine masculinity. Reflecting on their queer and metrosexual masculinities, Clifford and 
Oscar, who both live in cosmopolitan cities, said: 
 
Dandyism is a very big part of my self. I have often wondered where that 
fascination came from. Since I was a kid I have always been into ties and cravats, 
my dad has lots of great ties that I used to wear, and I always wanted a monocle. 
Which Dandy was it? I think it might have been George Brummel, an eighteenth 
century Dandy. He is wearing a monocle, so since I was about seven [years old] I 
wanted a monocle so I bought one at an auction. That is a 1920s monocle, it cost 
me fifteen pounds, which I was really chuffed with because it is kind of quirky, 
and eccentric. I do like dressing up and the dandy, the figure of the dandy is about 
going back to Oscar Wilde and the aesthetes of the nineteenth century, which is 
part of my identity and in terms of sexuality, I am attracted to gay boys as well and 
when my dandy image comes through I am aware that it can also be equated with a 
lesbian identity such as those like Radclyffe Hall and so it is all about a white 
upper class, aristocracy and so it is a kind of play on that (transman Oscar). 
 
The cities where these young transmen live and socialise allowed them to explore and take-
up non-traditional masculinities. These masculinities are wrapped up with sexualised 
spaces. Clifford, who described himself as pansexual, suggested that heightened 
masculinity was not important to him at all, however, being regarded as male was: 
 
Zowie: So what image do you like to give out to society? 
 
Clifford: I suppose I want to be individual, not necessarily standing out and being 
in the limelight, just to be me and not have to conform to a group of people and fit 
in the box, I prefer to just to be me. With regards to gender I prefer to be seen as 
male but not in a very typically masculine way that is not important to me. By the 
same token I do not want to be treated in a typically feminine way (transman 
Clifford). 
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Hegemonic masculinity was shunned by all of the transmen in the research. “To be seen as 
male,” without being seen as “typically masculine,” created grounds for negating forms of 
masculinity which were deemed wrong and unsuitable within the transmen’s life. This is, 
however, tethered by outside pressures of conforming to certain aspects of masculinity. In a 
working environment, that is made up of predominantly male employees, Jackson 
suggested that he was advised by his colleagues (who knew of Jackson’s trans status) to 
express himself in line with normative masculinity found in the construction industry. 
However, Jackson contemplated this and finally rejected the advice because it was not how 
he felt he liked to be: 
 
I believe, well people tell me, that I am too nice and friendly to be a man [laugh] 
and I am trying not to listen because it is not in my nature, I have always been 
smiley, I have always been friendly. People say that I should try to be more serious 
and even men on the [building] site say I should try to be more serious. The 
brickies say “you’re always so nice stop doing it” but I cannot, so I am a bit lost 
with that really. I don’t really have a good role model because I don’t really like 
my dad very much. I had a very nice granddad, and I try to remember him and I try 
to be like him (transman Jackson). 
 
Negotiations of masculinity are centred upon Jackson’s “phenomenological” body. The 
interaction between Jackson and his work colleagues at the building site are a cause of 
perplexity for him because learning to fit in as masculine in this social environment 
requires him to base his behaviour on models of masculinity that he does not like. He likens 
his work colleagues’ ideas about masculinity with his father’s outlook that he did not 
respect. Jackson prefers to rely on a model of masculinity akin to that of his granddad, 
whom he saw as a “gentleman,” which was validated by his ex-partner. Jackson 
demonstrated this in the following exchange: 
 
Zowie: What do you think she was attracted to? 
 
Jackson: well Fiona always said that that was what she liked about me; she said 
that I was an exception to the rule. She said that I was gentlemanly and quiet and 
that I had nice manners and treated her right. 
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Zowie: What kinds of things do you do to show off your masculinity? 
 
Jackson: Well I don’t know if I show it off. I play in a band, a jazz band, I am a 
trumpet player, I have always played in bands and I play the guitar, nothing else 
really. I don’t think I am showy really. 
 
Zowie: What kind of masculinity do you aspire to? 
 
Jackson: Do you mean what I would like to be like? 
 
Zowie: Yes. 
 
Jackson: Well I suppose I would like to be like my grandpa was (transman 
Jackson). 
 
The “exception to the rule” comment by his ex-partner was understood by Jackson to be a 
positive critique of his form of masculinity. In this respect, Jackson’s masculinity is a 
continuation of his pre-transition temperament. He continued with his pastimes, such as 
music, in his distinctive way, taking his masculine cues from his grandpa. What this 
illustrates is the changing formulations and negotiations of masculinity in different “social” 
and “sexual” spheres. Moreover, there are interesting combinations of “old” and 
“new/queer” ideas of masculinity at play for Jackson and Oscar. 
 
Conclusion 
Childhood lived experiences often manifested as chaotic disidentifications with transmen’s 
sense of their “phenomenological bodies” and their social roles. For most participants, these 
feelings were heightened during puberty, which engendered feelings of disidentification 
towards their pubescent bodies, which had betrayed them and caused them both psychical 
and physical pain, which resonates with Rubin’s (2003) analysis. However, these were far 
from disembodied feelings. Indeed their bodies were central to their sense of 
disidentification.  
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Once the decision to transition was made, “thinking the process through,” for these 
participants, was about weighing up their feelings about corporeal requirements in relation 
to their sense of self, along with personal dynamics of bodily discomfort and 
disidentification. Bodily aesthetics were variously desired and actualised. The ontology of 
transmen’s “body projects” is formulated at three levels that all affect the overall body 
image. The first level is the personal “phenomenological body,” the experiential body that 
lives in the world. The “social body” is gazed upon and valued by others, which 
incorporates both good and bad signs of acceptance. The “sexual body” is judged in more 
particular spaces and aesthetic validations are often given by significant others. The 
judgments by (significant) others about the “social” and “sexual” bodies of these 
participants, were also relevant in the decision making process, and impacted upon whether 
the participants would aesthetically alter their bodies, in the gym, hormonally, surgically, or 
through clothing. Most participants forsake the idea of a perfect(ed) body in its entirety and 
concessions are made about scarring and the possible disputability of an authentic looking 
penis. In some cases, the limits of the bodily aesthetic were overcome with prosthetics, 
which achieved a sense of unity with the self as a man psychically, socially, and sexually. 
In some other cases, the refashioning of genitals or having a non-operative body, and the 
limitations that come with that were accepted, especially when the non- or pre-surgical 
bodily aesthetic was validated through the gaze of, and acceptance by significant others. 
Being accepted as male sometimes mitigated the desire to surgically trans-sex, but could 
create a vicious circle when encountering people in spaces where the body is more open to 
the gaze of others. A central theme to emerge from these narratives is the heterogeneity of 
transmen’s narratives. These heterogeneous narratives challenge traditional medicine’s 
aetiology of transsexuality, because transmen are phenomenologically too diverse to 
capture in traditional medical models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 134
Chapter V: Recognising the Self: Transwomen’s Body Projects 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will argue that transwomen’s identities and subjectivities are constituted 
through a complex array of body modification, clothing, and adornment practices within 
discourses of choice and desire. Similarly to my consideration of transmen, I explore how 
transwomen’s identities are experienced in relation to the complex interplay of sociological 
variables, different demographics, and aesthetic signifiers of gender. I aim to illustrate the 
broad range of trans subject positions and move beyond monolithic and universalist 
understandings of transwomen and explore the diversity among their narratives. I will also 
weigh these against the transmen’s narratives explored in Chapter IV. 
 
Using the heuristic devices employed in the previous chapter on transmen – the “social 
body,” “sexual body,” and “phenomenological body” – I will first consider the participants’ 
childhood recollections. Following this, I will concentrate on the decision making processes 
and the emotional ebb and flow and ambivalence inherent in the desire to transition from 
male to female. The penis as a potent symbolic signifier in transwomen’s narratives will 
then be explored. Next, I draw on the participants’ understandings of the sartorial aspects of 
trans-sexing and the antagonistic relationship with discourses of transvestism and gender 
stereotypicality. I will then consider hormone therapy in relation to beauty and femininity. 
Finally, I will explore the various surgeries, aesthetic outcomes, and the “passing” “social,” 
“sexual” and “phenomenological” bodies of transwomen. 
 
Childhood re-envisions 
In this research the feeling that “there was something wrong” for male-to female 
transsexuals was very similar to the transmen’s understandings. The narratives of 
transwomen, on the whole, differed only slightly with this feeling that “something was 
wrong” starting around four or five years old instead of various ages for transmen: 
 
[It was] about the fourth or fifth birthday, don’t ask me why I identified, well 
actually that was wrong I did not identify as a woman, I just knew there was 
something wrong (transwoman Jess). 
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Identification with the opposite gender was not automatic. Identification was not static and 
was not premised primarily in binary thinking. Like many of the transwomen, Jess’ sense 
of difference was present when she was playing with girls. However, she did not identify as 
anything other than the volatile boy she had been (medically and familiarly) ascribed as. 
Phenomenological feelings intensified with childhood cross-dressing scenarios, 
nonetheless, these feelings of difference were intermittent and pleasure was derived from 
feminine clothing and playing with girls. Jess continued: 
 
I was cross-dressing in my grandmother’s clothes. I was always more interested in 
clothes than other little boys. I was very envious of my girl cousins and I played 
with them at my grandmother’s house and was far happier doing that than playing 
with boys. However, I was aware that that is not the way the game is played and I 
conformed. I am by nature a conformist; I am not a rebel (transwoman Jess). 
 
There was a sense that she did not feel like an ordinary boy because she was happier to mix 
and play with female children rather than male children. Interestingly, though, Jess likened 
gender performativity to a “game.” Erik Erickson (1950) claims that the games played by 
children act as a function of the ego, in an attempt to synchronise the body and social life 
with a coherent self. The theory highlights the self’s need to master the various areas of 
social life, and especially those areas in which the individual finds his or herself, his or her 
body and their expected social roles deficient in some way. The self is not solely the “core” 
self in these instances, as Claudine Griggs (1998) would suggest, as a “core gender” 
yearning for aesthetic representation, but more of a negotiation between ambiguous 
feelings, re-envisioned as gendered, “with a continuity of one’s meanings for others” 
(Erikson, 1950: 253). 
 
In Diane’s narrative, seeing the naked female body of a neighbour was a key moment, 
which allowed her to contrast male and female bodies: 
 
my second memory was seeing one of the daughters living next door and seeing 
her without any clothes on and instantly knowing that my body should be like that, 
wanting to be like that and that was at about the age of five (transwoman Diane). 
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This visual encounter for Diane heightened feelings of identification with the girl’s bodily 
aesthetic. 
 
These narratives indicate that sex differentiation was clearly understood at a young age. 
However, through these types of experiences Jess and Diane, like many other transwomen 
in this research, came to recognise themselves as boys and were willing to conform to 
performative ideals of male gender, which were constraining “reiterations of [gendered] 
norms” (Butler, 1993: 94). However, the feelings of difference continued. Lesley said: 
 
I like life too much and the single thing in a transgender life and anyone else’s life 
is life. And if you can’t do it well you got to live with it. Of course some people 
can’t and commit suicide and all the rest of it but I couldn’t let that happen to me. 
So that is when I started to make the effort to be a male and try to be aware of 
what males do and try to fit in a bit (transwoman Lesley). 
 
Jess and Lesley both conformed to normalised notions of masculinity until they were 
middle aged, both marrying, and in Jess’ case, having a normative family life (eight of the 
male-to-female participants transitioned at middle age or older and seven transitioned at 
aged thirty or younger). This was until, what they described as “gender issues,” came to the 
forefront of their concerns and they decided to act upon their desires. 
 
For Emily, the willingness to conform to a social ascription of masculinity lasted until she 
went to university. Prior to this, however, identification with other teenage girls added to 
Emily’s desire to be like them: 
 
Emily: Well, I thought about transition vaguely since I was about 13 although I 
didn’t really know that people could transition and I didn’t really know any other 
transgender issues […]. For most of my adolescence, I just tried very hard to be a 
young teenage boy. Yeah, when I got to about eighteen some of the more 
interesting teenage girls appeared. I got into them and thought I would like to be 
like them if I could. I still knew what I wanted, but it still didn’t seem like a 
possibility though. 
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Zowie: Can you describe these girls? 
 
Emily: The punk indie types, dyed hair, funky clothing. 
 
Zowie: Were you a part of that subculture? 
 
Emily: No not then, I would say I am now. I just admired them from afar 
(transwoman Emily). 
 
The connection to “the more interesting” girls had a profound affect on Emily, which 
suggests that she fantasised about being figuratively feminine inline with the punk/indie 
sub-cultural aesthetics that girls in this group conveyed. However, at this point in time, not 
having the cultural and gender capital to consider trans-sex technology left Emily unaware 
of hormonal or surgical possibilities, so she continued to “admire” feminine signifiers of 
her (potential) sub-culture, while retaining a sense of herself as male. 
 
Following the transgender academic Elaine Lerner’s (Lerner, 2006: 151) observation in 
Crossing Sexual Boundaries (Kane-DeMaios & Bullough, 2006): 
 
[m]any of the transgender I have talked with have similar early childhood 
memories-clomping around in mother’s high heels, hiding in her closet, and 
feeling the soft fabric of her dresses […]. Perhaps many little boys hide in mom’s 
closet and put on girls’ clothes sometimes; this [re-envisioning of narratives] 
subsequently seems more significant to transgender. 
 
The focus on gendered aesthetics and gendered signifiers is more comprehensive in this 
research than in Lerner’s account of gendered clothing and other signifiers are offered up in 
the re-envisioned narratives of the participants, as I will demonstrate. For example, feelings 
of difference emerged through viewing the bodies of others, during play, trying on clothing, 
which created identifications with the “opposite” gender. “Wanting to be like them,” 
however, was thwarted because of cultural ascriptions of masculinity, which were adhered 
to primarily because of age and social pressure. As children, the transwomen in this 
research began to weigh-up the “rules” of play that were encouraged and validated by 
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society. In all the cases, conformity to cultural ascriptions of normative gender was adhered 
to until adulthood was reached. Whilst identification with feminine signifiers and cross-
dressing scenarios continued, the lack of cultural capital about trans-sexing was identified 
as the most significant factor to impede their desires. Cultural capital is “gained” and 
situated within a person’s “habitus,” where conditions of knowledge, taste and judgment 
can engender an infinite number of patterns of behaviour, thoughts and expressions 
(Bourdieu, 1992). The habitus is a generative structure – rather than a deterministic 
structure – with objective limits (McNay, 2000). For my participants, the limit at this time 
was the lack of knowledge about trans-sexing. As I will explore in the next section, even in 
adolescence and later in life, cultural and gender capital about trans-sexing is required to 
give shape to transsexual embodiment and bodily aesthetics. 
 
Decision making process 
Emily, who transitioned as an adult teenager in the 1990s, said: 
 
I met my first long-term partner who I was with for four and half years, she was 
really helpful. She identified as lesbian when she met me, when I was obviously 
pre-op. It gave me the freedom to start wearing make-up and wearing, well not 
necessarily female clothes but wearing clothes in a slightly more effeminate style. 
So I started wearing things like vest tops, which would not have worn before, 
leaving my arms uncovered and things like that. Gradually with her I started 
making plans for transition. The interesting thing was the male friends I had, 
although I never told any that I was going to transition, I slotted in to this strange 
space. For example, in straight pubs they [the heterosexual males] would let me sit 
on their knees and things and it was not considered homosexual. I don’t think they 
would have done it with other men but they did it with me. I am not sure how I 
managed it, maybe looking asexual. I think this gave me confidence and I would 
still have friends and they would be ok (transwoman Emily). 
 
This freedom to express herself can be viewed in different ways. Firstly, university 
provided the space for Emily to find a partner who was complicit in her gender 
experimentation within punk/indie sub-cultural aesthetics that she had been fantasising 
about while at,, and prior to, leaving home. University was also a place where mainstream 
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and alternative cultures overlapped and thus lessened concerns around homophobic and 
transphobic encounters. 
 
People in our group often stated they were bisexual, even if they did not partake in 
sex with males and females (transwoman Emily). 
 
During the 1990s, Britain fostered many queer sub-cultures, where rigid gender aesthetics 
were disrupted. For example, following on from Glam Rock of the 60s, punk in the 70s and 
the New Romantics of the 1980s, “gender bending” singers emerged, such as Boy George, 
Pete Burns and Placebo’s Brian Molko, whose aesthetic was extremely visible in popular 
culture at the time, and who endorsed the mixing up of gendered signifiers. Similarly, the 
punk/indie sub-culture facilitated aesthetic styles that allowed for multiple (trans) gender 
figurations, as Emily illustrates in the following exchange: 
 
Emily: Well it is suddenly a partying phase when all your female friends are 
inviting you round to paint your nails and watching chick-flicks and give you 
reassurance, it was quite good. 
 
Zowie: And your male friends? 
 
Emily: I had some very open-minded male friends. I think it was the university 
setting and there were many bands and films and things that it was hip to be in to 
that had trans elements in there. I hate using this as an example but Brian Molko 
from Placebo was huge at the time and loads of people were going around with 
various make-ups and there were various levels of cross dressing. So having that in 
the mainstream certainly made it easier. Having things like Boys Don’t Cry, 
although this was not at the start of my transition but certainly nearer the end, and 
everyone was talking about these things. It was good for talking about mainstream 
things and the possibility that he was trans in it. I used to look very different then, 
I had a shaved head, and I looked quite aggressive then, so before hormones, I 
didn’t look particularly calm, let’s say (transwoman Emily). 
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Similarly, Octavia suggested that being part of a Goth subculture made her 
experimentations far easier than she imagined it would have been in normative society. She 
stated: 
 
The S&M Goth scene is very much about playing with styles that highlight the 
secondary sex characteristics, which is great fun. You can also do it in an 
environment where people don’t mind. It is a wonderfully liberating experience to 
play like that, in the clothes and atmosphere where that sort of behaviour is 
encouraged, which helps a lot. I came out of my shell a great deal because I was 
allowed to explore these behaviours and these styles in a way that I think a lot of 
people can’t in everyday life. Some people might say that it has left me more 
balanced, some people might say not but I know it has (transwoman Octavia). 
 
 
Many transwomen sought out and explored particular sub-cultures to experiment with 
aesthetic expressions of gender and sexuality in order to get a fuller sense of what they 
enjoyed and who they wanted to be. Nancy for example stated: 
 
Nancy: Within a few years of that, maybe six, seven, eight years ago, everything 
became untenable. I was no longer happy with this like up and down way of 
living. Then I began a search of what exactly I am. Something happened and being 
in a situation of no longer knowing what I am […] so I explored, was I a gay man? 
Was I a bisexual man? Was I this kind of man or that kind of man? Was I a 
transvestite? And in the end the last thing I explored was, was I a boy who was a 
girl who was a boy? That didn’t work either. 
 
Zowie: Can I ask how you explored these positions? I mean did you explore them 
within subcultures, for example the gay scene? 
 
Nancy: Yes I did I got involved with the gay scene and then I got involved with 
the transvestite scene. I can clearly remember the time I went out dressed as a 
woman since I was eighteen and I have never had anything like a femme name for 
myself. I was always Norman, the name given to me at birth. I remember going to 
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my first transvestite thing and there was this person who was meant to be 
mentoring me and this person introduced me to one of their friends. “This is 
Diane.” Then they looked at me and said “this is…” and I said “I don’t have a 
femme name,” so she said “this is no-name” and I suddenly thought my name is 
Nancy, which was the first name that came into my mind and it has just stuck 
there. The name was not important to me it was being me that was important none 
of that was important. So I was exploring these kinds of things on the transvestite, 
transsexual scene. And that I was bisexual and I quickly found that I could not take 
a male role in these things, in these activities and it would have to be female. Even 
in the days that I was Norman sex was difficult for me and I would have to 
fantasise about it. So I found out really quickly that I wasn’t gay and I found out 
very quickly that I wasn’t transvestite because they just didn’t work for me. There 
was me, wanting to go out on the streets and in everyday life being me, and these 
people just wanted to go to venues and clubs and this sort of thing. Very quickly 
after about six months of that sort of contact I just did everything on my own. So I 
would dress anyway in quite a boyish manner on the transvestite scene exploring, 
was I a boy who was a girl who was a boy, but in the end when I had ran out of 
any possibilities of what I could be I just turned round to myself and said oh shit I 
am a woman! I knew I needed help (transwoman Nancy). 
 
Within Nancy’s narrative the preference for a stable subjectivity was central, as it was for 
all the transwomen in this research, and was marked by socio-cultural and personal beliefs 
about masculinity and femininity, maleness and femaleness, transgender and sexuality. 
These narratives compliment the findings of Ekins’ (1997: 87) study, in which he asserts 
that the primary phase of “doing femaling” – that is a building-up of a sense of femaleness 
through sex, sexuality and gender – what I have conceptualised as the “sexual body” image 
 
is not constituted in any coherent manner [, which] differentiates the self to an 
opposite gender. As his [sic] ‘doing femaling’ becomes more frequent the 
tendency to seek to ‘explain’ it may well become more pressing. 
 
Prescribed modes of being gay, bisexual, and transvestite were formulated by Nancy but 
were not adequate identities for her, in the sense that she felt could she could not securely 
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fit into any one of them. Nonetheless, the journey through these various identities was 
required in order to dismiss them as inadequate. Whilst Nancy had an array of gendered and 
sexual subject positions available to her, fluidity marked by “was I a boy, who was a girl, 
who was a boy?” was an unliveable option, as, too, was the fluidity of the transvestite 
identity, because Nancy’s search was for a permanently fixed and unambiguous self “in 
everyday life.” Moreover, a presence within a secure bodily boundary considered as 
“woman,” produced self-value as well as having social currency. 
 
Nancy’s gender conformity is negotiated through many subject positions prior to her 
establishing and exclaiming “shit, I am a woman” and settling on a comfortable identity 
and where she feels at one with her self. Nancy’s feelings started to become fixed and 
definite in form, which also alleviated “phenomenological” feelings of “difference.” 
 
It seemed important for some participants to have some sort of support network, whether 
sub-cultural or closer, such as friends and/or lovers. In Nancy’s, and Emily’s, case these 
networks allowed them the space, support, and time to work “phenomenological body” 
issues of difference through. The intimacy and support provided by significant others lent 
these participants much needed clarification of thought, and added to the “gender capital” 
required to accomplish womanhood. These points raise the important issue that it is not the 
“core gender identity” of medical opinion (Griggs, 1998; Money, 1995) that somehow 
guides transwomen to actualise a female gender aesthetic. Body modification and/or 
sartorial practices are explored along with (socially constructed) gendered signifiers in 
supportive spaces. In addition, which is of paramount importance for these participants is 
the realisation that something can be done about feelings of “difference” with the aid of 
technology and medicine. 
 
As the sociologist Brian Tully (1992) concluded, in his extensive study of transsexuality, 
what matters is that they have the “resourcefulness,” that is: 
 
what is entailed […] acts, intensions, judgements and justifications and so on […] 
the crucial cognitive, emotional and imaginative processes necessary for the final 
crystallization of the transgender commitment (Tully, 1992: 16). 
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This, in part, is illustrated by Karen, who was middle aged and pre-operative at the time of 
the interview: 
 
[I did] the usual really, the cross-dressing, going out meeting people, talking to 
people, finding out about things, and obviously living in different environments. 
So there was lots of experimentation and the strength of feelings was very intense. 
I also had quite a strong relationship about ten to fifteen years ago now, with 
somebody who was transsexual and I helped her through her transition, I took her 
down to her surgery in […]. She lived here for quite a long time while she 
recovered; she spent a lot of time here until we split up eventually. So there were 
different bits and pieces and in a way I suppose it may be a horrible way to look at 
it but I suppose I think I drifted into it in a lot of respects (transwoman Karen). 
 
Courtenay suggested: 
 
going to get my nails done is the one trigger that eventually pushed me forward. I 
kind of rationalised, I sort of tricked myself into it, because once I had made one 
step then I thought I’d get my eyebrows shaped I had that done and eventually had 
my eyelashes tinted, I guess I was experimenting. I then began to transition 
(transwoman Courtenay). 
 
 
In contrast to these personal “phenomenological body” image balancing and “social” bodily 
experimentations, the ebb and flow of sex and gender “testing” sometimes involved 
medical intervention, but it must be noted that the encounter with the medical field that 
followed was not the determining factor in creating a transsexual subjectivity, as some 
feminists suggest (Raymond, 1980). Transgender feelings come about not because of the 
ascription of a medical label – a theoretical error that positions transsexuals as dupes of the 
medical field – but because of the strong and persistent desire to transform the body and 
trans-sex. It is often stated in feminist literature that the transsexual will, in full or in part, 
adopt the medical discourse to secure treatment (Hausman, 1995). However, I argue that 
this adoption is often only rhetorical. This is because transsexualism is not a testable 
medico-pathological condition but rather relies on self-diagnosis by adult transsexuals in 
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order to actualise the desire to trans-sex. In this sense, the psychologist’s “diagnosis,” 
which brings institutionalised legitimacy, only follows the transsexual’s own. These self 
and medical diagnostic events, then, tell us more about the social structure of the “gender 
order” and aesthetics within either a given (sub) culture or medical discourse, rather than 
telling us about the “nature” of Gender Dysphoria. For instance, Lesley observed: 
 
I thought I could do something about being different, so I made some enquiries 
and started to go down that path. I was quite clever, I thought, looking back I was 
keeping my options open, because I was determined not to tell my GP because 
then it is on your records forever. I found a sympathetic social worker at a 
‘people’s centre.’ I had a meeting with her and she referred me to a sympathetic 
GP who was not my own GP, who had an interest in transsexuals and other social 
and sexual stuff as well. I was referred to a psychiatrist. He diagnosed me with 
Gender Dysphoria, this was in 1974 and he prescribed an oestrogen based thing, 
whatever was available. When I went to the gender clinic twenty five years later 
all my files were still there (transwoman Lesley). 
 
According to the majority of participants, periods of indecision can last many years, as the 
quotation above illustrates. Lesley, who was married and pre-operative at the time of the 
interview, understood her feelings within a medical context, however, she did not identify 
with the construction of a pathologised transsexual subjectivity and body, as Finn and 
Dell’s (1999) study suggests. Lesley’s body management was carefully arranged so that she 
could leave her options open. Choice and desire, then, were intrinsic to trans-sexing for 
some of my respondents. 
 
Relationship factors, such as marriage and partnerships, were important considerations in 
decision making processes. Jess, like many late on-set transsexuals, also used a medical 
discourse of “remission” to account for the ebb and flow of feminine behaviours. She said: 
 
I went into remission for a year to save my marriage, I said “please I love you I 
don’t want to loose you and if you just try [and] understand how I feel I will try 
and give you what you want and present myself as a man.” So I cut my hair, which 
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was kind of long, cut my nails, stopped plucking my eyebrows and went into 
remission for a year (transwoman Jess). 
 
To save her marriage, Jess had to curtail her feminine practices and bodily aesthetics and 
present her “social” and “sexual” body as unambiguously male. This explicitly highlights 
the constructed “nature” of both femininity and masculinity. Whereas Diane used 
psychology from her degree course to work through her “gender issues” and help save her 
relationships: 
 
I spent my twenties becoming an art therapist, trying to understand myself, 
basically, and trying to persuade myself that I could be a normal heterosexual man. 
I had relationships with women but all the time I was wishing that I was them. 
After a series of catastrophic relationships, which always left me being left high 
and dry when I told my partner how I felt, I realised it was something that I was 
unable to get away from and that I would have to do something about. I would 
have to go through with it and do it. I had all the knowledge about it from when I 
was a student. Even though, I wasn’t able to actualise it then. I had a store of 
information, which I was able to use and I did. So I started the medical treatment 
by the time I was thirty (transwoman Diane). 
 
A Psychology degree provided academic assistance for Diane in trying to “understand” her 
“phenomenological body,” and make her a “normal heterosexual man.”  
 
Diane’s feminine aesthetic she intermittently portrayed resulted in partnership breakdowns. 
For many of my respondents, conformity to their ascribed gender continued for many years. 
This conformity, however, was not based on changing behaviour; it was based on aesthetic 
signifiers of gender. Being male in these instances was pursued because of significant 
others. This aspect of conformity is different from Emily’s, whose partner supported her 
experimentation. This suggests that the “phenomenological,” “social,” and “sexual body” 
are adhered to differently within different social and sexual situations, due to significant 
others’ approval of bodily aesthetics. 
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(Medical) information about trans-sexing was important to some of my participants while 
they were considering whether or not to transition. In a few cases, medical information, and 
its inherent authority, clarified fluctuating feelings. However, in addition to medical 
information, representations of transpeople in popular culture, and trans groups’ 
publications also added to the bountiful information within which the respondents became 
immersed when working out their identity positions. For example, autobiographies of 
transwomen and magazines from various transgender groups were read, reflected upon, and 
digested. Sometimes these texts24 seemed to address the respondents’ sense of themselves, 
allowing for revelatory “eureka moments,” which positioned them into an overarching 
transsexual narrative. For example, Penny said: 
 
I know Roberta Cowell was around; it was all in the papers but that all passed over 
my head at that stage. I think for me, in my teens, it was when we delivered the 
Sunday papers, a friend and I did that, and it [transsexuality] was very 
sensationally presented then, I felt oh, I think that’s me (transwoman Penny). 
 
The awareness of “transsexualism” planted seeds in their minds, providing the “gender 
capital” to investigate further. Information was gathered and stored, sometimes over many 
years, before transition was actualised. None of the respondents said that they were (trans) 
women prior to revelations brought about through the discovery of the “transsexual” 
concept in various texts. Moreover, “cross-dressing” did figure in interviewees’ narratives. 
The use of this concept, by some respondents, suggests that at that point they still did not 
identify as (trans) women, because, if they had, they would not understand it as cross-
dressing. 
 
Penis as male signifier 
The penis stood in for “man”, “male”, “masculinity”, the “phallus” and “non-woman” for 
transwomen, in markedly different ways than for most of the transmen I interviewed. This 
study, in relation to the penis being a potent signifier of maleness, reflects Kessler and 
McKenna’s (1978) project that was conducted thirty years ago, which also suggested that 
                                                 
24 The word ‘text’ here refers to the written word and the aesthetic figurations of transpeople in 
other popular culture mediums, such as film and art. 
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the presence of a “penis” on a drawn figure was a powerful enough sign to extract a gender 
attribution of male from ninety six percent of their participants. For example, Jess said: 
 
I have a theory here, not proven, no evidence, no research, but I think a man’s 
penis is like a loaded gun being held, in a relationship with a woman. The fact that 
you are not going to shoot her at that time, you are still holding a gun and I think if 
you are pre-op even though it is not functioning it is kind of there. It [the penis] 
exists in the relationship and I found that when I had my penis removed through 
sex reassignment surgery it changed my relationship with other women; I was kind 
of made safe. It sounds rather stupid, this is post rationalisation, but I know my 
relationship with other women was different and yet I was the same person, only 
two months apart, the only difference they knew I had gone through surgery. I 
don’t know if it was a rite of passage. But I think it was because I wasn’t carrying 
a gun anymore (transwoman Jess). 
 
To put this quotation into context, Jess had been talking about female colleagues who knew 
about her pre-operative trans status. She sensed that in her pre-operative bodily state, 
having a penis, impinged on her colleagues’ ability to imagine her as a female. Jess 
believed that her colleagues had regarded her as “non-woman” or as “still-male.” Jess also 
talked about the penis as a “loaded gun”, which for her seemed to maintain the power of the 
phallus in the relationships with her colleagues, even though the penis was “not 
functioning.” According to Jess, the non-functioning penis still had the ability to penetrate 
and invade the relationship with the threat of rape, without it actually being seen. As Annie 
Potts (2002) argues in her study, The Vocabularies of Heterosex, the “penis” stands in for 
the man and the phallus. In Lacanian terms the phallus is the transcendental signifier in the 
symbolic order. The phallus represents power and privilege and “the symbolic function of 
the phallus envelops the penis as the tangible sign of a privileged masculinity, thus in effect 
naturalizing male dominance” (Grosz, 1990: 123). Jess believes that the penis continues to 
be a potent signifier. The penis, for Jess, despite it being flaccid and “not functioning,” 
remained symbolically powerful.  
 
Jess also believes her feminine “social body” was re-merged into her male “sexual body” 
by her colleagues because of the ideological power of the (imagined) penis-phallus and it’s 
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potency as a signifier of maleness. Jess constructs herself as a dangerous and powerful man. 
However, Jess’ colleagues’ agency is given no weight. As Foucault (1998 [1976]) suggests, 
“power is everywhere.” According to Jess, her colleagues do not offer her closeness 
because of her penis and its “inherent” power; however, it is in fact her colleagues who are 
exerting power by refusing to grant the “phallic” “sexual body” any. In effect, they are 
refusing social integration on the basis of Jess’ bodily aesthetic and reiterating what they 
think is female. Whilst this may be construed as transphobic, it can also be seen as similar 
to radical feminist notions of the “womyn born womyn” stance. However, there is a 
fundamental difference here to the stance of radical feminism in that Jess believed that SRS 
changed the relationship. 
 
Emily’s understanding of the penis is different and suggests that the penis is a socially 
“potent symbol” for both her “phenomenological body” image and her “sexual body” 
image: 
 
on good days I can be relaxed and say “oh yeah, woman with a big dick, very 
interesting, fantastic,” but a lot of the time my gut reaction is “just get it sorted 
out.” Also the idea of a guy with a clitoris is quite appealing […] well I just don’t 
like biological men and it is mostly because they have penises but if I am with a 
trans guy who was hairy, big and tall who had had a Metoidioplasty I would be 
very comfortable with that and appreciative of that (transwoman Emily). 
 
Emily socialises in a trans/queer/lesbian community and has various contextual and 
political associations with the “penis.” As a political queer, she is aware of the transgender 
discourse about transmen’s bodies, which explores their gender identities without penises. 
While “on good days,” Emily can grapple politically with the idea of “a woman with a “big 
dick,”” this is not always the case. Emily suggests that in sexual contexts, and as a lesbian, 
the penis promotes the idea of maleness for transwomen and, in relation to her own bodily 
aesthetic, she said: 
 
being lesbian, in the long run, seemed more important than being trans. The social 
interaction and relationships I wanted to have meant that I would have to transition 
(transwoman Emily). 
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“Transition” here refers to genital surgery. Moreover, in the past, Emily had experimented 
sexually with both transwomen and transmen. Transwomen with penises should “get it 
sorted out,” according to Emily, because of her dislike of penises in sexual relationships. 
Nonetheless, the penis is unappealing to her on both counts. Emily equates the penis with 
biological men and it is the male characteristic, opposed to being hairy, “big” or “tall,” she 
finds most displeasing. However, transmen who have Metoidioplasty to create a 
neophallus, it seems, do not hold the same aesthetic and imaginary power for Emily.  
 
Octavia believes that the penis affects her phenomenological feelings and “dictates how 
you live your life” in many “sexual,” and “social” spaces. In a similar way to both Emily 
and Jess, Octavia, who is bisexual and was pre-operative when she became involved in a 
relationship with a woman, suggested that her male genitals authoritatively signified her 
male “sexual body” and gender to others. She said: 
 
The penis and male genitals are just such an obvious pronouncement and 
advertisement of the gender itself and dictates how you live your life in a lot of 
ways, how you use the toilet, how you interact with other people. So society 
dealing with MtF and their gender recognition is one thing, dealing with someone 
who has got male genitals who is female is so much more of a difficult path to 
follow (transwoman Octavia). 
 
Octavia’s concern was with the “social body” and the unlikely acceptance of females with 
penises,25 something she believed would be a difficult “social bodily” aesthetic for society 
to accept. The social pressures concerning a normative bodily aesthetic were crucial for 
Octavia’s sense of femaleness. Transsexual bodily aesthetics are also regulated through the 
use of clothing and make-up, as I will now explore. 
 
Gendered clothing and make-up 
In this section, I will discuss representations and aesthetics that resonate intensely with 
social and material conditions of life. Arguably, it was Terry Eagleton’s book The Ideology 
                                                 
25 I will take this point up in Chapter VII: Negotiating Authenticity and Bodily Aesthetics, with 
regard to the UK’s Medicolegal System. 
 150
of the Aesthetic (1990), which situated the aesthetic outside the confines of philosophy in 
order to re-establish the body as the major site of subjectivity and aesthetic practice. This 
section establishes the aesthetic as an important indicator of the social power relations and 
ideological coercions inherent in the management of transwomen’s body images. However, 
whilst coercion was apparent, the choices of representation were creatively and agentically 
actualised with reference to the transwomen’s histories. As I have observed above in the 
chapter concerning transmen, aesthetic representations of the body are constituted with 
strategic agency. Relying upon “phenomenological,” “social,” and “sexual body” images of 
non-normative bodies transmen discursively and materially produced various bodily 
representations. In this study transwomen, too, constitute their bodily aesthetic with 
strategic agency but in markedly different ways. 
 
Nearly all my transwomen respondents said clothing was a crucial indicator of their gender 
identification and gender expression. This was regardless of whether they had a 
“transvestite career” prior to transitioning or whether they had happy memories of cross-
dressing as a child and throughout adolescence. Clothing as a social artefact requires an 
understanding of the cultural codes of masculine and feminine sartorial behaviour. As 
Suthrell (2004: 5-6) indicates: 
 
[t]he outward and visible manifestation of transvestism – of its building blocks – is 
the material culture of clothing but the deeper direction and inner motivation are 
inevitably to be found in cultural issues of sex and gender. 
 
The “transvestite career” stood as a stark reminder for some respondents of their prior male 
embodiment, when they enjoyed the sensuousness and aesthetics of feminine clothing. 
Their male “sexual body” in feminine clothing, and the comfort and pleasure derived from 
cross-dressing, however, stood in an antagonistic relationship to their eventual sense of 
being female. This relationship was understood against a backdrop of social beliefs about 
“men” in feminine clothes as “perverted.” For example: talking about her pre- and post-
operative body, Nancy mentioned playing down her visibility whilst out and about, 
choosing to wear women’s trousers rather than a skirt. Talking about a photograph, she 
said: 
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Nancy: I have a blouse with a tweed jacket, a pair of very light trousers, with a 
pair of flat trainers and a handbag. Dare I say it, some women would dress like that 
and you would say ooh, “she looks smart.” So I like to look smart, tidy, clean, 
which I am sure comes from my forces days […] Well, maybe it is self 
preservation. 
 
Zowie: Can you explain what you mean by that? 
 
Nancy: Well it is very dangerous out there for people such as ourselves. Not with 
99.99999% of the population, it is a problem for the odd nutter […] So it is 
important for me to look ok and that is where passability does become important to 
protect yourself from this odd nutter. Maybe dressing smartly and so on and by not 
dressing in a skirt maybe that is all part of it. Although I do believe dressing in 
trousers is much more practical (transwoman Nancy). 
 
The threat of physical violence from the “odd nutter” was always a frightening possibility 
for Nancy. She had a long history of people inflicting “violence” on her for not following 
codes of “gender appropriate” dress. She continued: 
 
At work I would wear women’s things and then of course that would result in a job 
change. The job I had was a school teacher and I would go to school wearing 
women’s clothing and the final job I had as an Air Force Officer and that of 
course, at the time being transsexual or transvestite, was an extremely dodgy thing 
and could result in having to leave (transwoman Nancy). 
 
Nancy highlights the negotiations that take place while out and about and at work because 
of her cross-dressing being seen as a social stigma, a “fetishistic perversion.” 
 
The “denial” or “hiding” of the “transvestite career” was more acutely evident when the 
respondent desired “full transition.” In order for their trajectory to be seen as legitimate, 
especially in the clinicians’ office, but also within the research setting, and because cross-
dressing was an un-deniable part of their trajectory into womanhood participants often 
emphasised the difference between cross-dressing as a sexual act and as an expression of 
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femaleness. Courtenay, tentatively opened up about her cross-dressing to me, but 
understood the relationship between her sense of her “phenomenological body” and 
clothing as a building up of a feminine identity through “non-perverse” actions of “self-
discovery.” “Part-time” dressing in feminine clothing for Courtenay, 
 
had been a kind of a stop gap it offered something, some relief that I otherwise 
wouldn’t have. It did allow me to be in some ways myself (transwoman 
Courtenay). 
 
Like all the respondents who said that they had cross-dressed or had been a transvestite, 
Courtenay never indicated in the research setting that she had derived sexual pleasure from 
wearing female clothing. Before deciding to trans-sex, she did, nonetheless, regard herself 
as an “old fashioned kind of transvestite”: 
 
Courtenay: Then the transgender thing was a bit like a tide and it would come and 
really, really grip me and at other times it would ease down a bit. 
 
Zowie: How would it grip you, in what sense? 
 
Courtenay: It would sort of, well I’ll have to do something about it at this period, 
and I was cross-dressing quite a lot, sort of, not in front of anybody, just for me. I 
suppose in lots of ways I would have described myself as a transvestite. It was an 
old fashioned transvestism harping back to the nineteenth century. It was a mixture 
of transvestite and transsexual because I always had had the desire to be female 
(transwoman Courtenay). 
 
The polemical attack by radical lesbian feminists, Janice Raymond and Sheila Jeffreys 
(Jeffreys, 2005; Raymond, 1980) on (predominantly) transwomen, was on the minds of 
some participants during the interviews. Most of the transwomen who talked about cross-
dressing and transvestism mentioned the radical lesbian stance as clichéd, suggesting that 
the interviewees were aware of the critical discourse and had internalised it as referring to 
them. In the interview with Amelia, she stated: 
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I think Janice Raymond is a very sad case, she doesn’t know what she is talking 
about, and I would tend to pigeonhole her with the likes of J. Michael Bailey and 
the likes of John Money who plainly are abusers of transpeople (transwoman 
Amelia). 
 
As I illustrated in Chapter II, transwomen are seen as trespassers, who appropriate 
femininity to infiltrate women’s spaces. This debate is widely known in the transgender 
community and so I am assuming in my analysis that this is the target of Amelia’s, and the 
other participants, riposte. 
 
There is a consecutive relationship between cross-dressing/transvestism and transsexualism 
in Courtenay’s account, which Ekins (1997) also identified in his study. Cross-dressing was 
common among many other transwomen in the research, an investment, which offered a 
“stop gap” between the confusion and feelings of “difference.” The clothing temporarily 
comforted the “phenomenological body”, and allowed for private imaginings of a feminine 
body image.  
 
It all started when I was twelve [years old]. I started to cross-dress and it took me 
all of ten years to actually work things through in my head, to determine what I 
was actually going to become. I took a long time looking at websites reading up on 
research and the more I read about it – the more I was terrified that it might be that 
I am a transsexual; it has huge amounts of repercussions and problems in our life 
(transwoman Anna-Marie). 
 
The comfort that occurred through dressing in feminine clothing prevailed prior to the more 
frightening and momentous desire to trans-sex. Feminine clothing and make-up use, 
however, did not come naturally to the respondents. Whilst showing photographs of herself, 
Amelia illustrated that femininity and the use of clothing was sometimes a difficult “thing” 
to do well without practice: 
 
This is borrowed clothing, it is not my clothing. I did not know how to relax with 
me. At this time I was still trying to work out who I am. In this one madam doesn’t 
know how to wear a wig, doesn’t know how to do make-up and wear clothes and it 
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shows. That would have been in my late twenties early thirties. Again this one, I 
am a bag of nerves, I really don’t know what I am doing there. This [photo] is very 
early post transition, this is me mid thirties and I am out, out and it shows. In this I 
don’t know how to use make-up and I still haven’t got the hair right, I haven’t got 
the look right at all […] I am sure that’s how a thirteen year old, fourteen year old, 
fifteen year old learns that is to have disasters and I didn’t get that opportunity so 
you have to make mistakes on the hoof as it were (transwoman Amelia). 
 
Anna-Marie described how she learnt her femininity from others: 
 
Basically a lot of observation, taking into account every girl that is walking by. I 
would take into account every action, ways of being, ways of talking, ways of 
moving and a lot of that I had drawn in my head from life, if you like what you see 
and it suits you, and then apply it to yourself. For example, I learned to do my 
walk from Beyonce’s Crazy video, I downloaded it of the internet and you know 
the beginning scene when she is walking and I learned to walk like that by 
mimicking it then down playing it so it looked natural and it has worked very, very 
well. So it is all observation and application (transwoman Anna-Marie). 
 
As I noted above, for Amelia, clothing had political implications in relation to radical 
feminist theorisations of transwomen’s sartorial practices, which she juxtaposed with her 
own practices, which were unremarkable in her daily life: 
 
There are certainly people out there who think we want to look like 50s bouffant 
wearing women; I mean, who really wants to look like that now? Well, April 
Ashley looked like that but one must remember she looked like that because she 
was around at that time. People look at pictures of April Ashley and Christine 
Jorgensen and people like that and think we all look like that but they looked like 
that because it was the style. If you look at Lilly Elba she’s in a little flapper’s 
outfit with a flop hat but of course that is the era she lived in (transwoman 
Amelia). 
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Performing to counter the criticisms of being inscribed in stereotypical ways was an 
important element for Amelia. This required a sustained attempt to manage the meanings of 
some types of clothing and styles. Amelia rebukes challenges to her clothing aesthetic by 
understanding (in)famous transwomen’s styles as merely fashions of their time. In 
Hausman’s (1995) work  she critical analyses of autobiographies of (in)famous transwomen 
and argues that transsexuals invest a lot of time in “mimicking” the autobiographical 
accounts of successfully transitioned transpeople. Whilst this may be true at a figurative 
level, Amelia clearly intends to be individual in her own aesthetic presentation. 
 
Like Amelia, Bernadette said: 
 
Bernadette: Have you seen [the film] Transamerica? 
 
Zowie: Not yet. 
 
Bernadette: Oh well it is a wonderful film. If you don’t cry I would be incredibly 
surprised. She is portrayed as being a believable person, she is not portrayed as in 
your face, bad clothes, the drag queen type, and it is very real. She is perceived as 
being a lady and I don’t mean that in a derogatory sense. I have always considered 
myself a lady because that is my background, conservative, not in your face in 
terms cutting fashion style. My choice of clothes, therefore, which I hope I get 
right, in the colours and styles, is reflected in my perception of classic cuts and 
classic styles. There is nothing in my wardrobe that is going to set the world alight. 
I am not comfortable in wearing things like that and I think I would look 
ridiculous. I like stylish clothes and they tend to be more expensive, so a lot of my 
clothes, well I bought them in the sales, so they were theoretically more expensive 
clothes. They are timeless for someone of my age (transwoman Bernadette). 
 
Clothing, for Bernadette, was only made use of for self-formation through fashionable, 
timely, and appropriate performances of dress and decoration, which reflects the (sub) 
cultural etiquette of being female in various “social” spaces: 
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Well I love denim and blue is my favourite colour. At home I am just relaxed but I 
will dress-up, if we are going somewhere like the opera, special. If we are going 
out for a meal, depending on what it is for, I may be casual, but if it is for 
somebody’s birthday I would put something on that’s a little dressy. I am quite 
happy to dress as I feel as I say I am quite happy wearing jeans and a t-shirt under 
the sink unblocking the pipes. I mean clothes are not the be all and end all, they 
are fun and they are nice to have, it’s a nice thing to do but in the end I am me 
whatever I am wearing. If I put on a man’s suit it would still be me (transwoman 
Amelia). 
 
Amelia talked about her non-stereotypicality: 
 
[I was] riding very large motorcycles, believe it or not. I am afraid the love of the 
larger motorcycles has never left me but the being hairy has. Yes my bike was a 
Harley Davidson and I still had that when I met John (transwoman Amelia). 
 
Amelia’s complex narrative offers information that is not elucidated from her aesthetic 
presentation, her love of big motorbikes. For Amelia, stating her fondness for 
“stereotypical” masculine motorbikes and her utilisation of unremarkable “feminine” 
beauty regimes and clothing, illustrates her non-stereotypicality. Karen, understands that 
some transpeople are stereotypical, and suggested that it was transgender identities that 
were more stereotypical than transsexual identities, she stated: 
 
Well I think a lot of transpeople are very influenced by stereotypes. I think it tends 
to be more transvestites and those who fit into the transgender category, who seem 
to mimic stereotypes. I think a lot of transsexual people actually become 
downplayed once they have transitioned but then again I think it varies from 
person to person. I haven’t mixed with trans people for a while, but I used to go to 
the Village in Manchester an awful lot and there you meet so many different 
people with different agendas and different needs. You do not know who you are 
meeting half the time and I think a full spectrum of human life is there. Some 
people fulfil stereotypes and other people come much downplayed and muted 
(transwoman Karen). 
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In a sub-culture that use clothing and make-up to complicate mainstream gendered 
signifiers, i.e. having an emphasis on androgyny, it can alert us to the subtleties of aesthetic 
signifiers. Interestingly in the following exchange with Octavia, she suggests that that 
normative femininity is not always a part of transwomen’s lives: 
 
Zowie: You mentioned your style, you are a Goth. Can you tell me how important 
that is to you? 
 
Octavia: Well it is everything really; the average Goth defines themselves through 
their image and the music they listen to. So as my body image started to change I 
had to start thinking about the way my make-up and clothing has to change as 
well. So I had to get rid of the male corsets because they were male corsets and 
had to buy a whole load of corsets for the female body shape. My make-up style 
changed, I mean the Goth style is androgynous anyway so there is not a huge 
change but subtle changes. 
 
Zowie: Can you expand on that, I find this really interesting? 
 
Octavia: Ok, well before I changed [sex/gender] I could quite easily get away with 
wearing a micro skirt but afterwards I would tend to wear a long flowing one, 
more sort of Victorian in style. Before I changed [sex/gender] I would wear 
flouncy pirate shirts underneath a black corset but of course now I would wear a 
velvety corset over a tee-shirt. I have taken to wearing a dog collar more because it 
hides the Adam’s apple, which is not a huge problem and ties quite nicely into my 
partner’s aesthetic ideals for me as well. She likes me to wear it so that is fine 
(transwoman Octavia). 
 
The gendered policing of sartorial and make-up styles here is obvious (which Octavia was 
compliant in). However, mainstream femininity does not figure in Octavia’s androgynous 
framework and, along with Emily’s queer aesthetic framework, disrupts normative and 
sexological understandings of female transsexuals’ femininity, which I discussed in 
Chapter I: Shifting the Medicolegal Construction of Transsexual Aesthetics. 
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Nonetheless, clothing and make-up are intrinsic to the transsexual trajectory of trans- 
sexing and subjectivity. Cross-dressing and make-up are figured as practical steps and have 
a consecutive relationship in building up a feminine image. Nonetheless, the discursive 
rebuttals of perversion and stereotypicality do influence the discursive and aesthetic aspects 
of trans femininities. The rebuttal of stereotypicality was not observed from participants 
who construct feminine signifiers outside of normative femininity. 
 
Hormones, emotionality and “beauty” 
The accomplishment of womanhood is dependent on an aesthetically congruent body with 
more emphasis on the hair and face in social interactions. The transwoman’s “social body” 
requires investment strategies to maintain its “beauty” and ability to “pass” in much the 
same way as biological women do. As Paula Black and Ursula Sharma (2001: 101) argue, 
men require much less maintenance to turn their bodies into cultural ones, while femininity 
for women, “is a state to be constantly sought.” Samantha, who was one of the younger 
transwomen in the research, connects her maintenance of beauty with regimes associated 
with normative femininity. She stated: 
 
In a sense I am lucky because I changed so early, maintenance is easy [laugh]. 
Fundamentally, it is just a little maintenance. Basically it is the same as my 
girlfriends, who are biological [females]. Well I do my legs about once a week. 
Luckily my arms are not too bad. Especially in this warm weather it’s the first year 
ever that I have got a tan on my legs. I have inherited the genes of male patterned 
baldness and female pattern baldness. Baldness is in both sides of my family. HRT 
has worked, but I am still quite thin [stroking hair]. That’s natural for me but 
nobody can guess [about my trans status] (transwoman Samantha). 
 
Samantha used the term HRT (Hormone Replacement Therapy) to indicate the hormone 
therapy used for her transition. Hormones and anti-androgens26 featured highly in relation 
to beauty in this research. They enabled the transwomen various aesthetic benefits, such as 
softening the skin, reduction of body hair, breast formation and feminine fat deposits 
                                                 
26 For an extensive review of endocrine therapy refer to Dahl et al (2006). 
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around the hips and, most importantly, for the majority of participants, arresting the balding 
that men sometimes suffer. Diane said: 
 
When I took the Cypretone,27 it improved my skin virtually overnight; it certainly 
made my skin a lot softer and reduced body hair. It did reduce my libido, but 
unfortunately it made me tired, but that was a side-effect that was well worth 
putting up with. It didn’t do everything that I wanted, it may not have feminised 
me but it did de-masculinise (transwoman Diane). 
 
The age of transwomen is also important in relation to feminisation: 
 
What scares me a bit is when I read “I am a fifty seven year old transsexual,” “I 
am a forty five year old,” “I am fifty five and have just started hormones, or just 
started to see [psychiatrist]” and all these things and it terrifies me to think that I 
could have been like that. But I couldn’t have been like that because it was so 
strong in me and by the time I saw thirty approaching and I thought I can’t let this 
go on any longer. I feel sorry for these people but then feel less sorry for them 
when they say “I have had a good life” and they are glad to have their families, 
they have earnt thousands of pounds in their male jobs so that they can have their 
surgery and laser hair removal and stuff and “oh I am glad I waited till I was fifty 
five because that means I can do it more easily,” or “I am more adjusted to life.” I 
think, sorry I can not relate to that. As far as I am concerned and the way I felt 
about it, the sooner I can do something about it and the younger the better, because 
of the physical changes involved, because if you have a fifty five year old male 
body to feminise it is a dam site harder to do that than if it was younger. For 
example if you had a twenty five or a thirty or even thirty five year old 
masculinised body. I know I shouldn’t put them down about this but I have met 
someone recently who had their genital surgery at sixty three and I found this 
person actually vaguely offensive, and I know this will sound terribly judgemental, 
when they said nine months into the transition, “I feel comfortable, I feel 
completely like a woman. I feel completely transitioned.” I am sorry, I don’t 
                                                 
27 Cypretone is an anti-androgen, which is prescribed to reduce masculine characteristics, such as 
body hair. 
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believe you can live as a man until you are sixty two and then have a bit of facial 
surgery and then have electrolysis or laser treatment, I don’t buy it basically, 
because it took me long enough (transwoman Diane). 
 
According to Diane, both aesthetically and in relation to your sense of self as a woman, it is 
better to transition early because you can live as your preferred gender more successfully 
and attain a feminine body more easily without the “ravages” of testosterone on the body. 
To illustrate this, some older transitioning participants said that the effects of the hormonal 
intake were not as dramatic as had been expected. Mariza, for example, said: 
 
I was hoping for them to work wonders and do miracles, well actually they did, 
but not in the way I felt. I thought they would transform me into superwoman 
overnight, which of course they don’t (transwoman Mariza). 
 
Like Mariza, Amelia highlights the slow process of attaining a feminised body in the 
following exchange: 
 
Zowie: Can you tell me your experiences of taking the hormones? 
 
Amelia: Well there was the initial excitement of getting hold of these things. Then 
at first you are looking at every little change, every little thing at all to say that 
there is a change happening. Of course it doesn’t happen particularly quickly but 
you persuade yourself you are a little less hairy, you persuade yourself your hair is 
coming back [pointing to the head] and so forth. In truth I think very little happens 
but as you go on you do notice the changes. I guess I noticed the emotional 
changes, which the hormones do. Certainly I found myself calmer, and although I 
have always been pretty emotional I found I was easier with my emotions, I could 
let go. If I wanted to cry at a silly movie, I would cry at a silly movie. If I wanted 
to cry at a piece of music I would do it. I no longer felt any embarrassment at 
doing that it was just, well that is ok to do it. 
 
Zowie: Do you think that was down to the hormones? 
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Amelia: I do think they are partly down to the hormones, I think they give you that 
freedom to be who you are. I don’t like stereotypes but, well I was always an 
emotional character, but I certainly think that they stopped me thinking I have got 
to control this, I have got to pretend this is not happening. I was able to say “go for 
it”. Now it is something I just take daily and I don’t really think about it, it is just a 
pill I take and that’s it (transwoman Amelia). 
 
Bernadette, who was sixty years old, questions the assumption that beauty and femininity 
are as much of a requirement for older (trans) women: 
 
Zowie: Do you think as a woman you are meant to perform more with the way you 
look? 
 
Bernadette: I don’t think I am expected to perform more, not at the age of sixty. I 
think if I was someone considerably younger then yes, but at the age of sixty, what 
it has given me is freedom. I can dress exactly as I wish. […] I have quite a mixed 
wardrobe; I buy what I like within the bounds of expense. There is no question that 
I do take more care of myself, in terms of beauty treatments and things like that. I 
do spend a little bit of money; I go for a manicure once a month, the hairdressers, 
where I never bothered before. I enjoy that but I enjoy it simply because I enjoy it 
not because I think I have to. There has certainly been a change in mental attitude; 
I take much more interest in fashion, clothes, make-up a little bit, although I don’t 
wear heavy make-up or anything like that. (transwoman Bernadette). 
 
Emily, for whom femininity was far from normative, stated: 
 
I think sometimes I am quite aggressively trans, I am completely out with 
everybody and the bars I go to I probably am known as the trans woman, “see that, 
that’s the trans woman.” Also not trying to be stealth I find so much easier than 
trying to pass. I am more concerned with looking good, which is slightly different, 
because I don’t mind people looking at me and being able to work out that I am 
trans but I would also like them to look at me and if they work it out , look at me 
and think that I look OK (transwoman Emily). 
 162
 
 
Cosmetics and beauty regimes were elaborated on as body techniques, which were used to 
construct a range of attributes associated with the self, gender, femininity and imitation of 
normative femininity. Some transwomen incorporated the rhetoric of individualism. Other 
transwomen suggested that their body work was regulated in quite a disciplined way to 
produce the feminine “social body.” However, Emily completely rejected normative 
femininity in relation to her presentation. 
 
Genital surgery and aesthetic surgery 
In contrast to most transmen in this research, genital surgery (in these cases Vaginoplasty)28 
is held up as inevitable for transwomen. As I observed above in the section, Penis as male 
signifier, the penis holds phallic power “phenomenologically,” “socially” and “sexually.” 
Without Vaginoplasty, the transwomen in this study would continue to feel incomplete. For 
Amelia, vaginoplasty “made [her] feel like a woman in both a physical and mental sense.” 
 
In all but two of the narratives, the transwomen mentioned their “fear” of losing their 
neovaginas after surgery. More positively, though, Jess described her experience of 
preparation, surgery and aftercare: 
 
Well about the surgeries as I said I found the SRS [Sex Reassignment Surgery] a 
joyous experience. I am pleased to say he did a wonderful job. I have a beautiful 
vagina. I went back after four months for a labia trim, because it was uneven, but 
he did explain with the swelling, anyway he did it without any problem. And it 
also validated my decision not to go to Thailand. How do you do that, go to 
Thailand for an out-patient procedure you wouldn’t do it would you? I had on and 
off cystitis for a year due to the plumbing. Oh the joys of cranberry juice. I never 
had any problem dilating at all. I remember them saying, that “there is not much 
donor material here Jess.” I said, “I am glad to hear it.” He said that he’s going to 
                                                 
28 “The term vaginoplasty includes several procedures which transform the male external genitals 
into female genitals. The [medical] goals of vaginoplasty include: (a) creation of a sensate and 
aesthetically acceptable vulva – including clitoris, labia minora and majora, and a vaginal introitus: 
[…] (c) creation of a stable and sensate neovagina with adequate dimensions for penetrative sexual 
intercourse […] (e) preservation of orgasmic capability” (Bowman & Goldberg, 2006: 140). 
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have to use your testicles and I said, “well if you can find them you can have them 
[…] So he said “can you stretch it before surgery?” So for a few months I was 
stretching it in the bath, so I ended up with a vagina which was four and half 
inches in depth (transwoman Jess). 
 
Jess illustrates the personal preparation required in order to attain a satisfactory vagina in a 
relaxed and joke like manner. Jess’ satisfaction with the procedure had a lot to do with the 
surgical results. As I mentioned above, this was not always the case. For Courtenay and 
Diane there were problems associated with the genital surgery itself. For Nancy and 
Courtenay there were problems with the outcomes of the procedure(s), which led to a fear 
of loss and depression: 
 
One section of the labia on the left never healed properly even from the beginning 
you could see it was a darker red than the rest. And before I left [the hospital] they 
[nurses] were saying to me, “make sure you ask all the questions you want” 
(transwoman Courtenay). 
 
Courtenay’s difficulties with the surgery were quite common amongst the participants in 
this research where, partial necrosis of the labia and clitoris impacted on the aesthetic 
results of the vagina and clitoris.29 Courtenay continued: 
 
Even then I had some protracted granulated skin, which was red and was not going 
to heal properly. I found it hard to the touch and some of it was up near the clitoris 
it was the size of a pea. They put some nitrate stuff on it, which burns the top 
away. I did not realise what it was; I did not realise what it was going to do, but it 
did feel a lot better. I went down to London and on the train back I thought this 
was a lot better, I knew I had lost some more skin but I wasn’t sure if it had 
damaged the clitoris or not. I was crying and sometimes I was fixated that I was 
going to lose my clitoris. I don’t know why but I did. I have a diary which I could 
read you bit there only tiny bits but it says “blood on the pad” “crying today” and 
stuff like that stuff I really did think I’d lose it (transwoman Courtenay). 
                                                 
29 For a more complete medical understanding of the potential problems associated with SRS and 
other secondary sex characteristic surgeries see Bowman and Goldberg (2006). 
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Nancy commented on how her “phenomenological body” and psychological well-being 
were affected through her fear of loss: 
 
I remember getting quite upset because I had a problem with the narrowing of my 
vagina and I was very worried that I might lose it, and that did affect me. I did start 
thinking; I would not want that to happen (transwoman Nancy). 
 
However, Diane suggested that the vaginal aesthetic resulting from the surgery was “a 
mess” and “unrealistic.” This was affecting her phenomenologically and affecting her 
“sexual body” and potential relationships: 
 
three years ago I realised that I had to do something, because I had not had sexual 
contact for years and years and years and that I needed to do something about 
getting corrective surgery, that was the reason I had this whole health collapse 
because I was too overwhelmed about what had happened and being 
disempowered, to cut a long story short I found my way to [hospital] and [the 
surgeons I] got corrective urological surgery from them. I mean it is not perfect 
but it is a big improvement. So perhaps this is why the physical side of it is so 
important to me, I think it would be anyway, I think it may have made it more 
important (transwoman Diane). 
 
Samantha also had to return to the surgeon to correct some problems: 
 
Mine was done in [hospital] by [surgeon], I love him; I thank him to such a degree. 
I have had two fairly major surgeries with him and a few minor ones but even 
though his registrar could have done them he did them himself (transwoman 
Samantha). 
 
Samantha added: 
 
The second [operation] wasn’t too bad but it caused me to have a massive dose of 
depression. Instead of putting a [catheter] bag, which I have had since, they didn’t, 
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they put a valve in, which meant that I had to stand up and wee, which was so 
depressing (transwoman Samantha). 
 
In Samantha’s narrative there was an obvious appreciation of the surgeon’s “work.” Even 
after many returns to the hospital, because of medical problems, which consisted of urinary 
infections, blood loss, and non-healing of tissue, Samantha regarded the surgery as a 
success on an aesthetic level. However, Samantha had a bout of depression because she was 
reminded “phenomenologically” of her previous (“male”) body while having to stand up to 
urinate. This lasted until she healed. 
 
In contrast to the stories above, there was one respondent, Brian, who reported that 
although surgery was successful, both aesthetically and physically: 
 
I just think I am never going to be like any other woman. I know all women are 
different, anyway but I am never going to fit in to a lot of things. There are also a 
lot of things that once I had surgery, I don’t relate to (Bi-Gendered Brian). 
 
Brian was thinking about living with a more masculine aesthetic on account of him/her not 
fitting in to the female role as s/he wanted to or felt s/he could. While s/he had no problem 
“passing” in an aesthetic sense, s/he felt that there were still fundamental differences 
between him/her and biological women. Brian suggested that this situation was 
deleteriously affecting his/her self-esteem and confidence. In the following exchange Brian 
explained why: 
 
Zowie: Is that because you are not attaining the femininity that you wanted to 
attain? 
 
Brian: No I have always thought that has been there for me but I just thought and 
feel that it is just very difficult to be myself. Where I have conversations with 
people and I have never mentioned about [my trans status] there might be 
something I’d say or something that I’d do that they just won’t relate to and I felt 
the subtleness of their looks of “that’s a strange thing to say or do for a woman.” 
That is one of the things that has made me think that my true self is coming out 
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and maybe I shouldn’t have [transitioned]. This is because it was a choice and I 
went through the thoughts about would I go down that road. I did sacrifice a lot of 
things, like giving up my job, a relationship and I moved to be able to go through 
it. I don’t have any regrets about it; it is just that I feel such a pressure socially (Bi-
Gendered Brian). 
 
Prior to transitioning, Brian’s sense of his/herself as a woman was augmented through 
his/her positive relationship with an ex-partner. When s/he decided that s/he felt like a 
woman the “choice” to “sacrifice” his/her job and home was made in relation to this 
relationship.. After perceiving that his/her practices and bodily aesthetic and people were 
“saying” that is “a strange thing to say or do for a woman” through “the subtleness of their 
looks,” Brian understood that his/her ways of being-in-the-world were not perceived as 
feminine and thus, by default, were masculine. This instigated his/her “reverting back” 
aesthetically. This reminds us of Merleau-Ponty’s (2002 [1962]) assertions concerning the 
formation of the “self.” Merleau-Ponty suggests that as intersubjective agents 
(ephemerally) positioned in a body-world dialectic, our perception of the perceptions of 
others are instrumental to our ongoing body projects and body image. Crossley (1996), 
following Husserl, would perhaps theorise this as us establishing subjectivity and our sense 
of “self” through the shared confirmation and negotiation which takes place between 
different and independent perspectives. 
 
While genital surgery was important, the most striking and frequently expressed bodily 
aesthetic desire was the retention of, or surgery to improve, the amount of head hair. The 
following quotations highlight the huge benefit of having your own hair in order for the 
“social body” to “pass: 
 
As far as passing goes I was worried about passing pre-op, not so much post-op 
but pre-op the hair transplants made an amazing difference, although there are all 
kinds of hair conditions that are unpleasant for people to have, I think male pattern 
baldness is quite debilitating for transwomen. I know one transwoman who had 
lost more hair than I did before she got on the hormones and that is the biggest 
physical challenge she has to cope with day by day. She suffers quite a lot of 
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depression because of it, which it did to me, a lot of depression (transwoman 
Emily). 
 
Similarly, Nancy said: 
 
Actually I have had some hair transplants as well and that enabled me to have my 
own hair. That has made the biggest difference of all (transwoman Nancy). 
 
 
According to one recent report by Bockting et al. (2006: 30): 
 
Surgical procedures intended to reduce female or male features can reduce gender 
dysphoria, and are not intrinsically problematic (indeed, they are an important part 
of medical treatment for some transgender individuals). However, some 
transgender persons become obsessed with cosmetic procedures relating to 
discomfort with their general body image, internalized transphobia, or feelings of 
not being conventionally feminine/masculine, rather than gender dysphoria per se. 
 
While in the quotation above, acquiring aesthetic surgery was interpreted as sometimes 
“obsessive,” aesthetic procedures in my research were considered by many transwomen as 
a site of “phenomenological” and “social” control, and, by some, as a contestation of 
Western beauty ideals. Courtenay stated: 
 
I'm bound for Thailand in early July for some more surgery this time to the face, 
forehead sculpting and mandible realigning. I’m still a little in two minds about 
this, as it seems a bit of a sell-out, making me less noticeable as a transsexual 
woman. At least I hope so. Diminishing my TS presence, which I feel undermines 
my own radical views. But I would like to feel more safe, and a greater sense of 
belonging (transwoman Courtenay). 
 
Aesthetic interventions, here, are complexly understood. Courtenay, on the one hand, sees 
her political transsexual body as losing its trans visibility and moving more inline with 
normative bi-gendered assumptions but, on the other hand, the interventions will bring a 
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supplementary level of social safety and security in her self because of their normative 
aesthetic representation. Jess, following numerous procedures to her body and face, said: 
 
But I must admit I feel more comfortable no one in the street looks at me or stares 
at me. I work [it] out on the basis that I don’t pass, because experience tells me I 
don’t. I came to terms with that because I am quite realistic, but what I could do is 
kind of negotiate a truce with the world as long as I did my best. I more or less 
fitted in and nobody is going to make a fuss about it there is a difference between 
that and someone passing surreptitiously. So I was going to be a transwoman with 
flair and style and then it didn’t matter, because I wasn’t going to waste my life 
chasing a dream and be forever dissatisfied. But if I do pass that’s a bonus, but I 
don’t expect to. It does not bother me, so whatever I do, I’ll do it with style 
(transwoman Jess). 
 
Jess’ pragmatic approach to her (non) passing was a defence mechanism against being read 
as her “original” gender. Jess suggested that if you show people that you are serious about 
your aesthetic presentation social relations can be negotiated more easily. Nancy indicated 
that whilst the facial surgery was important for her, people need the “feminine” foundations 
for it to be truly successful, she said: 
 
[facial surgery] made me look younger, it made me look more pretty, which is all 
in the eyes of the beholder anyway. So they did not make me feel particularly 
better about myself. It didn’t make me feel more passable, because I think 
passability is about acceptance than how you look. I never had much passing 
issues anyway […] Well you see I was lucky with my facial features as I said 
earlier on, if somebody did have particularly masculine features and bone structure 
then I can’t help feeling that their interaction with the rest of society would be 
improved if they’d had structural surgery on their faces, I simply can not believe 
that it would not be improved. But I am not saying that, well facial surgery does 
not turn Arnold Schwarzenegger into Bridget Bardot it just shaves the edges off 
(transwoman Nancy). 
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Facial surgery was viewed as part of the feminisation process. Participants were realistic 
about how much change was possible. In most cases, participants realised that the 
“original” facial structure could only be softened. The softening did provide a certain 
amount of feminine enhancement, and, as Nancy and Courtenay suggested, would alleviate 
some of the dangers they felt during social relations. Passing for these participants was 
much more contextual. The age of participants was a significant factor in whether they 
could attain an unambiguous feminine aesthetics because for the older transwomen 
hormone and surgical technology could only lessen the masculinising effects of the 
“ravages of testosterone.”  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I explored the various subjective positions of transwomen through 
childhood and the decision making processes in order to transition. Identification with 
feminine signifiers and cross-dressing scenarios were re-envisioned as important markers of 
being transwomen. However, these identifications were not the catalysts for the decision to 
trans-sex. The habitus is a generative structure, rather than a deterministic one. Trans-
sexing was accomplished primarily when conditions within the transwomen’s “habitus” 
were realised and acted upon. Identifying with medical and popular cultural discourses 
about trans-sexing needed to be a part of the transwomen’s cultural capital in this respect. 
Cultural and gender capital about trans-sexing was required to give shape to transwomen’s 
desired embodiment and bodily aesthetics. The intimacy and support provided by 
significant others allowed for much needed clarification of thought, and added to the 
“gender capital” required to accomplish womanhood. I argued that the exploration of and 
experimentation with (socially constructed) gendered signifiers in supportive spaces, and 
the realisation that something could be done about feelings of “difference” were important 
factors in actualising gender reassignment. 
 
I suggested that once the decision to change sex was secure the most important aspects of 
transsexual subjectivities to be considered were the aesthetics, albeit in varying degrees for 
each respondent. Gendered aesthetics had to be negotiated within various discourses of 
beauty, sartorial and body modification practices. The “social,” “sexual” and 
“phenomenological body” were the sites of these negotiations. Many transwomen rebutted 
the association of transpeople with perversion and stereotypicality, which influenced their 
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aesthetic sartorial figurations. However, most of the transwomen suggested that males and 
females needed “proper” “sexual bodies” and “appropriate” clothing. This “sexual body” 
was linked to the “social body” as it was believed in most cases that society would not 
accept transwomen with penises. The social pressures of a normative bodily aesthetic were 
adhered to by some transwomen in this research, which was a crucial difference to the 
transmen in this research. Whilst mainstream femininity was observed by some 
transwomen it was negated in other narratives. For instance, in both Octavia’s androgynous 
framework and Emily’s queer aesthetic framework, they disrupt normative and sexological 
understandings of femininity. The research showed how the narratives of transwomen were 
influenced by the aesthetics of (sub) cultural gender systems which they were a part of. 
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Chapter VI: Framing Bodies in Trans-Community Organisations (T-CO) in the UK 
 
Introduction 
In the previous empirical chapters I used the concepts “social,” “sexual” and 
“phenomenological body” to analyse the “private” aspects of transpeople’s embodiment. 
This provided a nuanced understanding of transsexuals’ body projects. In this chapter I use 
the concept of “bodily aesthetics” – to refer to the appearance of the body that is subjected 
to judgments – in order to understand how three T-COs in the UK represent transsexual 
bodies publicly. These representations, I suggest, are a part of the political praxes each of 
the T-COs are engaged in. The T-COs, in effect, try to represent the “social body” of the 
transsexual. However, the “social body” is formulated differently by each of the T-COs I 
consider. 
 
In the 1990s transgender activism30 emerged primarily in the US aided by academic writing 
and grassroots activism. A pamphlet by Leslie Feinberg (1992) titled Transgender 
Liberation: A Movement Whose Time has Come, was a call to a diverse group of people 
who defined themselves in many ways (transgender, transsexual, intersex, queer, transboi, 
androgyne and so on),31 to come together within a transgender community and transform 
the social and medical meanings of their existence. Similarly, Sandy Stone’s (1991: 141) 
“call to arms” said “[p]erhaps it is time to begin laying the groundwork for the next 
transformation.” Transformation refers to transitioning from socially expected sex roles and 
gender expressions based on one’s ascribed birth sex and also to challenging and rewriting 
academic and medical literature, which constructed non-normatively gendered people as 
pathological or sexually deviant. Activists wanted to restructure what it meant to be 
transgender and transsexual (Feinberg, 1992, 1998). The term transgender replaced the 
medicalised term transsexual, which was an obvious change of tack in relation to self-
naming. By incorporating a feminist understanding of the sex/gender divide, which 
illustrated gender as the socially constructed aspect of sex differences, transgender groups 
                                                 
30 More and more transpeople have identified with the term transgender and see it as an umbrella 
term, even though on a personal level they may identify as a specific identity, such as Butch, Drag 
Queen and so on. Transgender activism is not a fixed concept either, but one that has morphed in 
many directions from its first inscription. 
31 Rather than list the many identities I will use the widely employed concept transgender as an 
umbrella to capture the variation. 
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were able to rally support from a wider range of trans identified people who did not 
necessarily think of themselves as transsexual. This type of political organising was distinct 
from “traditional” transsexual organising, which was primarily concerned with directing its 
energies towards the human rights of transsexuals and their legal recognition. Transsexuals 
were concerned with the rights to medical intervention for their Gender Dysphoria, rather 
than critiquing psycho-medical constructions of transsexuality. 
 
In the US, Kate Bornstein (1994) and Riki Ann Wilchins (1997) began speaking about a 
new type of politics for a transgender community that would be inclusive of all those who 
do not fit the binary sex and gender system (including those transsexuals who felt affiliated 
to this new type of activism). Transgender political activists were debating about identity 
politics as a type of “ethnic” minority, on the one hand, and the deconstruction of identity 
based politics, on the other (Broad, 2002). These politics were born out of queer theory’s 
refusal of the “self” as a coherent ontological subject. However, there was an obvious fear 
that the subject may be deconstructed out of existence (cf A. I. Green, 2007). These 
deconstructionary activities and conceptualising of “new” “subjectless” politics were not 
uniformly accepted, and engendered much debate and consideration of the identity 
boundaries and goals of transgender political activism (Namaste, 1996). One inherent 
problem of deconstructing identity out of existence is the difficulty in pinning down 
minoritarian political goals for subjects. As I noted above, these debates took place in a US 
context, yet they did influence the debates that were going on in the UK as all theorists 
writing in this area cited their US forerunners (Monro, 2003). 
 
The T-COs in the UK engage in a whole range of activism and cultural work, such as 
attending vigils, being visible in local, national, and international medical and legal forums 
and organising trans awareness campaigns. Stephen Whittle (2001), a transman, academic 
and political activist, has argued that the trans social movement is a “merged collective 
body,” where personal subjective belief is suspended for the wider good of the community. 
Whilst this may be true of some aspects of T-COs and whilst there may be some agreement 
on the broader tenets of T-COs’ aims, such as respect for diversity (Press for Change, 
2004), it is difficult to envisage the transgender political movement as a “merged 
collective” due to the diverse views of the organisations and their members. Sally Hines’ 
(2007) work considers transgender support groups in the UK and addresses the care that 
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these groups provide and how trans education and values are shared through giving and 
receiving support. However, involvement is not evenly practiced because of concerns over 
visibility, particularly being visibly “transsexual.” Surya Monro (2003, 2005) critically 
explores the tensions between transgender and heteronormative models of citizenship and 
argues for “gender pluralism” in future models of citizenship. Monro (2005) is wary of 
some of the dangers she sees in identity based politics that can (re)produce new boundaries, 
which continue to marginalise those who do not fit. There is no research to date, about 
which bodies that do, or do not fit, into existing frames of activism and cultural work in the 
UK. Moreover, there is still a scarcity of empirical and theoretical work on UK transgender 
politics and activism. 
 
Framing analysis, inspired by the work of Goffman (Benford, 1997), has contributed to an 
array of empirical case studies about social movements in feminism (Walby, 2005) and 
LGBT politics (Douglas Creed et al., 2002). Framing, according to Benford, is where 
activists 
 
seek to affect interpretations of reality among various audiences. They engage in 
this framing work because they assume, rightly or wrongly, that meaning is 
prefatory to action (Benford, 1997: 410). 
 
Using framing analysis, Sylvia Walby understands feminist political struggles as being 
about “sameness,” “difference” or “transformation” (Walby, 2005). If we apply these 
concepts to trans politics, broadly, “sameness” has been framed in transgender activism 
literature as “assimilationist” (MacKenzie, 1994; Raymond, 1994). Assimilation into a 
binary system is seen as allowing transmen and transwomen to accomplish gender 
normativity, which is seen as having grave consequences for all women and gender 
minorities who do not abide by the gender order’s notions of masculinity and femininity 
(MacKenzie, 1994). “Difference” politics are framed as wanting acceptance and civil rights 
awarded to citizens, such as marriage, inheritance and equal civil liberties, whilst retaining 
a sense that being transgender is a worthy subject position (see Whittle, 2002). 
“Transformative” politics are framed as progressive and queer, and as a way to move 
beyond identity politics, which constructs restrictive bodily boundaries (Stryker, 2006). On 
a basic level, each model can be seen to apply to the three T-COs I am about to discuss. 
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However, Walby (2004) illustrates that political “sameness” may have a particular standard 
in one domain, for example, equal opportunity legislation, simultaneously with “difference” 
as in specific policies, such as targeted healthcare. Moreover, in Walby’s (2004) 
formulation these standards may also become “transformative” through highlighting the 
visibility of issues. Therefore, Walby (2004) argues that “transformative” work is also 
connected to “sameness” and “difference” strategies, because there is always the possibility 
of “transformation” within existing gender orders. This means that we may be able to build 
productive bridges – rather than dichotomies – between “sameness” assimilationist politics 
and “difference” and “transformative” queer politics, in their respective activism and 
cultural work. This, however, would only be made possible by understanding that the 
either/or and both/neither (Roen, 2001) dichotomies of assimilationist/queer politics are not 
so divided. This standpoint and Walby’s concepts are useful in conceptualising T-COs in 
the UK. 
 
This chapter, then, will critically explore the particular political framings of (trans) bodies 
and the aesthetic judgments that accompany them in three prominent T-COs in the UK, the 
Gender Identity Research & Education Society (GIRES), Press for Change (PFC) and a 
“DIY” Queer collective that is based in Manchester, UK but which has links with similar 
collectives across the UK (see pen portraits in Chapter III Methods, Methodology and the 
Research Process). I will analyse and emphasise these political frames in relation to bodies 
that are absent from, or which have been reintegrated into the T-COs political 
considerations and ask: why might this be? And: is it to the detriment of social change? I 
will explore how these frames of bodies and aesthetic judgments are used within 
campaigns, for legal, medical, informational, and representational work. I argue that 
politics and cultural work theorised as “assimilationist,” “difference,” and “transformative 
politics are unproductive when seen as dichotomous “good” or “bad” practices, we often 
see in transgender politics literature (MacKenzie, 1994) and queer politics literature (cf 
Richardson, 2004). Instead I will suggest that each of the T-CO’s perspective addresses its 
particular audience and that the framing of trans bodies is adapted to the specific context. 
As political praxis and cultural productions rarely invoke instantaneous social change, 
ongoing research questions need to be formulated, in relation to which trans bodies become 
assimilationist or radical, before laying blame about destructive or “unproductive” activism 
and cultural work. This chapter opens up the body question(s) this thesis is addressing by 
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illustrating three major areas – healthcare, law and cultural production – where (absent) 
bodies figure in changing social attitudes towards trans embodiment. 
 
Methods 
I analysed three T-CO web-sites and numerous emails related to embodiment and bodily 
aesthetics which had been sent out by the three organisations over a six year period and 
from which we can learn much about the many strands of information that have been 
produced by their members. Grassroots activists belonging to these groups have retrieved 
and subsequently redistributed petitions, academic and newspaper articles, conference calls, 
and so on through the various organisations’ internet mailing lists and through hard copies 
too. The six year period was chosen in order to incorporate the period just prior to 
implementation of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which I will explore in more depth in 
the following chapter Negotiating Authenticity and Bodily Aesthetics within the UK’s 
Medicolegal System. I interweave a textual analysis of e-materials with participant accounts 
of activism and their involvement in T-COs. 
 
The website material was retrieved by entering the homepage of each T-CO and 
systematically reading the information. I entered the hyperlinks on each page, and from the 
new page displayed, went on to open each hyperlink present. I did this many times on Press 
for Change’s website due to the comprehensive range of information that was stored. The 
process of entering all the hyperlinks was much smaller for GIRES and Kaffequeeria due to 
their size. I made judgements about data collection from each webpage in relation to bodily 
aesthetics. I made similar judgments about the emails sent out through the mailing lists. I 
decided not to gather data from any hyperlinks outside of the website for various reasons, 
such as being unable to work with an overload of data and because I regarded this data as 
superfluous for understanding the T-CO’s representation of transsexual “social” body and 
bodily aesthetics. The limitations of this website data retrieval method was on one hand, the 
sheer amount of hyperlinks that I needed to explore in order for me to find all the 
information produced about bodily aesthetics. This provided me with a huge amount of data 
to code and analyse. On the other hand, there were difficult ethical issues of informed 
consent, and privacy and confidentiality to be considered especially in relation to email list 
information. 
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The internet holds a variety of drawbacks for researchers, who can simply and inadvertently 
breach the privacy of individuals. For instance, even if the researcher takes out any private 
information about the producer of an email, it is quite easy, with the aid of a search engine 
to find email addresses if the quotation used in the research report/publication is written 
verbatim. Once I had decided on the emails data that were going to be used in the chapter, I 
contacted the producer to ask for consent. I did not deem there to be any issues about 
privacy and confidentiality in relation to the websites due to the public nature of the 
internet. Thus, I provided only correct referencing of the site. I assumed that the e-materials 
were for public use and, as long as it was correctly referenced, seeking publicity. I 
considered the possibility of not giving attribution to the authors on the website (if known), 
because of not having written consent, and that this would have been a misuse of another’s 
intellectual property (see Eysenbach & Till, 2001). 
 
Framing bodies in a biogenetic paradigm 
The Gender Identity Research & Education Society (GIRES) is a registered charity. The 
organisation was initially set up to offer scientific and medical explanations of 
transsexualism, in the hope of enlightening various locally and nationally run institutional 
bodies, such as educational authorities, members of parliament, and medical practitioners 
who would not necessarily meet transsexuals or transgendered in their daily work. In 
addition, the information offered would be available to those who were inquisitive about 
the “condition,” and may help employers deal with the relatively rare incidences of 
transsexual employees and the (policy) issues that may materialise in relation to them. It 
was also meant to provide up-to-date medical information for transsexuals and their 
families. 
 
The most notable and consistent characteristic of GIRES, which claims to have “nearly 300 
members” and whose membership “consists of trans and non-transpeople,” is its 
concentration on the aetiology of “gender identity disorders” or “gender dysphoric” people 
(Gender Identity Research & Education Society, 2007). Within its virtual information it 
provides truncated scientific and medical evidence of transsexualism and supports a 
biogenetic paradigm. This biogenetic basis is intimately linked to pathological models of 
transsexuality and “is constituted through the logic of loss and deficit” (Blackman, 2007: 
1). In the case of transpeople, the loss and deficit is of a normative bodily aesthetic. 
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Although there is persuasive evidence that the brains of transsexual people are 
programmed before birth to develop, in small but highly significant ways, 
inconsistently with the rest of the body, this difference is, and is likely to remain, 
undetectable in living subjects (Reed, 2006 emphasis added). 
 
According to GIRES, transpeople’s are placed on a cerebral continuum, which runs 
between male and female brains. Consequently, these differences in brain morphology 
apparently account for transpeople’s desire to change their outer bodies to be consistent 
with their gendered selves. 
 
GIRES offers other resources too, such as information for politicians. In a document called 
Transsexuality – The inside story: Information for MPs (Gender Identity Research & 
Education Society, : http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/inside-story.pdf) it stresses its message 
through a biologically reductive lens, however, here transsexuality is couched in the 
discourse of intersexuality: 
 
Transsexualism does not stand alone, but may be understood as part of a complex 
spectrum of related conditions, an interpretation acknowledged by Lady Butler-
Sloss, (Court of Appeal, 2001): “There is, in informed medical circles, a growing 
momentum for the recognition of transsexual individuals for every purpose and in 
a manner similar to those who are intersexed (Gender Identity Research & 
Education Society, : http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/inside-story.pdf). 
 
Although participants in this research did not directly refer to GIRES, five participants 
claimed that intersexuality was closely related to their transsexuality. For example, Amelia, 
who is a historian, claims that the “third”32 is a universal phenomenon. 
                                                 
32 Ethnologists who have engaged in research into gender, sex, and sexuality and have long been 
interested in cultures, which recognize more than two genders (Malinowski, 1927; Mead, 1949). 
The most influential of these ethnologists, Herdt (1994) created the concept of the “third” to 
condense various sex and gender configurations from various parts of the world, such as the Hirja 
of Southern Asia, the Berdache of the Americas and the female husbands of Western Africa. The 
sexologist, Havelock Ellis (1942 [1905]), argued that the tribes reason for the inclusion of another 
‘gender’ was probably due to congenital abnormalities, such as hermaphroditism. This, he suggests, 
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Well there is a historical way of looking at it and [I] began to realise that it is not 
as recent a phenomenon as people try to make out. It does go back a long way. It 
goes back to the Greeks and Romans, it goes back to Carthage. It goes back to 
ancient China, to India, Native America and so that opened it up for me. The third 
gender as some people define it is not unusual and in many societies had a lot of 
respect (transwoman Amelia). 
 
This realisation, following her own research, that transgender people have been visible in 
various cultures, secured Amelia’s understanding about her transsexualism, allowing her a 
sense of normality within a gender system that did not approve of her position. Amelia, like 
GIRES, seemed to be searching for, and finding, sources to validate the transsexual 
experience.  
 
GIRES disseminates the intersex paradigm across its entire web-site, using medicolegal 
language, which illustrates the relationship between two highly “valued” social institutions 
in liberal democratic countries. In one sense, GIRES is situating biological sexed positions 
in relation to established sex/gender orders and, thus, could be seen as an assimilationist 
model. This positioning systematically augments medicalised and biological explanations 
of transsexualism as the “informed” “truth” and “reality” of a congenital condition. The 
choice of this particular body framing, if we understand it as assimilationist, is therefore a 
belief in the positivistic claim that science understands the phenomenon of transsexualism, 
and its relationship to intersexuality and to males and females. The relationship between 
transsexuality and intersexuality has been a longstanding issue in sexology (Diamond, 
2000; H. Ellis, 1942 [1905]) and in psychological perspectives (A. Ellis, 1945) throughout 
transsexuality’s history, albeit having different conceptualisations as I discussed in Chapter 
I. 
 
This causal story of transsexualism utilises socially “legitimated” actors, who are also the 
“expert” social commentators in this particular arena, the biogeneticists and lawyers. 
Narratives that are considered valuable by society’s elites, such as legal and biogenetic 
                                                                                                                                                    
is highlighted by the tribal names for these individuals such as, bote, which means ‘not man, not 
woman’ and burdash, which means ‘half man, half woman.’ 
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accounts, are usually consistently portrayed in other areas of social life, such as popular 
culture and the media, for example. In the media “impoverished representations of social 
life” (Jackson & Rees, 2007: 917), in relation to gender and sexuality, are explained 
through a(n) (evolutionary) biological lens and are presented as “natural facts, given by our 
evolutionary heritage […] and are assumed as the basis of all human conduct” (2007: 918). 
The so called biogenetic aspects of transsexualism are intimately linked with the 
psychological, where somehow nature has gone awry. This seems to be more appropriate 
for the claims and sympathies which GIRES is trying to foster, rather than the socially less 
convincing lifestyle choice model. 
 
For GIRES there is a fine line between biogenetic and psychological accounts, which 
dialectically produce a pathological and deficient trans body, even though some doctors 
who have been in the “trans care business” for many years advocate the removal of the 
“condition” from the DSM (Burns, 2005a). For example, Walter Bockting a prominent 
board member of WPATH (World Professional Association of Transgender Health) 
remarked: 
 
The inclusion of gender identity disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental disorders has not resulted in broad health insurance coverage for 
transgender care, more and more transgender individuals perceive this diagnosis 
and the need to consult with a mental health provider as unnecessarily 
pathologising (cited in Burns, 2005a). 
 
This quotation is aimed at healthcare systems in countries that are reluctant, or refuse, to 
provide trans surgery through medical insurance plans. In the UK, where free surgery is 
provided (albeit after a long and restrictive assessment), the context will be different. There 
have been debates in the UK trans community about the potential cost to transpeople if the 
medical classification were to be removed. The community is also debating the “cost” of 
pathologisation, as Christine Burns from Press for Change, remarks: 
 
there could be a tipping point when the trans community might decide that the 
benefits of accepting a degree of medical pathologisation were outweighed by the 
disadvantages (Burns, 2006: 53). 
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However, the jury is still out in the UK. However, what is striking about the virtual 
literature from GIRES is the picture it paints of transsexualism as pathology, albeit, one that 
requires compassion and understanding. Nancy understands her transsexualism in a similar 
way: 
 
Nancy: Genital surgery, as I say, it is a correction of this congenital defect, the 
congenital defect being the penis, although it is not a fuller correction that would 
be nice to have. 
 
Zowie: What would be nice to have? 
 
Nancy: Well as far as I know I don’t have any female internal organs (transwoman 
Nancy). 
 
Nancy has not been diagnosed with an intersexed condition, however, in her narrative it is 
purported that the transsexual as abject, is a victim of a cruel but natural aberration rather 
than a social, medical, and psychiatric construction. This echoes GIRES’ understanding of 
transsexualism. 
 
GIRES recognises that identifying the biological determinants of gender identity 
and intersex conditions helps society generally to understand and accept that those 
they affect are naturally transgendered. The understanding that gender dysphoria is 
not a fantasy is especially important (Gender Identity Research & Education 
Society, : http://www.gires.org.uk/priorities.php). 
 
This narrative raises a number of themes in relation to intersexuality. The transsexual is 
reduced to unconfirmed interior substances. There is a sense of the body as an authentic yet 
aberrant natural manifestation of human sexuality. This approach may mean that it is less 
likely to be rejected by NHS managers, policy makers, and MPs, who hold the purse strings 
to sex-change technology, due to “awareness” of the diversity within a binary system.  
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In order for GIRES to set this “natural” discourse up with any sort of coherence, the 
constructions of normative male and female bodies are a necessary and strategic point of 
departure. The transsexual body – as a congenital aberration – sits somewhere between the 
poles of normal male and female bodies on a continuum of human sexuality. The website 
states: 
 
We all know that boys and girls are different. They look different, they often 
behave differently, and they feel different. Outside appearances of the sex of our 
bodies - the genitals - are the indicators we all recognise, but internally too, the 
organs of reproduction are different, and, importantly, so are small areas of the 
brain. The process of developing into “male” and “female” is called “sex-
differentiation”. There are complicated reasons for this development. […] in the 
presence of testosterone the baby will be born looking like a boy; without 
testosterone a baby will be born looking like a girl. Recent research suggests that, 
in addition to these hormonal effects, certain genes may act directly on the brain to 
trigger its differentiation into “male” and “female”. The brain is structurally 
different between men and women, and appears to be “programmed” so that each 
experiences a strong predisposition to “feel” like one or the other. This feeling of 
being a boy or a girl, a man or a woman is called our “gender identity” or, 
sometimes, “core gender identity” (Gender Identity Research & Education 
Society, 2007: http://www.gires.org.uk/Web_Page_Assets/frontframeset.htm). 
 
While this quotation suggests that there are biogenetic factors that can influence the way 
bodies look, which it seems cannot be denied, it further suggests that physiological factors 
can also influence the way people feel as “boys” and “girls”. The environment and 
experiences of socialisation play no part in bodily aesthetics according to GIRES. Bodily 
aesthetics are constructed as basic intrinsic characteristics. They are not characterised 
differently through history and cross culturally and, therefore, within different political 
climates, rendering bodily aesthetics natural characteristics, rather than, social productions. 
This attempt to create the “transsexual” aetiologically is asocial and ahistorical, and based 
on, what GIRES, following the medical establishment’s aetiology, calls “core gender 
identity” (Money, 1973). The often anonymous author(s) working for GIRES create a 
simplistic gendered analysis and leave this claim as a “common sense” statement to 
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encourage potential adherents to the discourse. Moreover, website posts crave no deep 
deconstruction due to the obvious ease of a theoretical rebuttal. This “feeling like a boy or a 
girl” idea has often been successfully critiqued with a more nuanced analysis within work 
undertaken in Women’s and Gender Studies over the years, especially by feminists within 
psychoanalysis (Chodorow, 1978) phenomenology (de Beauvoir, 1997 [1949]; Young, 
1990) and postmodern/queer accounts (Butler, 1993). It seems that GIRES uses a socially 
convincing narrative and commonly held social view of the binary sex system, whilst 
attempting to broaden the gender system’s scope. 
 
The site also states: 
 
Biology, through genetic and hormonal interactions, determines the structure of 
the brain as male or female and is a major factor in the development of gender 
identity from the moment of conception, through the foetal stage and postnatally. 
Infrequently, gender identity develops within the brain in a manner that is 
incongruent with the male or female characteristics of the rest of the body. It is 
reasonable to accept that some people may be more affected than others by this 
process. Consequently, not all will feel an equal degree of discomfort with the 
discordance between their innate gender identities and the genders that, based on 
their genital appearance, were assigned to them at birth. The term transgender 
includes this broad range of people who all experience atypical gender identity 
development but the way they express their gender roles may vary widely  
(Gender Identity Research & Education Society, 2007: 
http://www.gires.org.uk/Web_Page_Assets/frontframeset.htm). 
 
The scientific explanations of transsexualism are prioritised over other dimensions of 
transpeople’s lives as this narrative strategy assists in rationalising and justifying most of 
the other publications on the website. The study by Kruijver et al. (2000), that focuses on 
the amount of neurons in a limbic nucleus,33 which I explored earlier, claims to add to the 
evidence of a sexually dimorphic brain and is appropriated by the organisation and offered 
                                                 
33 I do not want to imply that this study is evidence or not of the sexually dimorphic brain paradigm 
that would situate transwomen and transmen in the range of their respective sex, i.e. transwomen in 
the range of women’s and transmen in the range of men. The results in Kruijver et al’s (2000) study 
are, as with many scientific studies, expressed with reservations. 
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as sound evidence in the majority of publications on the website. Other scientific references 
are offered in addition to undergird this line of reasoning. The adherence to medical 
literature in this quotation is based on a conviction that a small section of the brain, and its 
pre-natal “encounter” with hormones, is the instigator of a psychologically dimorphic 
gender identity in transsexuals and “normal” people. Albeit, non-transsexuals have outer 
physical bodies that have sexual characteristics, which match a “core gender identity” 
instigated by the cerebral and hormonal physiological factors, whereas in transsexuals these 
do not match with the outer physical body. Counter arguments, such as Fausto Sterling’s 
and Pfafflin’s (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Pfafflin, 2006), which hold that there is no statistical 
evidence to back these claims up and that the phenomenology of transgender is too diverse 
to capture in these models, are never revealed for public perusal on the website.  
 
Making a convincing argument 
There is an assumption, then, that this kind of community information, comprising of both 
biogenetic and causal explanations, will allow transgenderism, transsexualism, and 
intersexuality eventually overcome the cultural stigma of the abject, as the disabled 
people’s movement (Oliver, 1990), or as the Lesbian and Gay Movement’s has partially 
achieved in the UK. This is as long as, to paraphrase Blackman (2007: 8), the “person can 
retain their dignity as a service user in the face of stigma and shame” that is still associated 
with “gender dysphoria.” 
 
Nevertheless, this “biological” frame allows them to call for medical intervention on behalf 
of the transperson. By constructing a scientifically prescribed sexuality frame based on 
intersexuality, the transperson, then, can reasonably request to have their “congenital 
defect” changed through hormonal and surgical technology. This is because aesthetic 
surgery is a standard clinical practice for intersexed people and generally regarded as a 
“medical necessity.” Whilst the “medical necessity” angle seems to provide a vehicle for 
access to trans-sex technology, medical authorities, as a whole, do not view trans surgery as 
a “medical necessity.” 
 
Nonetheless, the emergence of Primary care trusts (PCTs) and patient groups has enabled 
transpeople to complain about health services. PCTs covering all parts of England receive 
budgets directly from the Department of Health. Since April 2002, PCTs have taken control 
 184
of local health care while strategic Health Authorities monitor performance and standards. 
Negotiation and political pressure using the intersexed narrative is often employed when 
confronting those who hold the medical purse strings. For example Brian said: 
 
it was a ten page A4 size [document] from the organization that had a page on the 
medical viewpoint and other topics, short paragraphs on the differences between 
homosexuality, transgender, transsexual and transvestite and I thought that was 
very compact and condensed and for me it got the information over (Bi-gendered 
Brian). 
 
Surgeries and other technological interventions deemed “medical necessities” have more 
social and medical currency than aesthetic surgery in the UK, as I explored in Chapter I. In 
relation to PCTs, who are ideologically against the use of body modification practices for 
transsexuals, the discourse of intersexuality may help when transpeople argue for medical 
intervention. T-COs, who follow this line of reasoning, recreate a modernist discourse of 
the body that has a scientific, medical, legal, and thus “rational” empirical standpoint. Thus, 
GIRES’ message becomes more “persuasive” to the “rational” and lay reader, because of 
the “findings” of science. 
 
GIRES further fulfils its mission statement of disseminating educational and scientific 
studies, which are socially “valued” about the “unalterable” and, to many people, invisible 
cerebral aspects of bodies. The promise of this discourse is the provision of a “scientific” 
account of what is wrong with transsexuals, within a “difference” model of human 
sexuality, and helps qualify the “condition” as being beyond the control of the transsexual, 
intersexual, and transgendered. Moreover, GIRES provides an effective strategy, which is 
seen by a few participants in this research as a form of appropriate information, which 
allows the space and time for recognising themselves and understanding what trans-sexing 
may entail. It provides a (virtual) space to explore the best strategy for their “self-health” 
management. 
 
GIRES may be read, on the one hand, as being part and parcel of the consumerist ethic that 
governs cultures of self-health in advanced liberal societies (Blackman, 2007), whilst, on 
the other hand, continuing to leave the ultimate power relations unaltered and securely in 
the interests of the medical field and political elites. GIRES is wary of the eugenically 
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motivated possibilities of medical discourse and pre-natal extermination that may 
materialise in relation to transsexuality, intersexuality or transgenderism, as medicine 
advances. The publication of Greenberg and Bailey’s article, Parental Selection of 
Children’s Sexual Orientation (2001), in the Archives of Sexual Behaviour may have been 
the catalyst for the inclusion of this warning: 
 
GIRES recognises the risk that research into causality may lead on to searches for 
ways to prevent the conditions pre-natally rather than to make life better for those 
they have already affected. However, it is powerless to curb the intellectual 
curiosity of the scientists working in this field (Gender Identity Research & 
Education Society, : http://www.gires.org.uk/priorities.php). 
 
The Bailey article suggested that in the near future, when scientists have uncovered the 
basis of sexual orientation – which they purport is not far off – it would not be morally 
wrong for parents to want (heterosexual) children “like themselves” and, in effect, be able 
to select for the preferred sexual orientation of their child. “Parents who did not wish to 
have homosexual children could then abort fetuses likely to become homosexual” (A. 
Greenberg & Bailey, 2001:425), assuming, of course, that abortion is not deemed morally 
wrong by the parent/s in the first instance. This paper is known in the trans community due 
to what has become known as the “Bailey Affair” (Burns, 2005b), where J Michael Bailey, 
one of the authors of the article, came up against a worldwide protest against his 
representation of two “sub-types” of transsexual, “autogynephilliacs” and “homosexual 
transsexuals.” “Autogynephilliacs” are said to be those transwomen who fantasise and 
become aroused when they think of themselves, and having sex, as women. 
“Autogynephilliacs” usually have a “transvestite career” prior to transitioning. 
“Homosexual transsexuals” are transwomen who have a “homosexual career” prior to 
transitioning (Bailey, 2003; Blanchard, 1991). Furthermore, allegations of unethical 
conduct were made against Bailey for using non-consented information in his book, The 
Man who would be Queen (Bailey, 2003). Transwoman, Lynn Conway, a Professor from 
the University of Michigan, along with other activists, initiated a campaign against Bailey’s 
work and distributed critiques on her website of both the article and the book, which she 
regards as eugenically motivated (James, 2004). However, GIRES argue that anything that 
may help the transperson now seems a risk worth taking, because of the political and 
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transphobic climate transpeople must endure in the here and now. Nonetheless, this strategy 
is contingent upon the continued goodwill of doctors and politicians, in providing the (ever 
decreasing) opportunities and funding for trans-sexing. One of the most consistent types of 
news story and area of concern for the trans community, both during and after the 
implementation of the GRA, was healthcare. These concerns mainly consisted of a critique 
of the gender clinics. Waiting times, closure of GICs and the funding of surgeries by the 
Health Trusts (see West, 2004) were highlighted as being unfair in relation to transsexuals. 
Moreover, West argued that transpeople were being treated as unworthy recipients of 
surgical technologies, even though they were tax paying citizens. 
 
By refusing all but a very narrow reading of the transgender medical literature, GIRES 
creates a believable medical viewpoint about transsexuality, which is persuasive and 
becomes, in many circumstances, framed as a congenital “condition.” It is one narrative, 
however, that removes the dimension of “social bodily” aesthetics from transpeoples lives, 
which is intrinsic to transsexual embodiment. This creates a political narrative that offers 
only a partial understanding of transgender lived experience. In so doing the political 
narrative fails to reflect all the contemporary political leanings and realities of transpeople. 
However, GIRES may not be trying to cover all angles. GIRES is unlikely to extensively 
change the social sex/gender order, which may suggest that it want to be “assimilationist” 
in relation to the existing sex/gender order. However, on a different level, there is what 
Marx Ferree has termed “frame bridging” (Marx Ferree, 2004), where activism and cultural 
production can exercise a relationship between “assimilationist” and “transformational” 
politics. GIRES could be seen as trying to meld the political goals of acceptance within 
dominant organising structures of gender whilst extending the parameters of sex/gender 
possibilities and transform the binary sex system to include the position(s) of intersexuality.  
 
Inadvertently framing bodies through a medicolegal frame? 
In GIRES’ political framing of trans embodiment there is little scope for capturing the 
diverse phenomenology of transpeople and the various “social bodies” they have. This is 
most aptly illustrated by a document by Stephen Whittle (first published in (Whittle, 
1999)), which was awarded a cash prize by GIRES and, which perhaps paradoxically, 
features on its website. It states: 
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a concept at the heart of the newly developed transgender activism […] The self 
with its trans identity can be now experienced as an authentic self rather than as 
the medicalised paraphiliac, currently imposed by physicians, attached to the body 
and regarded as the trans sense of identity by the rest of society. Through its 
organisational processes the transgender community itself is being redefined, and 
the issues of importance are shifting. The personal recognition of the actual self; 
internally defined, as opposed to the medical self; which had been externally 
dictated, has meant a huge shift has already been undergone in transgender 
politics; the body or its performativity is no longer the dictator of gender. Gender 
has become who or what you experience through your experience of oppression as 
well as through a celebration of diversity of experience and life styles (Gender 
Identity Research & Education Society, : http://www.gires.org.uk/priorities.php). 
 
The president of Press for Change, Stephen Whittle suggests that: 
 
within the community itself, as we move toward the new millennium, members no 
longer privilege ‘passing’ - the ability to hide a transsexual identity in a new 
gender role (Whittle, 1999). 
 
Press for Change’s gender frame of transsexual embodiment has been constructed so as not 
to make dogmatic claims about how a “social body” should appear when one identifies as 
transsexual or transgender. For example, on Press for Change’s web-site it states: 
 
Press for Change will resist a definition of transsexual status which relies on an 
individual having undergone any particular medical or surgical treatment. Some 
transsexual people are unable to obtain treatment, are unable to receive treatment 
for health reasons, or do not wish to submit to unsatisfactory or expensive 
treatment (e.g. phalloplasty). Such persons are no less entitled to their civil rights 
and liberties than others (Press for Change, 2004: www.pfc.org). 
 
The transsexual body or experience, according to PFC, thus, cannot simply be represented 
in a “true” or “false” dichotomy, or indeed, as having a “true” or “false” trajectory in 
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relation to body aesthetics, bodily transformation, or a wish for body modification. The 
“difference” model is further articulated by Stephen Whittle: 
 
I have been able to be at the forefront of a new political movement that is really 
challenging the issues of body fascism. If we can win the one about trans bodies, 
then we can win in all the other battle grounds surrounding the body whether to do 
with people being fat or thin, abled or disabled, black or brown, male or female 
(Whittle, 2007b). 
 
What Stephen Whittle is referring to here is the Gender Recognition Bill and, eventual, 
Act.34 A number of consultation exercises were set up by PFC with the expanding T-CO’s 
networks in the UK, to understand the wishes and desires of transpeople. The findings were 
to be taken forward by PFC members, such as Stephen Whittle, who could draw on his 
legal expertise. These, however, were analysed against a backdrop of governmental 
directives about contemporary medical viewpoints, cross-cultural (European) precedents 
and human rights directives (see Home Office, 2000). Representatives from various 
organisations, such as PFC, GIRES, Beaumont Society, Liberty, Northern Concord and 
Change, collaborated with a group named The Interdepartmental Working Group on 
Transsexual People, which consisted of ministers, MPs and other social policy makers, to 
formulate a report that was to guide legislation in British Parliament. The “Working Group” 
was set up in April 1999 and was to reconvene in Easter 2000 with a report that would: 
 
consider, with particular reference to birth certificates, the need for appropriate 
legal measures to address the problems experienced by transsexual people, having 
due regard to scientific and societal developments, and measures undertaken in 
other countries to deal with this issue (Home Office, 2000). 
 
In 2002 the “Working Group” reconvened to resolve legal intricacies and difficult technical 
issues involved in changing a person’s legal status. Two years later, in 2004, the law was 
given royal assent. 
                                                 
34 On the 11th November 2003, in a Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights from the UK 
government, claimed that the proposed legislation would possibly be the most progressive system of 
gender recognition in Europe. 
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The surprisingly “queer” UK Gender Recognition Act allows transsexuals to acquire full 
legal recognition in their acquired gender without the requirement of endocrinological or 
surgical intervention. Thus, in effect, trans bodies can be materially constituted in various 
ways. We can understand the legal gains achieved by the T-COs not simply as an 
assimilationist model of “sameness” but also as transformative, because it allows for bodily 
diversity. The legal recognition of transsexuals in their acquired gender regardless of bodily 
morphology was of paramount importance to PFC, and to the majority of those who 
participated in this research. Jess highlighted PFC and allied T-COs’ political focus: 
 
I realised this was where we were going with the Gender Recognition Act and the 
medical model was being resolved as a result of human rights and legal activism 
not from medical rights. The NHS is not going to solve the problems. What has 
solved the problems is Press for Change getting the law changed. So what is 
happening, the way we are moving legally is actually beginning to correct the 
social and medical sides (transwoman Jess). 
 
Jess believed that attending to politics solely concerned with medicine would not be enough 
to bring about adequate social change. In so doing, Jess promotes the legal angle as the 
perspective from which all other social spheres will benefit. Jess’ hopes that the state and 
the law will remain key domains for counter hegemonic struggles. This is not because the 
state is a monolithic entity, which beholds a static and unified set of political structures to 
be broken down, but because the various state agencies create, through various avenues, 
opportunities to engage in critical analysis and reconfigure state and legal structures. In 
essence the state allows for the potential for “transformation” with equal opportunity 
directives and to address “difference” inequalities. Furthermore, transpeople are less afraid 
to be “visible” and to be a part of the emerging “transformation” of the state and civil 
liberty policies in relation to sexual and gender minorities. 
 
However, within all activism there is some “social bodily” aesthetic policing going on. 
Some of the participants had a more problematic relationship with the PFC’s difference 
model. For example, Diane said: 
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there is a wealth of disagreement within the community (transwoman Diane). 
 
Diane illustrates the contentious relationship between transpeople and the “social bodily” 
requirements set out in the GRA.35 The T-CO rather than bringing claims about a group 
boundary based on bodily aesthetics highlights the potential of gender diversity and the 
“transformation” of the states understanding of trans “social bodies.” I suggest, then, that 
“sameness” is only possible at a basic level of transsexual identification. PFC is aiming to 
capture this basic level of “sameness” in the name of support whilst simultaneously 
promoting its “difference” model of trans bodies. 
 
Although the deconstructed trans “social body” within PFC is without bodily aesthetic 
parameters, bodies continue to remain acquiescent to the binary gender system, with its 
symbolic codes and meanings. The gender system is ordered by the legal framework. As 
with GIRES, which adheres to the medical paradigm, we may assume that the social 
structures that the organisations are working within always pull them back toward the 
system, which they are trying to transform. “Right” trans bodies are confirmed by 
transpeople themselves on a phenomenological level, however, they are also confirmed 
within medico-legal parameters that the law requires “set out” by the GRP, which holds the 
key to defining whose bodily aesthetics count as “right” and whose do not. Whilst PFC rely 
in part upon the medicolegal system to gain citizenship rights for (some) transpeople, we 
cannot view its politics in a purely assimilationist framework, because its political praxis is 
contextually diverse and refuses to crystallize bodies in any specific form. Furthermore, as 
the meanings of trans bodily aesthetics have shifted in medicolegal circles, this 
displacement of trans “social bodies” in law becomes transformative. 
 
“Get off my representation!” Aesthetic formulations of transgender 
In Sandy Stone’s (1991) work there was a significant “call to arms,” encouraging 
transgender and transsexuals to tell their own stories that were not the medicalised 
narratives of old. “Our stories,” she said, need not be the uniform medicalised narratives 
with well trodden tropes of “trapped in the wrong body” or “the male or female inside” 
(Stone, 1991), which have been conceptualised by Sally Hines as “rehearsed narratives” (S. 
                                                 
35 I will take this point up in more detail in Chapter VII: Negotiating Bodily Aesthetics in the UK’s 
Medicolegal System. 
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Hines, 2007). Rather, Stone urged transpeople to tell life stories and histories about their 
personalised transgender trajectories. Moreover, she recommended that non-justificatory 
reasons should be offered and, in so doing, become the authors of new forms of self-
expression. Bornstein (1994) suggests that this would constitute being “gender outlaws,” 
who are those transpeople who wish to break down or transform the binary continuum 
between male and female as opposed to the “conformist” transsexuals who wish to embrace 
the gender system. Katrina Roen argues that they both 
 
seek greater societal acceptance and legal rights for transpeople. However, the 
former seeks acceptance for gender transition and gender ambiguity, while the 
latter seeks acceptance for the practice of living as “the other sex.” The former 
seeks to destabilize and expand the categories “Woman,” “Transsexual,” and 
“man,” while the latter seeks ways for "Transsexuals" to be accepted as women 
and as men (Roen, 2001: 502-503). 
 
Roen’s work, which was conducted in New Zealand, suggests that on occasions the 
divisions are not as clear cut as this and that the lines between the “transsexual camp” and 
the “transgender camp” are much more contextual and multidimensional in relation to 
political praxes. She notes that there is a conceptual continuum between the “gender 
outlaws” and the “conformist” transsexuals during some political praxis, which this 
research illustrates too. Thus, Roen’s conceptualisation of the two “camps” cannot be easily 
placed in the assimilationist/conformist dichotomy. And, as she concedes, political praxis is 
contextual. 
 
Three younger transpeople in my research were part of, and had helped formulate, other 
community groups (CG), which fight for political gains away from established T-COs. In 
the social movement literature these CGs are regarded as “DIY” queer organisations 
(Brown, 2007) and are growing in membership. Within these CGs are a number of 
transsexuals whose political allegiance is to a more “critical community” of (queer) gay and 
lesbian people. These groups are formulating new ideas, cultural productions, and spaces in 
which gender, embodiment, and sexual desire have been able to open up (Roseneil, 2002). 
Processes of collective experimentation, in order to build autonomous queer spaces, are 
seen as more personally transformative and empowering (Brown, 2007). This suggests that 
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the established T-COs do not fully represent the political goals, which these queer 
transpeople see as important. Nevertheless, there are connections between some of the 
political praxes that the more established T-COs cultivate on a practical level. For instance, 
collaborations with other T-COs are not discouraged by the “DIY” organisations on certain 
issues, especially when the focus is on “queerer” civil liberties. I will explore this “queerer” 
civil liberties concept in more detail below, following a discussion of what I observe as a 
shift that has occurred by older more established T-COs in relation to representations of 
trans bodies and the opening up of the gender system. This is, I argue, more coextensive 
with the rationale of the newer “DIY” groups. 
 
For example, as I discussed above, activists from many “DIY” groups in the UK, and in a 
global context, staged a highly publicised e-campaign to counter the publication of the 
psychologist J. Michael Bailey’s book The Man who would be Queen (2003), and the 
representations therein of (mainly) “paraphillic” transwomen. The email discussions within 
activist circles contemplated the validity of the author’s ethical, methodological, and 
analytical stance on transwomen, gay men and ethnic minorities, who, in the book, were 
“predisposed to sexual deviancy” because of their genetic make-up (Roughgarden, 2004). 
An email was circulated with an open letter questioning Bailey’s research validity, 
professional honesty, and personal politics: 
 
We would like to ask you why you have not even mentioned the biological basis 
of transsexualism; it's intersexual nature? Why have you disregarded the fact that, 
for nearly 80 years, those most actively involved in researching our condition have 
postulated its somatic origin? Why did you not explore the intricacies of the 
neurological data provided by leading researchers (Email 01/09/2003) 
 
Whilst this could be seen as a non-queer position, I suggest that those queer activists who 
gave support to this political action were, in fact, fighting against Bailey and his negative 
representations of transpeople rather than agreeing wholeheartedly with the content of the 
letter. Bailey is seen as a homophobic and transphobic member of the medical 
establishment who needs stopping (Roughgarden, 2004). Therefore, any action to halt his 
work would be seen as a positive step forward. In addition to the questions directed at 
Bailey, the email also urged activists to engage in a letter writing campaign, with the 
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correspondence being sent directly to Bailey’s publishing house, complete within 
photographs of a happy trans life, and pointing out the “well adjusted transperson” in the 
image. The protest had a few branches of action, and was also aimed at the LGBT Lambda 
literary awards, where an online petition was formulated: 
 
We, the undersigned, formally protest the decision by the Lambda Literary 
Foundation to continue listing J Michael Bailey's book, "The Man Who Would Be 
Queen", as a finalist in the Transgender/GenderQueer category of the 16th Annual 
Literary award. […] As signatories WE DO NOT advocate that J Michael Bailey's 
book should be suppressed or withdrawn. Nevertheless we feel that the nature of 
the distress and potential harm occasioned to transsexual people by the author's 
actions makes this work an inappropriate candidate to be honoured by a 
transgender-inclusive organisation and that the book should therefore be 
withdrawn forthwith from the list of nominees at our collective request. 
(http://www.petitiononline.com/bailey/petition.html). 
 
The political fervour that arose from the publication and the possibility that it may be 
honoured by an organisation that is supposed to celebrate LGBT literary pioneers was 
enough to engender much support, resulting in a posting on the Lambda website on March 
12th 2004, stating that Bailey had been removed from the list of finalists. The book, which 
was publicised as a robust piece of research, was condemned globally by trans activists and 
non-trans allies, which ultimately led to investigations into the ethical behaviour of Bailey 
with regard to his “research subjects.” Bailey resigned from his post as professor and chair 
of the psychology department at Northwestern University in the US, however, it is not 
known if this was as a direct result of the controversy surrounding his book. 
 
Whilst the illustration above shows the possible effects that protest and political actions can 
achieve, it was not contained and pursued within a single organisation. The protest was 
trans-global and advocated by many prominent members of the UK trans T-COs. 
Moreover, it was different in focus from most of the previous political interventions. This 
could possibly be put down to the recent social and legal gains that have been achieved in 
the UK, which have allowed more time and resources to be ploughed into other areas of 
protest. However, it can also be seen as direct action with a theoretical underpinning of 
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queer theory and queer activism, which would account for the protest having a more 
aesthetic and representational focus. Queer activism is characterised by the generative 
power of oppositional “identity” constructions. As a more tolerant social climate develops 
and more positive views of transpeople are heard,36 activists have more time to stage more 
aesthetically and culturally political actions with “in your face” non-justificatory cultural 
productions. Clifford suggested: 
 
I think that people have been living across boundaries and other things; for as long 
as, but it is more in the limelight now, it is more acceptable now but still 
controversial (transman Clifford). 
 
The rationale for these DIY groups is derived from queer politics, which they state critiques 
“hierarchies, capitalism and assimilation” (Queer Mutiny, 2007: 
http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/manchester/2006/01/331245.html). Gamson 
suggests: 
 
serious consideration of queerness as a logic of action can force important 
revisions in approaches to collective identity formation and deployment and their 
relationship to political gains. First, it calls attention to the fact that secure 
boundaries and stabilized identities are necessarily not general, but in the specific 
–a point current social movement theory largely misses (Gamson, 1995:402). 
 
Whilst the focus is not solely on transsexualism and transgenderism within these CGs, the 
possibility of transpeople’s inclusion is never questioned. “Social bodily” aesthetics are of 
no importance, in relation to the notion of “right” and “wrong” bodies. However, the 
aesthetic and representational aspects of trans visibility and trans cultural production in a 
                                                 
36 Nadia Almada, a Portuguese transwoman, was the 2004 winner of the hugely popular Big Brother 
television show in the UK. Her appearance on the show was in stark contrast to the usual media 
representations of transwomen. She appeared on many daytime TV shows after her victory and was 
respected, without suffering any ridicule. Nonetheless, tabloid newspapers did continue to use 
transphobic language to describe her, such as “[t]he gender-bending Portugeezer who confounded 
her critics when she snatched the reality show” (Desborough & Myall, 2004). More recently, 
documentaries which have featured transpeople have been more sympathetic and less sensational 
about the various lived world experiences that their participants have had, in relation to their trans 
situation. 
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queer culture are encouraged and fostered equally with other concerns. Oscar articulates the 
difference between some (mainstream) “scenes” and the “DIY scenes” and how his trans 
visibility is diminished in more mainstream trans community because of its understanding 
of transsexualism and transgenderism: 
 
So I still get a little frustrated with the limited readings within some 
[organisations]. There is a space called Kafequeeria in Manchester, which is an 
activist, anarchist café and I find there my identity is taken more seriously and 
people are able to recognise that (transman Oscar). 
 
The political division is much less stark between transsexuals and transgender in these 
queer spaces, this is illustrated more so in the younger DIY groups: 
 
Get Bent is a safe space for all genders and sexualities and seeks to engage with 
and foster the possibility of creating queer-positive spaces. […] Get Bent follows a 
DIY ethic, creating wide variety of programming by supporting diverse people to 
create diverse events (GetBent, 2007b: http://www.get-bent-manchester.com/). 
 
Building on the US’s Transsexual Menace, Transgender Nation and Queer Nation political 
consciousnesses of being out and proud, and not necessarily “passing,” queer “DIY” groups 
encourage the deconstruction of what constitutes a transperson in relation to bodily 
aesthetics. Much encouragement is given to visibility, regardless of what you look like, as 
long as you self-identify as politically proud. Raymond suggested: 
 
How can we say there is nothing wrong with being trans if we ourselves do not 
stand up? You have a duty to stand up in a sense and embrace the fact that there is 
a lot of space and there are other options but if we do not stand up we are also 
insinuating that there is something wrong with being trans. […] Actually you are 
enforcing the things that oppress you in the first place. It doesn’t make any sense; 
it really doesn’t (transman Raymond). 
 
Nonetheless, there is still an understanding that serious repercussions may take place 
because of society’s transphobia and homophobia. The “DIY” groups create the space to 
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become aware of the wider political arena. These spaces fuse politics, culture, and sex in a 
spirit of inventive playfulness and offer an important “DIY” alternative to other groups in 
the political sphere (Brown, 2006). In one meeting 
 
[Organiser] introduces this open forum to discuss and debate how people approach 
their own body image and self image, and view their own physicality in a positive 
way. This is part of a larger project aiming to empower, liberate and inspire all 
kinds of people to reclaim, love and look after their bodies and physicality, using 
visual and performing arts, creative writing and holistic healthy living techniques. 
A founding principle of this project is to actively challenge unrealistic pressures 
and negative representations of gender normative "perfect bodies" and messages 
promoting body fascism surrounding us in the 21st Century. Everyone is welcome 
to get involved and there is a special invite to anyone who feels invisible, 
marginalised and unrepresented, such as people who self-identify as transgender or 
intersex or undefined/non-heterosexual, people with disabilities, people with 
eating disorders, people who self-harm and people who use body modification 
techniques (tattoos, piercings, binding, scarification, corsetry, drag, etc) (transman 
Oscar, email 31/08/2007). 
 
Here, the focus is on the disruption of the established social order’s representations of 
certain bodies having intrinsic negative meanings. This may, for example, also include 
challenging the social structures and the power relations in transpeople’s everyday lives. 
The focus, then, becomes about desire and choice in using the technology available to 
modify the body, as Oscar explained when he talked about a group called Dimensions: 
 
for younger trans people, twenty five [years old] and under. Apparently you have 
two consultations and you can get prescribed hormones so I am just seeing what 
other ways are available. I have a friend in New York who set up the Sylvia Rivera 
Law Project, which is very much about enabling access for anyone to hormones 
and I know there are clinics where you don’t have to pass a test or abide to 
guidelines in order to get the hormones, so I am looking at those routes. With the 
whole queer movement wanting to do away with all the system; I think we need 
more options (transman Oscar). 
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Sexing it up 
The projects of representation rely on transforming spaces in which trans queers can then 
explore themselves. Queer and camp aesthetics are intrinsic to these explorations. An 
illustration of these queer and camp aesthetics was staged in Manchester, UK at a 
film/performance/talk and presentations festival called Get Bent 2007. Drag performances, 
readings, experimental film and documentaries were part of the line-up. In one session, 
Eliza Steinbock (2007) opened up a dialogue about trans pornography. Steinbock showed 
films that interrogated trans bodies and pornography alongside the film maker’s comments. 
Steinbock’s analysis questioned the idea that transsexualism and transgenderism was solely 
about gender as a core characteristic and argued that sexuality was part of trans subjectivity 
too. After many years of being silenced about sexuality and sex, for fear of being pigeon 
holed as sexual deviants and transvestite fetishists by the medical teams in the GICs, 
transsexuals have started to explore and produce their “sexual bodies” and represent them 
in novel ways through prose, poetry, and film. Steinbock’s film explored many 
configurations of trans bodies in relation to pornography, which moved away from the 
better known “chicks with dicks” pornographic genre. The films depicted transmen on 
transmen, transmen on transwomen, transwomen on transmen, women on transmen, and 
who were using all their erogenous zones and non normative bodily make-ups. This staging 
not only helps reconfigure the staid ideas in the GICs, but also the staid ideas about 
transpeople as non sexual people, which have inadvertently been promoted by some T-COs. 
Therefore, these new “DIY” collectives have, what Kate Bornstein (Bornstein, 1994: 163) 
suggested over a decade ago, an “irreverence for the established order” and utilise an “often 
dizzying use of paradox.” These new kinds of trans activists, who are passionate about 
being able to live as they wish and represent themselves as authentically as is possible, pose 
an ideological challenge to both the T-COs who work “within” to transform law and 
medicine and the ruling order itself.  
 
By elaborating new aesthetic representations Beyond the narrow structures, Oscar suggests 
that queer activism questions the value of heteronormative and gender normative benefits, 
such as marriage and birth certificates, but it also needs to be open to others’ desire of 
wanting normative gains made by other T-COs. Therefore, Oscar is using queer as a 
relational ethics of engaging with desires relating to sexual and gender differences (Brown, 
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2006). Moreover, Oscar’s queer politics is framed as contextual in its relation to social 
structures and the representations of transpeople and in its relation to other T-COs which 
have made gains for transpeople’s through normative political avenues. Oscar states: 
 
I think we need more options and possible coalitions between these options, 
between the Gender Recognition Act, civil partnerships, but at the same time 
would it reinforce it? It is tricky (transman Oscar) 
 
As Oscar illustrates, activism is not simply an either/or problem. Queer aesthetic activism 
can be both transformative and empathetic to others who choose not to be so defiantly 
separatist. Therefore, it seems that there is something more at stake in considering 
techniques and practices of queer self-production than whether it is assimilationist or 
transformative. More importantly, queer politics must allow for a contextual space for 
difference and a space for collaboration amongst different political actors. As Terry 
Eagleton (1990) suggests, the test of a truly radical aesthetics will be its ability to 
manoeuvre as a social critique without simultaneously providing the grounds of its own 
political ratification. 
 
Conclusion 
“Sameness” (assimilationist politics), “difference” (different but equal politics) and 
“transformative” (queer politics) in their respective activism and cultural work cannot 
simply be conceptualised as “sameness,” “difference” or “transformative” politics. The 
types of political and cultural productions and political activism concerning trans bodies 
that each T-CO fights for, poses a challenge to the system in some way by offering a 
critique of the dominant understandings of trans bodies in the specific areas that the 
organisations work. Discursive cultural work and activism strategies, I observed, were 
aimed at different areas of concern. The T-COs I focussed on adapted the most effective 
discourses in relation to the audiences they were addressing. Transgender political 
communities largely exist as smaller marginal sub cultures doing specific work (S. Hines, 
2007) rather than merged collectives (Whittle, 2001). In this sense, trans “social bodies,” 
which are subjected to aesthetic judgements, will always be contextually driven. 
Nonetheless, I showed how particular political actions work to change dominant 
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representations of trans “social bodies.” Thus, this research suggests that politics, in 
relation to trans bodily aesthetics have some form of “transformative” power. 
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Chapter VII: Negotiating Authenticity and Bodily Aesthetics within the UK’s 
Medicolegal System 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I look at the complex encounters transpeople have with the ontological 
claims made by experts within medical and legal institutions, and how transpeople 
negotiate them. Following Butler (1993, 2004), I will be using the term “medicolegal,” to 
conceptualise the relationship between medical and legal regulatory norms, which function 
to constitute “authentic” transmen and “authentic” transwomen in society. Transpeople 
often foster relationships with medicine in order to negotiate access to aesthetic 
technologies, and to receive legal recognition in their acquired gender. During these 
negotiations, both transpeople and medicolegal representatives construct, deconstruct, and 
reconstruct various narratives of (trans) authenticity.’  This chapter addresses my 
participants’ narratives phenomenologically – that is, a study of experiences, actions and 
practices, and their meanings (Heinamaa, 1997) – moreover it explores how participants 
understand and negotiate their “authentic” subject positions when seeking body 
modification and legal recognition. The aim of this chapter, then, is firstly to refrain from 
falling into the trap of reducing authenticity to essentialism, which rests on biological 
notions of “sex” as the natural basis for “gender.” Secondly, I do not want to reduce 
inauthenticity to poststructuralist understandings of gender, in which subjects are often seen 
as passive and culturally determined by the coercive forces, which constitute their mental 
and behavioural characteristics. I argue that we should regard transsexual subjectivities as 
intentionally “situational” (H. Rubin, 2003) and understand the agentic negotiations that are 
intrinsic to them, in order to access a deeper understanding of how the medicolegal fields 
are navigated. 
 
In providing a complex assortment of transsexual narratives as situational, I aim to 
incorporate transsexual subjectivities into an agentic framework. The narratives show how 
transsexuals’ desire for body modification requires them to negotiate the medical 
discourses that constitute them and also requires them to work “with” doctors and 
psychiatrists when approaching services in relation to bodily modification. Transsexuals 
acknowledge that the medicolegal discourses are interpreted by the doctors and 
psychiatrists that use them, which then requires savvy manipulation in order to situate 
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themselves, actualise their desired bodily aesthetics and guarantee legal recognition. Thus, 
transsexual discourses have both subjective and subjugating elements, which participants 
utilise and/or rework at a discursive level as well as at a phenomenological level. 
 
In the first part of the chapter, I discuss the negotiations between general practitioners 
(GPs) and transpeople at the initial stages of transition, and look at how these encounters 
are experienced and at any problems which arise around the notion of “authenticity.” I then 
explore the experiences of transpeople’s treatment on the NHS and in the private healthcare 
sector, which uncovers inequalities based on age and economic and cultural capital. I move 
on to include a temporal dimension, considering successive policy implementations and 
how they may have affected the treatment of Gender Identity Disorder. Finally, I assess 
how the Gender Recognition Act 2004 influences the “medicolegal alliance” (Butler, 1993) 
and affects transsexual subjectivities and bodily aesthetics in the UK. In this research, nine 
participants had various body modification technologies as NHS patients. Gregory, who 
could not have any surgeries, was prescribed hormones on the NHS, and two other 
transmen had not decided to undertake body modification procedures at the time of the 
interviews. There were ten private patients, who had all undergone various body 
modifications.  
 
Gender recognition through the medical gaze(s) 
Diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria by the medical authorities is required not only to actualise 
the body modifications required by a transperson, but to actualise legal recognition of their 
acquired gender. The processes of referrals to Gender Clinics begin with participants 
presenting their narratives to their General Practitioner (GP), a psychiatrist or a counsellor. 
In my research, a GP was usually the first port of call for participants experiencing “gender 
issues” and in these meetings recipients were often confronted with problems of ignorance, 
which resonates with the findings of Hines ( 2007). Some GPs had very little experience of 
trans issues while some had none at all. Participants attempted to pre-empt or overcome 
GPs lack of knowledge about “gender disorders” and sought medical knowledge 
themselves. For example, Daniel suggested: 
 
if you are a T person, she [psychiatrist] tells you to get these books published in 
the States by Dr. Sheila Kirk. They are very good books about testosterone and 
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oestrogen for transpeople and they tell you far more than you would ever find out 
from the doctors I have come across here […] That helped me a lot and it all came 
from me, it didn’t come from medical professionals because they didn’t really 
know (transman Daniel). 
 
Half of the respondents were referred to counsellors, who did not necessarily work in 
Gender Clinics. Gregory said: 
 
I found out that my counsellor was actually a trainee counsellor. She wasn’t 
judgmental at all but I just freaked her out, because she thought I was a freak, she 
had no frame of reference. She couldn’t handle it (transman Gregory). 
 
Rather than being straightforwardly inflexible gatekeepers to transsex treatments, Daniel’s 
and Gregory’s experiences reflect GPs,’ and counsellors,’ lack of training and authoritative 
knowledge about “gender issues.” 
 
Both the GPs and the psychiatrists at the Gender Identity Clinic (GIC) need to cooperate in 
the treatment of transsexuality. The cooperation will enable a smoother transition to the 
primary trans-sexing stage of hormone therapy and the Real Life Test. Services did not 
always offer the support necessary, according to this research. Sometimes the GPs were at 
fault and sometimes it was the psychiatrists at the GIC, according to the participants’ 
narratives. GPs often did not know about the “Standards of Care” for transsexuals (Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001), which have been modified 
five times since the original version 1 in 1979 and which standardise professional key 
principles and treatments in the area of transgender and transsexualism. There was very 
little correspondence about treatment protocol between the clinics and the GPs, if any at all. 
In a few cases this was because the GPs were reluctant to treat the “condition,” for 
example, Raymond said: 
 
I had a doctor who struck me off because he couldn’t treat something like me 
because he was a good catholic (transman Raymond). 
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In Raymond’s narrative, the GP’s religious convictions seemed to outweigh professional 
codes and medical diagnoses, such as the DSM classification of Gender Identity Disorder. 
The refusal of treatment also suggests that this GP did not accept the psychiatric diagnosis 
as an authentic medical condition, but rather conceptualised it as “sinful” because of his 
faith. 
 
Many of the participants who related negative experiences of GPs suggested that they were 
not taken seriously and that their requests for treatment were seen as absurd. Regular visits 
to their GP, or to different GPs, were required to either demonstrate their determination to 
transition or to find a sympathetic GP who would prescribe hormones and provide regular 
health checks. For example, Courtenay suggested that at first she was put off talking about 
how she was feeling about her “gender issues,” because of not knowing the GP well enough 
and not knowing his professional position on transsexualism. She said: 
 
Why I had not gone earlier was because this new doctor didn’t really know me, I 
hadn’t seen him more than two or three times. I think he did say to me, “how has 
this come out of the blue,” and I said “I don’t think it has come out of the blue” 
and had to explain this. I kind of left it a while after that (transwoman Courtenay) 
 
Following this encounter with her GP, Courtenay consulted an experienced and well known 
psychiatrist in the field of GID who subsequently diagnosed her with Gender Identity 
Disorder. However, Courtenay continued to have problems with her GP, she stated: 
 
I went to my GP and [my psychiatrist] had given me a letter. So I gave him [the 
GP] the letter and I said “would you prescribe hormones for me” and he said to me 
“well how would your relatives feel if you drop down dead” and this sort of thing 
and I said “well I would hope that they would be upset” and then he basically said 
“no.” I thought he would be nice about saying no but he was adamant about it. I 
think he thought I was mad taking this health risk which he felt I did not need to 
take (transwoman Courtenay). 
 
According to Speer and Parsons (2006), in the clinical setting psychiatrists ask a number of 
hypothetical questions like the one addressed to Courtenay. These have been understood by 
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Speer and Parsons’ as an attempt to “obtain a spontaneous response which will provide a 
valid diagnostic test of the patient’s commitment to their aspired-for gender role” (Speer & 
Parsons, 2006: 801-802). Speer and Parsons concluded that these hypothetical questions are 
not hypothetical at all, because the scenario is premised on a “situation” that the 
psychiatrist (as with Courtenay’s GP) has power over. To be precise, a hypothetical 
question is asked only when the answer will have no effect on the situation. Because of the 
power relations inherent in the gatekeeper/client relationship the response will certainly 
involve power relations through which the transperson must negotiate. In this case, 
Courtenay needed to respond strategically, in a way that reduced the chances of her being 
denied hormone therapy. Thus, the GP “influence[s] whether or not the proposed 
hypothetical future scenario come[s] about [and acts] as gatekeeper to hormones” (2006: 
796). For Courtenay, the hypothetical question from her GP was unrelated to her diagnosis 
and contradicted what the gender identity specialist had written in the letter. No matter 
what Courtenay had said at this meeting, she would have been denied hormone treatment. 
There was no correct response that Courtenay could have offered, which suggests that her 
GP, like Raymond’s, was not influenced by the experts diagnosis nor convinced of the 
authenticity of Gender Identity Disorder. Furthermore, the question both undermined 
Courtenay’s phenomenological experiences and the psychiatrist’s diagnosis and rendered 
them both inauthentic. 
 
Courtenay subsequently approached a different GP in the same medical practice, where she 
was approved for prescription hormones. Here we witness different approaches from GPs, 
arising from their different opinions about Gender Identity Disorder and the hormone 
therapy required for transition. These procedural differences, far from being grounded in 
medical diagnoses, may be subject to non-medical influences like religious beliefs. Each 
GP asserted their beliefs in relation to the patient presenting to them, however, the second 
GP accepted Gender Identity Disorder as authentic and treatable, unlike the first. 
 
Other GPs, who worked with both the GICs and patients, were more accommodating 
during the referral process and the administering of hormones and this led to a smoother 
transition and RLT for transpeople. For example, Anna-Marie said: 
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I had no problem whatsoever with any of the staff, they were all very helpful and 
never gave me a cause for concern. We always hear so much about the badness of 
NHS staff and how someone was unjustly treated; you never hear anything about 
the successes, perhaps because it is not news if everything is going well. The 
problem with only the bad news making it to press is that it perpetuates a negative 
stereotype (transwoman Anna-Marie). 
 
Anna-Marie’s account was very positive. Similarly, Samantha was pleased with her GP’s 
understanding of her: 
 
I was living a dual life as it were. So living a dual life was a literal hell. I was 
lucky that I found my GP; she helped me deal with a lot of stuff. Anything I 
needed I got. 
 
So the support from the GP was very good? 
 
It was brilliant the two GPs I normally see have been very good one had just come 
back off maternity leave; she always asks how I am and refers to me by my first 
name, which is very surprising. Well I went to see her once because my asthma 
was driving me nuts and she said to me “well, Samantha what’s up with you” and 
that is how she referred to me, they’re great, I can’t thank them enough. I was 
originally going to have my GRS [gender reassignment surgery] privately and she 
just said to me do you want it on the NHS or not (transwoman Samantha).  
 
The GP’s use of Samantha’s first name and recognition of her economic status led to a 
situation of mutual respect. In this research, it is worth drawing on the possibility that 
Samantha and Anna-Marie were treated better than others because of their age and ability 
to “pass” successfully as attractive women, allowing them a sense that they are recognised 
as authentic candidates for body modification technology. 
 
Consumer rights and NHS provision: authentic vs. cosmetic 
Medical services were demanded even though some participants were sceptical about the 
psychiatric process within the NHS. The processes involved in persuading their 
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psychiatrist/gatekeeper that they were legitimate candidates for hormonal and surgical 
intervention were viewed as ritualistic, lengthy, and patronising. For example Benjamin 
said: 
 
The positives are only that you get what you need from them. The negatives were 
lack of clinics so long travel involved, and very generalised and out of date 
questioning which resulted in standard answers (transman Benjamin). 
 
Therefore, Benjamin and a few other participants provided a “standard” narrative response, 
which is performed out of obligation rather than believed in wholeheartedly. Benjamin is 
both a passive recipient of clinical determinations, by responding to questions in such a 
way as to acquiesce to clinical protocol, but, simultaneously, agentic in his securing of 
body modification by stage-managing the system in which he found himself. As with the 
majority of participants in this research, both Benjamin and Mariza understood that 
taxonomic legitimacy and a diagnosis are required to actualise the transformation of their 
bodies.  
 
Mariza rationalised her request for treatment as pragmatic, a run of the mill solution. She 
thought that her surgical and hormonal interventions should be provided in the same way as 
other treatments are offered for medical “conditions”: 
 
People with physical problems they do help, but the mental and any other 
problems are just as valid and are as much a contribution to the happiness of a 
person as getting rid of diphtheria or anything else. I remember the doctor telling 
me one time about hypochondria who really thinks they suffer with a disease, but I 
don’t think I suffer from a disease I was just born with the wrong bits. These 
needed sorting out. However, a medical health service can’t be called a medical 
health service unless there is a service and they sort them out. They can not be 
selective about who does and who does not need services (transwoman Mariza). 
 
According to Mariza, the NHS works hierarchically in relation to Gender Identity Disorder, 
which is deemed less significant than other conditions and which thus affects the funding 
for surgery. In the mid 1990s, when some participants, like Mariza, were waiting for SRS, 
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NHS budgets were tightened. The NHS reformed their accountability structures in relation 
to health care provision, and were further constrained by “clinical audit” mechanisms 
(Hughes Tuohy, 1999). Health authorities radically changed the way they purchased health 
care from providers (1999). Decisions to buy and then provide healthcare services to 
patients were made by managers and, in some health authorities, SRS and hormone therapy 
was reduced or cut. This is illustrated in a document that came to light in the court case, 
Regina v North West Lancashire Health Authority, 21st December 1998. In 1995 this health 
authority introduced a policy entitled “Medical procedure of no beneficial health gain or 
proven benefit,” in which it stated: 
 
[I]nterventions on the human body are not always related to ill-health but may be 
related to a desire to achieve an ideal body image or a bodily function that cannot 
currently be achieved. That is complicated by the fact that its supporters often 
describe the desire for intervention in medical terminology and indeed point out 
that the lack of complete well-being may itself be a health problem (cited in Press 
for Change, 1998a). 
 
Then followed a section specifically addressing transsexualism: 
 
Persons wishing to adopt the role of the opposite gender (male to female or female 
to male) have access to the general psychiatric or psychological services available 
within the contract portfolio. However no service will be commissioned extra 
contractually. The Heath Authority will not commission drug treatment or surgery 
that is intended to give patients the physical characteristics of the opposite gender 
(cited in Press for Change, 1998a). 
 
The plaintiffs’ case was based on the argument that health authorities did not regard Gender 
Identity Disorder as authentic and, therefore, they de-prioritised treatment. The health 
officials conflated a “superficial” perception of transsexualism with other body image 
cases, such as breast augmentation or rhinoplasty, viewing them all as cosmetic. According 
to the ruling, Gender Identity Disorder consists of both a psychological and a physical 
dimension, but the health service focused solely on the “cosmetic” body image aspect, 
downplaying Gender Identity Disorder and rendering transsexualism imaginary and, thus, 
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“inauthentic.”37 This health authority’s stance on transsexualism was ruled unlawful by Mr 
Justice Hidden (Press for Change, 1998a). 
 
The following quote from Octavia provides a critique of depictions of sex change surgery 
as cosmetic: 
 
Octavia: I don’t think it is necessarily fair to spend public money on cosmetic 
surgeries; fair enough the sex change should be paid for by the public money 
because it saves a lot of money in the long run and stops a lot of suffering. If I can 
afford to pay for things myself I do not see why I should burden the tax payer. 
 
Zowie: Is cosmetic surgery just that cosmetic for you? 
 
Octavia: Well I know I can live with my nose if I have to, I don’t have to have it 
chopped about and mashed up. I would like to but things I can live without I 
consider cosmetic but the actual change no. If I hadn’t had had that [sex change] 
done it would have finished me off (transwoman Octavia). 
 
Another interviewee, Jess, was not an NHS patient, but she had learned much anecdotal 
evidence from other transpeople receiving NHS services and treatments. Jess claimed to 
have mentored quite a few transwomen through transition surgery in an attempt to turn this 
“scary” and “harrowing” process into something positive. Jess visited or phoned the 
transwomen daily for the first month and then every week thereafter. In response to my 
questions about psychiatrists’ and surgeons’ attitudes in the clinical setting, by email Jess 
wrote: 
 
The psychiatrists have focussed on justifying the controversial provision of 
expensive medical resources to PCTs by bringing about a resolution of a 
                                                 
37 Evidence of hierarchies in relation to doctors’ perception of disease affects the decision making 
within a health service. As Album and Westin (2008: 188) suggest in their study in Norway 
“medical activities are organized, [by] categorizing patients, planning and allocating work, setting 
priorities at all levels, pricing services, and teaching and developing medical knowledge. A 
widespread, and at the same time tacit, prestige ordering of diseases may influence many 
understandings and decisions in the medical community and beyond.” 
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psychological ‘disorder’. The surgeons don’t really care beyond doing an 
acceptable job of genital reconstruction and both, understandably, wish to avoid 
post-treatment legal claims and keeping people off their backs (transwoman Jess). 
 
Jess sees the psychiatrists as “justifying” surgical interventions in the treatment of Gender 
Identity Disorder to health authorities who must provide the funding. Jess suggests that 
there is pressure from PCTs to justify spending and to curb any possible lawsuits for 
negligent treatment.38 Furthermore, Jess states that the treatment offered by the NHS is 
minimal and that surgical intervention is not about alleviating Gender Identity Disorder 
through transformational bodily aesthetics per se, but about doing just enough to keep both 
PCTs and patients “off their backs.” This interpretation compliments the findings of West’s 
(2004: 14) research, which held that: 
 
those who continued to [have the] operation with Charing Cross [gender identity 
clinic] report patronising attitudes, insensitivity and no sense of caring. The 
operative results, I have seen so far, are far inferior to those from other countries 
and invariably give problems post-op. Local psychiatrists can vary widely in their 
knowledge about GID and seem at times to be unsympathetic and unable to 
empathise. 
 
Diane, who became extremely distraught during this part of the interview, expressed her 
dissatisfaction with her genital surgery and the subsequent response of the surgeon: 
 
[my vagina] was ugly, it was not realistic at all, there was far too much tissue. I 
actually got really badly treated about it because I said, “look, this is not realistic, 
this is just a mess.” The way I was treated was “well it looks alright to me, what 
else, do you want me to do?” He actually said at one point, “well I have cut off 
your penis, what else, do you want me to do?” (transwoman Diane). 
 
                                                 
38 Many participants spoke of one psychiatrist who faced a General Medical Council disciplinary 
hearing into allegations that, between October 1984 and August 2003, he breached standards of care 
by prescribing patients sex-changing hormones and referring them for genital surgery without 
adequately assessing them. Two of the patients told the inquiry they regretted changing sex and 
were suing Russell Reid for wrongfully diagnosing them with Gender Identity Disorder. 
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Diane’s rendition of the follow-up meeting between her and the surgeon, when the surgeon 
said “I have cut off your penis, what else, do you want me to do?” demonstrates an 
insensitive and uncaring attitude towards her. Diane’s comments, here, illustrate the way 
this particular surgeon did not accommodate her in an ethical sense.39 There was a lack of 
an “ethics of care,” which should have allowed her to act authentically and with autonomy 
(Cardol, De Jong, & Ward, 2002).  According to Diane, her questioning of the surgeon’s 
“authority” was received negatively. 
 
This “questioning” attitude is further evidenced by psychiatrists writing in the medical 
literature, who often characterise attitudes of transsexuals in the clinical setting as 
“adversarial” (Newman, 2000) or resentful toward them (Green in Speer & Parsons, 2006). 
What is seen as adversarial by psychiatrists, however, is simply read as assertive by 
transsexuals. Kenneth said: 
 
Historically we have looked to the medical profession as gods. In fact these people 
have strong opinion and do not treat people impartially. To do these professions 
you must have a very strong belief in yourself, and what you’re doing and where 
you are going. When you get to that point where you are a leader in that 
profession, even though it is a microcosm of society, to change your opinion it 
takes a big man or big woman to do that. So as somebody who is trans it is down 
to me to have a responsibility in my own treatment […] I think in doing that it is 
educating people. I think people should be allowed to have a dialogue with the 
medical profession, allow them to change their theories (transman Kenneth). 
 
What Kenneth was attending to here was the hierarchal relationship between the 
psychiatrist and patient. Historically this meant absolute respect for the doctor and her/his 
“wisdom.” But Kenneth’s narrative spoke of the fallibility of doctors’ theories which made 
him question their judgement and be more proactive and research his own treatment. These 
treatment dynamics were expressed by a few participants in this research, which may 
                                                 
39 While definitions of accommodation may vary across jurisdictions, clinical staff are chiefly 
mandated to respect autonomy, respect comfort, self esteem and confidentiality. For a more 
extensive review of the guidelines for transgender clinical and legal care, White-Holman and 
Goldberg (2006) provide a contemporary overview. 
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account for the psychiatrists’ reports about difficult encounters with transpeople. Likewise, 
Karen was able to challenge her psychiatrist when he used male pronouns with her: 
 
“you are in a professional capacity where you give a service to people like me and 
you have just said something that is so unacceptable and so unprofessional.” 
People could have gone out after that and done something to themselves, after that 
very simple statement. So I think it is a question of training and I see this across 
the system at every level. And we all know that psychiatrists are a bunch of 
dysfunctional people, they are more dysfunctional than we are (transwoman 
Karen). 
 
Over the last few years the government has worked with the Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity Advisory Group, which is an umbrella group of stakeholder individuals and 
organizations, (such as Press For Change, for example) to assist the Department of Health 
with the development and delivery of a programme to eliminate discrimination of Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people in health and social care. This healthcare 
strategy covers both service users and employees. The group has four work streams: (1) 
Reducing Health Inequalities, (2) Better Employment, (3) Improving Services and (4) 
Transgender Health (Department of Health, 2007). The discourse of “providing a service” 
was often used by participants in the context of their own treatment. They describe this 
changing climate within healthcare as user/provider framework which has the potential to 
help them negotiate their sex-change demands. Perhaps this enabled Karen to understand 
the power dynamics between “client” and “psychiatrist” and feel able to demand more 
consumer rights in relation to her treatment. This may seem “adversarial” or “resentful” to 
the psychiatrists,40 however, it could also be seen as appropriate behaviour enabled by the 
service provider/service user policy initiatives within the NHS.41 
                                                 
40 A study in the US by Street Jr. et al., (2007: 594) suggests that physicians were more likely to be 
“patient-centred” if they judged that the patient was “more satisfied with care and more likely to 
adhere to treatment.” 
41 Although the policy initiatives are published, there is still much disappointment with healthcare 
delivery amongst the UK trans population, as the following petition to the government in 2008 
suggests: “We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to ensure equity of access to NHS 
treatment for Gender Identity Disorder. Currently, there is a postcode lottery over access to 
treatment of Gender Identity Disorder. With the creation of the Gender Recognition Act, 
transsexual people for the first time were able to become legally recognised in their true gender. 
However, with the process of getting one's true gender legally recognised depending heavily on 
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Hormones as a diagnostic tool in private care 
In this research there was also a strong financial factor determining the kind of treatment 
some transsexual patients received. Quality of treatment in many cases was dependent upon 
whether the participant was a private patient or a NHS patient. In most private practice 
cases, both the younger and older participants claimed that they were lucky not to have to 
go through the process as a NHS patient. Private practices, nonetheless, have their own 
criteria of assessment. 
 
There is a school of thought that believes hormones reduce the intensity of Gender Identity 
Disorder in transwomen by producing a more feminised body shape (Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001; Reid, 1998). For example, “[h]ormone 
therapy can provide significant comfort to gender patients who do not wish to cross live or 
undergo surgery, or who are unable to do so. In some patients, hormone therapy alone may 
provide sufficient symptomatic relief to obviate the need for cross-living or surgery” (Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001: 20-21). According to the 
“Standards of Care” (Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001) 
hormones can be administered to people, who are over the age of eighteen, show a 
demonstrable knowledge of their effects and limitations and who have attended 
psychotherapy session for at least three months, however, in some cases, if the patient 
intends to obtain hormones from “black market” sources, provision can be brought forward 
to facilitate monitored therapy.  
 
It seems from this research that in private practice, hormones also act as a diagnostic test 
for transsexualism, by virtue of their anti-libidinal effects (Reid, 1998). Anti-libidinal 
effects can take place between one and six months after having begun taking hormones, 
according to the medical literature (Dahl et al., 2006). Very little is mentioned in the 
literature about hormones as a diagnostic test for transmen. As I illustrated in chapter IV, in 
                                                                                                                                                    
medical evidence by specialist doctors, a number of transsexual people are unable to make use of 
the process within a reasonable timescale, if at all, due to inequity in healthcare provision by the 
NHS. This is discrimination by the back door. We call on the Prime Minister to ensure that 
transsexual people receive consistent treatment across all NHS areas in a timely manner and in line 
with treatment timescales set for other significant health affecting conditions. It is unacceptable for 
treatments to be managed and rationed in such a way that transsexual people must often wait many 
years for even a first appointment” (Pearse Rhiamon, 2008). 
 213
most cases, hormones heightened the libido of transmen. Nonetheless, the effects of 
hormones are assumed by some psychiatrists to have negative effects on male cross-
dressers and male “fetishistic transvestites.” Feinbloom suggests that hormones reduce the 
libido and render transpeople incapable of erections (Feinbloom, 1976). The hormonal 
“diagnostic” tool is employed to sort “fetishistic transvestites” from the “true transsexual.” 
Furthermore, an “authentic” diagnosis can be gained through an admission by the 
“fetishistic transvestite” or the “true transsexual” of the suitability of hormone therapy. For 
instance, if the hormones are refused the prognosis would probably be that the person is a 
“fetishistic transvestite,” and if they were requested this would suggest that they are a “true 
transsexual.” The refusal of hormone therapy was considered as admittance to being gender 
dysphoric for sexually motivated reasons and consequently unsuitable for further trans-
sexing technology. Many of the transwomen who had private treatment in this research 
understood that hormones were initially prescribed for these reasons. For example, 
Christina said: 
 
I went on hormones diagnostically with [my psychiatrist] (Christina transwoman). 
 
Christina agreed with [the psychiatrist’s] reasons for prescribing hormones and sees 
hormones as being able to determine, as much for her as for the psychiatrist, transsexuality. 
Similarly, Lesley said: 
 
I went to [a different psychiatrist] to get a second opinion, he wrote to my doctor 
with a slightly changed hormone regime. […] it is necessary because there are 
people out there who are kidding themselves and I do think with so much easy 
access on the internet people can be persuaded by people that they are what they 
are not. In essence we are presenting to them [doctors] our own diagnosis, saying I 
am transsexual, give me the drugs, and help me (transwoman Lesley). 
 
Lesley sees the hormones as a way of establishing who is an authentic transsexual and who 
is not. Bernadette agrees: 
 
I went to see [a psychiatrist] in February 1999, he gave me hormones as I thought 
he probably would, I knew that from friends that he probably would. I don’t 
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quarrel with his method as there are some people, transvestites who find that the 
hormones have a very negative effect on them and they don’t go further. I think 
that is a good thing (transwoman Bernadette). 
 
In most cases, the possible side effects of hormones are discussed in the clinical 
consultation in order to inform and aid the patient in monitoring their health risks. 
However, for Daniel, who was forty-nine at the time of transition, his medical care seemed 
to be simply about facilitating his treatment. He said: 
 
I went to a Harley Street endocrinologist who basically only knew about MtF 
people. So I went and said “I would like to try this,” and he would say “OK, jolly 
good, off you go.” So I was paying him fortunes, for a twenty minute consultation, 
for him to rubber stamp what I [had] decided to do. That is the way I see the 
medical professions, but I have had the money to pay them. God help me if I was 
on the NHS (transman Daniel). 
 
Money, treatment and agency  
Patients who could afford to have private care found the process allowed them a certain 
amount of agency with their treatment schedule, which was very important to them. 
Amelia, who transitioned in her early thirties, said: 
 
I was fortunate to be treated privately by [a psychiatrist]. The positives were that 
he did not attempt to stereotype or steer me and there really were no negatives. 
[…] I am aware of “experts” out there who do attempt to steer, lead and stereotype 
(transwoman Amelia). 
 
Amelia was referring to NHS psychiatrists who attempt to control what the transsexual 
process should be like. For Penny, agency was being able to plan the transition in relation 
to her work commitments. 
 
I appreciated being allowed to go at my own pace and being given hormones 
diagnostically at the first visit. I did ask at that time if I could begin with hormone 
patches, rather than tablets, bearing in mind my age, forty eight at that point. 
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Given that it took a year and a half before I was able to change documents because 
of work and begin the RLT (transwoman Penny). 
 
For Jess, who transitioned in 2000, agency was about gaining the respect of medical 
professionals. She stated: 
 
The positives were that they all respected my position and intelligence. Nobody 
treated me like a fool or as incompetent to understand the issues and consequences 
of transition and surgery. As a private patient I was able, within reason and the 
standards of care, to set my own timescale and support team. The negatives 
included the lack of knowledge of GPs, this continues. I was ok because I guided 
them, and still do, but if I hadn’t had the information and resources things might 
have been problematic. The biggest negative of course was the cost. Because I had 
no confidence in the NHS treatment of transsexual people at that time, I believe it 
has since improved. And because the NHS was never going to fund what I 
considered necessary to a successful gender transition and for an acceptable post 
transition quality of life, I paid over £60,000 in transition and surgery costs. It was 
worth it but I do resent that after years of paying higher-rate tax and NI 
contributions, even when most of my life I was a private patient and non NHS 
user, I could not get the treatment I felt I needed funded, at least in part by the 
NHS (transwoman Jess). 
 
Jess sees respect for her intelligence as an important element in the relationship between 
her and her private GIC, which made transitioning a mutually supportive arrangement. The 
arrangement seemed to give Jess agency and allowed her license to control her transition. 
Her body modification was not compromised by the shortfall in service from her GP, but 
this did come at a price. Jess continued: 
 
So what I decided to do was not go to the [NHS] Gender Identity Clinic, I had 
heard too much, and lets face it I had come from a privileged position of a 
managing director and I had the money and it was the most important thing in my 
life. I wanted to go 1st class, I wanted to enjoy it, I didn’t want to come out of it 
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bruised and saddened and battered I wanted to come out of it singing (transwoman 
Jess). 
 
A significant shift has to occur in the NHS if the diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder is to 
be treated uniformly by both public and private healthcare providers. Nonetheless, there 
seems to be a broader move in provision of healthcare generally that is marked by dynamic 
customer led negotiations within both the NHS and private healthcare sector. 
 
There are also more options to commence transition outside the medical profession. With 
the growth in internet companies and commercial and illegal outlets selling hormones 
(BBC News 24, 2008), it seems there is less of a need for medical intervention in the early 
stages. This was the case for Oscar, who was considering taking hormones unsupervised by 
a doctor or endocrinologist. He said: 
 
The whole NHS route […] I don’t want to be part of that […] The black market 
does seem quite appealing to me. What other options are available to me? 
(transman Oscar). 
 
Oscar was the only participant in my study who suggested that he may initiate his body 
modification through non-medical sources. He was weighing up the possibilities of 
hormone ingestion without supervision by medical experts. Most of the literature about this 
situation is from the US, and focuses on how expensive treatment there forces 
transgendered people to utilise black-market sources (Israel & Tarver, 1997) and how HIV 
infection can be reduced (Bockting et al., 2005; Hook, 2005), by providing hypodermically 
administered hormones. Providing hormones to reduce the risks of black market hormone 
taking is also a recommendation in the HBIGDA Standards of Care (Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association, 2001). There are very few studies in the UK, 
however, one recent UK study by Vardi et al, follows the HBIGDA recommendation: 
 
[i]n a harm reduction model (e.g., to prevent the use of black market hormones or 
decrease psychiatric consequences of denying the hormones), it can be appropriate 
to prescribe hormones with very minimal or no exam (Vardi et al., 2008). 
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The medical discourses about transpeople taking “black market” hormones can be 
understood in a couple of ways. On the one hand, it could be seen as reducing the risk to 
the transperson, through careful monitoring. On the other, by reducing adversarial 
guidelines in relation to hormone therapy it may suggest medical practitioners safeguarding 
their authority over “gender issues” and deterring transpeople from going elsewhere for 
treatments. 
 
NHS gender clinics past and present and the age factor 
Most of the participants who had started the transition process from 2002 onwards reported 
that they were treated quite well by the NHS. Participants who had begun transitioning 
before 2002 suggested that GPs and clinical and psychiatric staff in the NHS GICs were not 
so sympathetic. Interestingly, although Lesley went to “sort out her gender issues” in 1974, 
when she was in her twenties, her experiences of social services and the doctors were 
straightforward. Lesley did not continue to transition at that time, but when she did go back 
to the doctor’s, thirty years later, she had an altogether more negative experience: 
 
I hate them all! They spend a prolonged period assessing whether we are mad, in 
any definition of that term, or that we suffer from any major personality disorders. 
Their diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder is based clearly on the clinical 
perception that we are not mentally dysfunctional. But they continue to treat us in 
a one size fits all situations. There is no concept of patient choice, and their 
prevailing attitude is one of veiled hostility and contempt within an atmosphere of 
fear. We are expected to show blind compliance to their rules and procedures, no 
matter how bizarre or restrictive some of these rules are (transwoman Lesley). 
 
The younger transmen and transwomen, such as Samantha, Anna-Marie, and Benjamin, 
whose ages ranged from twenty one years old to twenty six years old, and who had 
transitioned in the last five years, mentioned very few problems associated with their 
psychiatrists. Instead, their problems were associated with the length of time before surgery 
dates was offered. The NHS patients, such as Anna-Marie, suggested that they had a 
relatively easy time in the consultations and in being referred for surgery, whereas older 
transwomen in particular reported NHS appointments and referrals as laden with 
difficulties, like Lesley’s narrative mentioned above. 
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Whilst it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the analysis presented here, it does 
suggest that the inferior treatment received by these particular participants at the NHS 
clinics they attended might be dependent on their age. However, for those who were 
financially able to access private healthcare, age seemed not to be a barrier. Some older 
participants started their initial hormone treatment on the NHS and then had surgery 
privately overseas. Many participants who accessed private treatment went overseas. 
 
I started off in the NHS, but I thought I would go private because if I went to 
Charing Cross [GIC] they would either put the clock back, I heard that they may 
do that, or they could have a long waiting list. Where I thought if work were going 
to give me that time off, I would negotiate that with them and then negotiate it 
with Thailand and book it. So that is why I did it like that (transwoman Penny). 
 
Penny’s story was very similar to most of the older transwomen’s in the research. Often, if 
they could afford it, the older transwomen sought treatment away from the NHS system. 
This awarded them greater agency in relation to body modification technologies. Getting a 
private referral for surgery was necessary, but private psychiatrists were often more 
accommodating. My research adds weight to that of West (2004), who conducted an 
extensive study in the south of England. West concluded that many transpeople in the UK 
were forced to become medical tourists and preferred to have private treatment abroad, 
rather than wait for NHS treatment or pay the high prices of UK surgeons. The positive 
aspects of medical tourism have become a common “news thread” in internet discussion 
groups and self-help forums. Transsexuals often state that they have had a:  
 
positive experience, where they were treated with respect, kindness and great 
professionalism, [where] operative results [were] excellent and [there were] very 
few post-op problems (West, 2004: 13). 
 
Authenticity and authentication 
In order to trans-sex both physically and legally requires authentication by a qualified 
doctor. The participants spoke about this authentication process in different ways. Anna-
Marie believed that her psychiatrist asked her clandestine questions in relation to her 
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childhood experiences to see her reaction and to search out the truth about her 
transsexuality. She said: 
 
I believe all they are looking for is someone who is balanced in what they are 
doing, what risks are involved and what is ahead of them. To know that along with 
knowing what role you will play in life afterwards. If you go in with the notion of 
changing sex for pleasure, let’s say, or sexual gratification, they will be able to tell 
that immediately. [The psychiatrist] asked me a typical trap question, he asked me 
if I played with girls’ toys when I was younger, girls may not play with girls’ toys, 
if I was to say yeah, yeah, yeah, he would know that I was trying to guide his 
opinion. When I go in I am honest with him, he is going to know that I am honest 
and dedicated to what I want to do (transwoman Anna-Marie). 
 
More important for Anna-Marie was the clinician’s expertise in differentiating sexually 
motivated sex-changing from that of the “balanced” type, who understands the situation 
they are getting themselves into and who is “dedicated” to the social role that they will 
perform once they have transitioned. Anna-Marie’s authentication is provided by the 
psychiatrist on the basis that she would pass the RLT and is committed to live in an 
authentic “woman’s” role. 
 
Anna-Marie sees the questions that the psychiatrist asked her as establishing authentic 
markers which differentiate transsexualism from other diagnoses of “gender deviancy,” 
such as Autogynephilia (Blanchard, 1991) or transvestism. For Anna-Marie, a “true 
transsexual” (Benjamin, 1966) woman’s authenticity is established by moving as far away 
as possible from the idea that she wants a sex change for “sexual gratification” and closer to 
the notion that it is because she wants to express her gender identity. 
 
Samantha was authenticated as a transwoman before going to the GIC. She stated: 
 
I saw a psychiatrist who had dealt with a transsexual before, I was suffering with a 
bit of depression and she spotted me within ten minutes and said yes you’re TS. I 
mean I was hiding it (transwoman Samantha). 
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Samantha’s psychiatrist, “who spotted” her, set in motion the process of Samantha seeing 
herself as a transwoman.  It was a turning point. Prior to this, Samantha had not admitted to 
herself that she was transsexual and only afterwards realised that she had been keeping her 
authentic self concealed. It seems that Samantha had a problematic entry into the discourse 
of transsexuality. Samantha was unique in this research insofar as she was the only 
participant who suggested that did not “self-diagnose” prior to attending the GIC. 
 
The participants who suggested that the authentication process “was a matter of course” 
were only concerned about the psychiatrist seeing them as their “gender of choice” at a 
superficial level. The strategy for getting through the RLT and the appointments needed to 
secure the “diagnosis” and subsequent surgery, if it was sought, was guided by “rehearsed 
narratives” (S. Hines, 2007). These patients offered stereotypical answers to questions that 
the psychiatrist asked. For example, Benjamin said: 
 
It was very generalised and out of date questioning which resulted in standard 
answers. So if you are like me a male with a feminine, sensitive side you would 
not show that side or even lie for fear of them thinking it meant you didn't truly 
want to change (transman Benjamin).  
 
Amongst younger participants, clinical authentication is seen as pliable to a certain extent. 
Similarly to Benjamin, Oscar suggested that his personal requirements and his queer 
political affiliations put him in a position that made him consider how his narrative could 
be tailored to NHS medical definitions. Later in the interview, Oscar clarified that he 
wanted primarily to look “trans,” because he was concerned about the effect transitioning 
would have on his relationship with his parents. Oscar suggested that he needed to 
transition slowly in order for his parents to get used to the physical changes. 
 
Oscar: I do not want to take hormones in order to pass as male yet […], but want 
the hormones to be more physically trans and less female. I am trying to weigh up 
at the moment through discussions with friends that this is first and foremost a 
personal decision and I am not doing it to please anybody else. The struggle I am 
having with this is that I am aware of the affects that the hormones are going to 
have on other people. 
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Zowie: Do you think you will be able to be prescribed hormones telling them this? 
 
Oscar: That is another thing, the whole NHS route, I don’t want to lie but I am 
quite keen on manipulating the system in order to get what I want. Pretty much 
nearly everyone does that. I am just wondering though how much impact I can 
have because I don’t want to be just another statistic that they cite in the 
medicalised narrative. I don’t want to be part of that and I do want to challenge 
that (transman Oscar). 
 
Oscar believed that by telling the clinician that he wanted to have hormone therapy to look 
“more physically trans” would hinder, if not stop, his transitioning. In addition, both 
Benjamin’s and Oscar’s concerns centred on hegemonic masculinities (Connell, 1995). 
Nonetheless, both participants understood that they needed to be careful not to disclose any 
form of femininity, because they knew that the psychiatrist had the power to halt the 
process of transition despite it being part of their authentic self. Benjamin’s fear stemmed 
from the fear of being read as inauthentic by the psychiatrist and Oscar’s fear stemmed 
from fear of being drawn into a medical discourse.  
 
Authenticity, then, is an unstable concept. Brian initially transitioned from Male-to-Female 
and had SRS in 2000. Brian had been living as Alison for a number of years, but during the 
times I interviewed him/her, s/he transitioned from appearing feminine to being more 
masculine. Brian does not identify as male or female now and prefers to see him/herself as 
Cross-Gendered or Bi-Gendered. This case is similar to St Jacques’ (2007) “Post-
Transsexual” position, where the “second” transition does not necessarily mean a reversion 
to an “original” sex, but, as in Brian’s case, a transition to an identity outside the 
medicolegal framework. Consultations with the psychiatrists for both Brian’s first and 
second transition were fairly routine. He said: 
 
I found that most of my consultations were just a matter of course: Go along to 
appointment, talk about what's been happening since last appointment, doctor 
takes notes, says goodbye until next appointment (Bi-gendered Brian). 
 
 222
Brian was authenticated as female by the first psychiatrist and unauthenticated as female by 
the second. He continued: 
 
This doctor suggested indirectly that I should sue my original consultant if I intend 
to go for reverse surgery, as I had only ever received one recommendation for my 
initial surgery when I should have had two (Bi-gendered Brian). 
 
While there was no pressure from the “consultant” “to go for reverse surgery,” Brian 
believed that the clinician thought that the only option was to have surgery that would try to 
rebuild a penis and allow “him” to live “fully” as a male. This suggests that the psychiatrist 
assumed that the initial diagnosis was a mistake and that if Brian was not a transsexual 
woman then “he” must have been a man all along. The “mistake” was understood within a 
binary system of gender, as opposed to Brian’s identification as “bi-gendered.” Brian, 
however, did not believe the initial diagnosis to be a mistake and referred to his/her 
situation as his/her “choice” that became untenable whilst living as Alison. 
 
The final set of authentication narratives, articulated by a few of the private patients, 
referred to the psychiatrist as simply rubber stamping their own decision to become 
transsexual. Jess’ narrative illustrated this: 
 
I phoned [the psychiatrist] to make an appointment and I have nothing but respect 
for [him] we had a long discussion and he said that I am “definitely Gender 
Dysphoric,” which I knew, but it was nice for someone else to tell me that. He said 
as to whether you are a transsexual person or not it is up to you, you are going to 
have to work that out, it is your decision (transwoman Jess). 
 
Gender recognition and the “medicolegal alliance” 
Prior to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA), transpeople were able to change their 
names by deed poll, and have passports, driving licences, and bank accounts in their new 
name and corresponding gender preceding any surgery or hormonal intervention. 
Sex/gender could not, however, be changed on national insurance records or on birth 
certificates. When the GRA was passed in 2004, it was heralded as a huge advance for the 
rights of transpeople (Press for Change, 2005), after more than thirty years of having only 
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partial legal recognition (Sharpe, 2007a, 2007b; Whittle, 2007a). However, amongst 
respondents in this research, the GRA provoked mixed reactions. Three significant themes 
emerged from the interviews, “authentication,” “agency” and “ambivalence.” In their 
current situations, some interviewees viewed the GRA ambivalently. Emily suggested: 
 
I haven’t applied for the Gender Recognition Certificate, even though I could 
have. I will, but because I have been trans for so long, for about seven years it 
doesn’t seem particularly urgent and it doesn’t actually affect my day to day life. I 
will get around to do it at some point especially when, although I am not satisfied 
with civil partnerships, I would like to marry a woman one day. I would like to be 
recognised as a woman when I do, do that (transwoman Emily). 
 
At this point, to be recognised by the law is of little consequence to Emily’s identity as a 
transwoman. Emily’s practices in day to day life and her bodily aesthetic, which I explored 
in Chapter V, are sufficient confirmation of her gender and sexual identity. Emily is aware 
that her legal status may change, however, she is prepared to use her legal recognition only 
if she needs to in some future contractual scenario, such as having a civil partnership. 
Similarly, Clifford said in response to my question: 
 
Zowie: How has the Gender Recognition Act affected your life? 
 
Clifford: I suppose at the moment getting a Gender Recognition Certificate is not 
really important to me so it has not influenced it that much. If the Act said that 
anybody who has not had treatments would not be considered then it might have 
had some influence in the long term (transman Clifford). 
 
Clifford raises a number of issues about how trans bodies are (not) situated in law. The law, 
as it stands, allows Clifford the freedom to reflect on his body project without its mandates 
forcing surgical intervention upon transpeople for legal recognition. Clifford continued: 
 
the Act is good for people who wish to be recognised as either male or female but 
in the long run I think I would rather see either three boxes or no boxes (transman 
Clifford). 
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In addition, Clifford highlights the growing “transgender phenomenon” (Ekins & King, 
2006) in the UK and his ambivalence with the binary logic of the law. Clifford suggests 
that the GRA cannot accommodate those who do not identify with the male and female 
options and, in effect, therefore, misrecognises many transpeople. Similarly, Oscar 
recognises the positive aspects for those transpeople who want “equal access” to citizenship 
rights in the binary system, but fears the underlying ideology on which sexed identity is 
premised. 
 
It is important for the recognition of trans identities and status in terms of 
transsexual peoples’ financial privileges and in terms of citizenship and equal 
access, but I am sceptical about the basis of this and the reliance on certain 
medicalised narratives. The status of the transsexual and the hierarchy being 
created through that and reinforcing, the “true” the “real” and the “authentic.” [At 
the point of saying “true, real and authentic” Oscar indicated that he wanted to use 
quotation marks around the words by gesturing with his fingers]. Also not 
recognising genderqueer and still only having two options to choose from. It is an 
important step but there is many flaws in it and should just be seen as the first step. 
I hope we can build on it (transman Oscar). 
 
Interestingly, but not surprising, it was the younger transpeople – Oscar, Emily and Clifford 
– who belonged to queer activist organisations, and who were ambivalent about 
institutional recognition. Oscar was grappling with different notions of authenticity within 
frameworks of socio-legal authenticity and personal authenticity. In Sartre’s (1966) 
existentialist philosophical discourse about  authenticity, he suggests that a person who has 
made their decisions based on pre-established codes of civil life – which the GRA would be 
seen as – is inauthentic. The decisions were made in “bad faith,” which is the primary 
obstacle to authenticity (1966). In a Sartrean sense, the pre-established codes of male and 
female which are enshrined in the GRA, foreclose the possibility of gender queerness and 
restrain freedom, the freedom which Oscar is striving for. In Clifford’s narrative he 
highlighted how “bad faith” and inauthenticity may act empirically: 
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In terms of doctors and psychiatrists and having to prove and actually going out of 
their way to, in the case of transwomen who are overtly feminine beyond what she 
might feel comfortable with just to prove a point. So there are always transpeople 
going out of their way, beyond what they want, just to not leave doubt in peoples’ 
minds. If you can not show to prove it then you are going to have to do something 
to prove it (transman Clifford). 
 
Nonetheless, transsexuals with non-normative bodies, can be constituted in law may also be 
seen as symbolic critiques of the binary sex/gender system. These bodies can contest the 
naturalness of sexed bodies and undermine the once dogmatic sex/gender binary. All 
transpeople who contest the symbolic understanding of “natural” or normative bodies 
undermines the notion that “bad faith” in civil codes, such as the GRA, can never overcome 
and challenge the social conditions of their production. As Lois McNay (2000) contends, 
the scope to re-enact social codes in new social contexts is always a possibility, because of 
individual agency. 
 
Medicine and the GRA are “new social contexts” that allow for agentic action in relation to 
how far people can go in realising their (non-normative) bodily aesthetic in relation to their 
gendered bodies. Sartre’s (1966) dichotomous assertion, that civil life suppresses authentic 
subjects and that “the desire to maintain distance from those structures, to call them into 
question and to change them” (Sartre cited in Zane Charme, 1991: 253) is more authentic, 
is witnessed in relation to trans bodily aesthetics. As I illustrated in Chapter VI, 
transsexuals are re-writing the civil codes themselves, and, thus, overcoming what it means 
to have normative bodies and a normative civil life and are staking claims about their own 
authenticity in various ways. 
 
The medicolegal alliance in the UK has, in many ways, reduced the institutional constraints 
regarding legal recognition of trans-sexed people in comparison to many other countries. 
This recognition by state institutions, on the one hand, has been a positive, forward looking 
regulative ideal. A new birth certificate, Gregory suggested, gave him both recognition and 
the feeling of authenticity: 
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The first thing I thought, when the law was first passed, was at last I am a real 
person. I exist. When I got my birth certificate at the age of thirty nine, I exist. 
Before, I felt like a part person in the eyes of the law but now I feel three 
dimensional (transman Gregory). 
 
Additionally, for Benjamin, Gender Recognition (GR) allowed him freedom to actualise 
dreams and plans that up until then he had put off due to the sex on his original birth 
certificate. 
 
I am funny about sending my original birth certificate away and also when I am 
putting my previous name on forms as it is a different identity. Just paperwork-
wise it's a completely different identity. So I think it [GR] will make me do things. 
I am going to learn to drive this year, but I might apply for that [GRC] first, 
because it will make me feel a bit better about sending my stuff off, that then will 
make quite a big difference (transman Benjamin). 
 
According to Gregory and Benjamin, the reification of transsexuality, through the 
regulatory practices of the GRA, establishes authentic transsexuals. Thus, it seems that 
Gregory and Benjamin accept that their authenticity is, in part, awarded by the 
“medicolegal alliance.” Gregory, as you may remember, was unable to have any body 
modification surgery due to the physical impairments he sustained during childbirth. 
Gregory was approved for surgery, but not operated on, giving him the necessary 
paperwork in order for the GRP to approve his new birth certificate. This recognition is 
seen by these participants as authenticating their citizenship. 
 
For the participants in this research the discourse of authenticity was key to their social 
recognition, their claims of embodiment and to their self-understanding within the 
structural parameters of medicolegal relations. Authenticity was qualified in various ways 
in relation to the medicolegal system. Rather than essentialising “authenticity,” participants 
used it as an ontological category within their lived relations. 
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Concluding remarks 
The participants’ narratives in this chapter suggest that the experiences of these transpeople 
when accessing body modification technologies can be both good and bad and are 
contingent upon whether they and their diagnoses were taken seriously. It was a “postcode 
lottery” as to how they were treated and also when they had medical treatments. The 
gamble was often replaced with agency, and respect, if the participant was fortunate enough 
to have the capital to fund their body modifications privately. Notions of agency and 
authenticity were complicated by intersubjective negotiations with those who act as 
gatekeepers to body modification technologies. According to some participants, there does 
seem to be a shift in the provision of treatment, which is marked by dynamic customer led 
negotiations, especially within the private healthcare sector. Nonetheless, new NHS 
healthcare policies gave some transpeople the confidence to challenge what they saw as 
unreasonable or unethical treatment. These situations and experiences, within the NHS or in 
private practice, fed into complex embodiment stories of authenticity and agency. Agency 
was not seen in terms of voluntarism, where identity can be negotiated without constraints, 
but was seen as consciousness about the social relations between them and those in 
positions of power. Therefore, the situation the participants found themselves in generated 
reflexive agency about how best to secure body modification if so desired, and legal 
recognition. 
 
The GRA has created novel parameters in which assorted trans bodily aesthetics are 
recognised. Bodily aesthetics, which are now permitted in law, creates socio-legal relations 
that allow participants to understand authenticity outside of essentialised notions of 
realness. Authenticity in legal terms is an altogether different ontological claim and is seen 
as enabling the autonomy and agency, which is required for transpeople to live their desired 
lives. Those participants, who embraced a more pluralistic outlook regarding trans 
embodiment and bodily aesthetics, had some reservations about the underlying ideology of 
the GRA. However, these participants also empathised with those transpeople who 
identified as either male or female and who did wish for the citizenship rights awarded by 
the GRA. The GRA was welcomed as a step in the right direction in relation to socially 
integrating transpeople. Moreover, what these diverse views help illustrate is the 
phenomenological diversity within the trans population which was studied. Such an 
understanding is important because it shows that stereotypes are far from the norm in 
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transpeople’s narratives and, thus may continue to generate knowledge about the situational 
and agentic aspects of trans-sexing. Furthermore, the phenomenological, discursive, and 
bodily diversity of transsexuals in relation to the medicolegal alliance poses a critique of 
the pervasive binaries, good/bad; natural/constructed, beautiful/ugly that often inform 
theories of the transsexual subject. I hope that this analysis will move the theoretical debate 
about transsexuality towards a less deterministic understanding and embrace more openly 
the agentic aspects of trans embodiment and bodily aesthetics. 
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Conclusion: A Springboard from which to Leap 
 
From aetiology to management  
This thesis has taken transpeoples’ embodiment and bodily aesthetics as a point of 
departure, rather than gender identity per se. I felt that a return to trans bodies was required 
because of the changing social and political contexts that transpeople in the UK were party 
to. The introduction of the Gender Recognition Act, and the influence of transgender 
politics in its implementation, offered fresh frameworks for developing analyses about trans 
bodies. A range of questions concerned with embodiment and bodily aesthetics, in relation 
to transsexuals’ lives, were the central foci of the research. The thesis explored the different 
personal and public considerations and experiences of transpeople’s embodiment and 
bodily aesthetics. I also investigated transpeople’s imaginatively anticipated bodies and 
body modification desires and to what degree bodily aesthetics are constituted as a 
commitment to a gender identity for transsexuals themselves and within emergent 
medicolegal and political contexts. 
 
In the first part of the thesis I reviewed, through phenomenological descriptions, the 
ephemeral medical landscape where the terms, “diagnosis” and “cure,” have “progressed” 
in tandem with wider academic and cultural narratives, which have clearly orientated their 
development. I have argued that traditional models of transsexualism preserve a “sex” 
dimension, upon which a psychical “gender” dimension is constructed, using cultural 
notions of masculinity and femininity, which are couched within heteronormativity. I 
suggested that traditional medical models have yet to find a credible account of the 
aetiology of transsexualism and that they continue to rely on cultural manifestations of 
“masculine” and “feminine” bodily aesthetics to support their theories. In 1990 
“transsexualism” was removed from the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
and in its place a broader category of “Gender Identity Disorder” was inserted.  This shifted 
the medical emphasis from a single to a double pronged approach where aetiology and the 
management of Gender Identity Disorder encompassed many more facets of 
transgendering. Alongside other critics (Billings & Urban, 1996), I argued that this shift 
was an attempt to control the sex-change industry, whose qualified clinicians provide 
diagnoses after a lengthy time span (recommended in the “Standards of Care”), and the 
surgical “cure” for adult transpeople. Moreover, this shift safeguarded the authority of 
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medicine in the construction of “deviant” gender identities and their underlying theories. 
More recently, those doctors and theorists interested in discovering the aetiology of the 
“condition,” Gender Identity Disorder (Gender Dysphoria), have incorporated topical 
neurochemical models with brain size studies to help refocus their theories through a 
biological lens. Rather than furthering theories, I argued instead that these adaptations still 
retain an aesthetic dimension, where visual markers of hormonal activity or sizes of parts of 
the brain relied upon ahistorical and culturally specific notions of masculinity and 
femininity. These theories are based on scant empirical evidence and have been critiqued 
by feminist biologists and psychologists. Moreover, I suggested that because the diverse 
phenomenology of transpeople could not be fully encapsulated in the theories, this also 
challenges the assumptions undergirding these models. In tandem with wider academic 
debates, feminist, queer, and postmodern theorists and clinicians’ understandings of 
masculinity and femininity in the clinical context have incorporated these challenges to 
traditional models of transsexuality. These novel explanations, whilst not denying the 
ontological claims that there are transmen and transwomen, have challenged gender 
essentialism and shifted emphasis from a biological model of bodily aesthetics to a 
psychosocial one. 
 
I provided a brief history of the relationship between intersexed and transsexualism in 
relation to the law. I suggested that prior to the Gender Recognition Act, UK law 
differentiated between intersexed bodies and trans bodies. UK law separated biological 
markers and psychological markers to differentiate the transsexual from intersexed. This 
differentiation continued even though the same types of surgeries were used to “correct” 
the “anomalies.” The intentions behind surgical interventions were seen differently, one 
was deemed a “necessity” (for intersexed people) while the other was seen as a “choice” 
(for transsexuals). I then looked at the relationship between medicine and law in 
contemporary Britain and showed how the medicolegal alliance constitutes ontological 
claims through the diagnosis of gender dysphoria. This new framework is now used for the 
purposes of legally defining transpeople. I illustrated that new legal precedents have 
recently come into force, through the implementation of the Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
I suggested that the Act allows for queer gender recognition through non-normative bodily 
aesthetics. However, this queer recognition is restricted to pathologised transpeople, who 
wish to change their sex socially and legally, rather than allowing for the dismantling of the 
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binary system all together. Thus, the clinicians still retain authority even though the criteria 
of bodily aesthetics in law have changed. However, this legal change, I suggested, contests 
the diagnosis and cure model based on traditional formulations of Gender Identity Disorder, 
because it is now possible that the “true transsexual” (Benjamin, 1966) in law may not 
correspond to the “true transsexual” in medicine. It was within this context that I situated 
my research, from which I could understand contemporary embodiment narratives and 
bodily aesthetics of transpeople in the UK. 
 
Moving beyond dichotomies 
I then moved on to consider how transpeople’s embodiment and bodily aesthetics have 
been theorised in feminist, socio-philosophical, and key transgender approaches. The 
purpose of this was to highlight my analytical approach in the thesis. Radical feminist work 
about beauty and trans embodiment and bodily aesthetics often ended up as dichotomous 
moral polemics, based on what they understand as “good” and “bad” practices. In the rest 
of the review I suggested that feminist and non-feminist work that drew on 
poststructuralism also fell into similar, problematic dichotomies, such as docile versus 
subversive action, good versus bad politics, mind and body, right and wrong bodies. The 
transgender (as opposed to transsexual) body projects represented in some of the literature 
were heralded as subversive, and as acting out against the oppressive gender system. 
Transgendered people, here, it seemed had unrestrained choice to be who they wanted to 
be. Transsexuals, however, were represented as the docile recipients of a medical discourse 
of “distress.” Transsexuals were constrained by a wish to pass as a member of a particular 
gender. I suggested that the transgender/transsexual distinction was in fact not an easy one 
to draw and, moreover, I argued that this dichotomy becomes divisive and unproductive for 
theorising the diverse phenomenology of transpeople. What is more, to posit that 
transsexuals do not have intentionality and agency halts questions about how transpeople 
do navigate, and help rewrite, the material and ideological constraints within the social 
fields of medicine and law, which I illustrated. I have taken a different position, which has 
assumed that transpeople have agency, and which has asked questions concerning the 
tactics employed in attaining, assessing, and subverting bodily aesthetics. I argue that this 
position enabled me to develop a fuller conceptualisation of transpeople and their bodily 
aesthetic desires. This also enabled me to move away from dichotomous and theoretically 
limited analyses of transpeople’s embodiment and bodily aesthetics, which often suggested 
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that transpeople were dupes or behaved stereotypically. Thus, I have offered a more 
nuanced understanding of how transpeople are (re)writing cultural scripts, and thereby 
situating their own authentic desires. 
 
I have argued that feminists who use poststructuralist approaches emphasise the 
structure/agency aspects of beauty, aesthetic surgery, and bodies as lived experiences, 
which are also important for this research. However, I suggested that their conclusions were 
too neat. I have illustrated that much of this work was restrictive and could only show how 
bodies are duped into conforming to the structural guidelines, which constitute normative 
bodily aesthetics. Theorised through the “negative paradigm” (McNay, 2000), social 
discourses, which support social structures that correspondingly affect the aesthetic criteria 
of social, sexual, and phenomenological body image, situate the subject as pervaded by 
ideology and subsumed by symbolic social norms. This, I suggested forecloses agency for 
transpeople. Similarly, whilst I identified some aspects of symbolic interactionism, which 
are able to account for a social analysis of trans embodiment and bodily aesthetics, I have 
argued that a more conducive framework for this research can be drawn from 
phenomenology. Phenomenology can attend to the inner conflicts and tensions arising from 
the construction of body images, and attend to limits of the body, limits of technology, as 
well as intersubjective negotiations. The concept of intentionality – someone who has an 
attitude toward the world – enables an analysis of divergent bodies in various personal and 
public situations; furthermore, it allows us to understand how the bodily aesthetics of 
transpeople are situated contextually. I observed that there is greater scope for a broader, 
inclusive understanding of transpeople’s differences if we refuse to judge “good” and “bad” 
transgender practices and instead incorporate phenomenological notions of asymmetry 
(difference) as both an ethical and methodological necessity. Thus, starting from this 
standpoint is valuable, because, not only does it allow us to recognise difference within 
broader categories of transmen and transwomen, but it also allows us to understand that the 
various habituses of transpeople have historically divergent aspects, which need addressing. 
 
The (diverse) phenomenology of trans bodily aesthetics 
The research suggests that acknowledgement of sex/gender differences is not a singular 
realisation for transpeople, but are understood through ongoing sensations of identification 
and disidentification. Feelings of difference were common to all the participants but were 
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experienced in various ways. The decision making process to transition is not a simple one 
and can, but does not always, take many years to decide upon. Various sub-cultures are 
prominent in the lives and decision making processes of the participants, which influence 
the contextual parameters of gender capital and knowledge about transgendering. Hines 
(2007) discusses how recognising the self as trans happens in complex contexts, where self-
help groups, intimate partners, and kinship networks all affect and produce non-normative 
spaces in which transpeople transition. Similar conclusions were drawn in this research, 
where decisions were reflexively negotiated with significant others, in the context of 
intimate relationships and in favoured sub-cultures. The “eureka moment” of becoming 
positioned in an overarching transsexual narrative is premised upon connections to other 
transpeople, and transgender literature. Moreover, reflections on participants’ own 
corporeal agendas within significant relationships are also important aspects of trans-
sexing. This challenges the medical accounts which suggest that there are predictable signs 
of Gender Identity Disorder that can be “captured” and averted. 
 
The thesis addressed important questions about the embodiment and bodily aesthetics of 
transpeople in contemporary UK contexts. The research addressed transmen and 
transwomen in different chapters. I suggested that transmen and transwomen considered 
their “body projects” through their particular lenses. This, I proposed, highlights the ways 
in which aesthetic judgements operate within different social, sexual and phenomenological 
contexts and with different intentions toward the world. This is a significant insight which 
will broaden both medicolegal understandings of trans difference, but also to broaden 
transgender studies’ approaches to politicised trans bodies and bodily aesthetics.  
 
I have argued that drawing on some of the insights of phenomenology can bring a 
contextual understanding to trans bodily aesthetics and embodiment. I suggested that 
transpeople understand their bodies through various body images that I heuristically 
divided into “social,” “sexual” and “phenomenological bodies.” Phenomenology is often 
seen as a voluntarist account of “I can” (cf Heinamaa, 2003). “I can” discursively represent 
my body, “I can” materially change my body, “I can” perceive my body in numerous ways. 
However, accusations of voluntarism are misplaced, because, as this research has 
illustrated, in harmony with Merleau-Ponty (1968, 2002 [1962]), participants’ agency and 
desire are imaginatively adapted through intersubjective validation by others. There is a 
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relationship between the body that is objectified and the gaze of significant others, which is 
instrumental to the phenomenological comprehension of the social and sexual body image. 
Furthermore, the habitus of divergently situated subjects guides these intersubjective 
evaluations of body images. The transperson’s habitus informs them of their own physical 
limits and the possibilities of technology. However, the habitus is not deterministic in 
transpeople’s body image formation. Transpeople recognised the limits of the technological 
and surgical procedures and that concessions also had to be made with regard to their non-
normative bodies after transitioning. In some transmen’s narratives these concessions were 
discursively and materially overcome with the use of prosthetics. The transmen understood 
the use of prosthetics as an extension of their corporeal limits in particular social and sexual 
spaces. In other participants’ narratives, a revaluation of their intentionality towards their 
own bodies was required in order to accept their non-perfect(ed) bodies. For some 
transwomen, passing was seen as a benefit if it happened, but was not always the expected 
outcome for some. In these narratives emphasis was placed on securing a mutual 
understanding with others about their non-normative bodies. Most of the transwomen, 
however, suggested that they, and other transwomen, needed “proper” sexual bodies. The 
notion of “females with penises,” in most cases, was considered a difficult bodily aesthetic 
for the majority of society to accept. This conception was coupled with the fear of violent 
retribution. This was a crucial difference to the narratives of most of the transmen in this 
research. Not surprisingly, younger, queer respondents wanted to move beyond normative 
understandings of bodies. 
 
Whilst mainstream femininity and masculinity was actualised by some transpeople in this 
research, they do not figure in all participants’ narratives. The research showed that the 
narratives of transwomen were influenced by the bodily and material aesthetics of (sub) 
cultural gender systems of which they were a part. Gendered aesthetics had to be negotiated 
within various discourses of “beauty, and sartorial and body modification practices. 
Octavia’s androgyny, Emily’s queer aesthetic, Oscar’s Dandyism, and Benjamin’s 
metrosexuality illustrated how normative and sexological understandings of femininity and 
masculinity were disrupted by participants. A central theme, then, to emerge from these 
narratives is heterogeneity, highlighting that the aetiology of transsexuality purported by 
traditional medicine is being challenged by transmen and queer participants, due to their 
insistence upon what is right for them in relation to their bodily aesthetic. Participants are 
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aesthetically and phenomenologically too diverse to be completely captured by traditional 
medical models. 
 
Building bridges over the political ravine 
Following my argument for the need for an understanding of the diversity of trans 
embodiment, I then picked up the theme of dichotomies again and considered how trans 
politics often assumes either an assimilationist stance or a transformative one. I used T-CO 
literature and participants’ narratives to analyse political actions. From what, on the 
surface, looked like three major differences in political standpoint, I argued for a more 
nuanced analysis of the three T-COs political praxes. I suggested that the website data I 
discussed cannot simply be placed into either a “sameness” (assimilationist) or “difference” 
(transformative) dichotomy of political activism. Political actions were formulated in 
relation to the audiences they were addressing, through offering several critiques. I showed 
how particular political praxes and cultural productions worked to change the dominance of 
normative bodily aesthetics in various ways; I have suggested that (absent) bodily 
aesthetics used through normative channels of action is strategic. These (absent) bodily 
aesthetics are also evident in queer groups; however, here more emphasis is placed on 
providing space for producing an array of bodily aesthetics and subjectivities. I also 
illustrated that queers sometimes work in collaboration with more mainstream trans 
organisations and, thus, that queer politics is contextually driven. This lends support to 
Brown’s (2006) argument that queer politics can be theorised as having a “relational ethics” 
in its politics and cultural productions. Thus, a key finding of this research is that trans 
politics, in general, needs to be open to diverse interpretations of bodily aesthetics as well 
as to future collaborations. This, I suggest, can only be done by understanding that political 
dichotomies only creates divisions, whereas accepting difference may start to build bridges. 
 
Agency and authenticity in context 
This thesis also addressed the medicolegal contexts that participants had or were 
experiencing. A number of questions were asked about the contemporary situation of being 
recognised through medicolegal institutions in order to gain civil rights. I suggest that these 
were timely to pose due to the changing perspectives of some clinicians and the 
implementation of the Gender Recognition Act. My research suggests that for my 
participants being recognised as trans was the “luck of the draw” or a postcode lottery, with 
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both GPs and psychiatrists alike as to how they were treated. I argued that (trans) identities 
are complicated by these structural and intersubjective negotiations, which showed that 
transsexuals are neither purely a product of the medical establishment nor purely product of 
self determination. However, I did suggest that in most adult cases “self-diagnosis” of 
transsexualism took place prior to entering the negotiations with medicolegal authorities, 
where social and personal authenticity was sought. Authenticity, I argued, was a concept 
that had numerous meanings. Rather than being situated as straightforwardly essentialist in 
participants’ narratives, the notion of authenticity was utilised to secure treatment and 
diagnosis, and validate their position from which to request body modification. In most 
cases, it also legitimated a social position for posing demands for equal civil liberties. Thus, 
a key finding in this research is that transpeople are agentic in their approach to trans-
sexing and that they need to be savvy in their negotiations with those who have the ability 
to stop them actualising their imaginatively anticipated bodily aesthetics. The luck of the 
draw was often replaced by agency if the participant was fortunate enough to have the 
capital to fund their body modification privately. 
 
I suggested that the GRA has created new spaces in which trans bodily aesthetics may be 
constructed. Moreover, these spaces were, in part, constructed by the document that was 
carried through parliamentary sessions during the passing of the law. The policing of bodily 
aesthetics is not, as much of the (anti) trans literature suggests (Billings & Urban, 1996; 
Hausman, 1995; Raymond, 1980), solely an attempt by transsexuals and medicine to 
maintain a gender order, but is also related to the personal projection of bodily aesthetics 
that the transperson feels they can live with in relation to their phenomenological, sexual, 
and social selves. The contemporary context of queer gender recognition is borne out 
within the law. I argued that by understanding this contribution by transpeople neither as 
dupes nor as transcendent agents in their own aesthetic construction offers a more nuanced 
consideration of the various agentic negotiations transpeople partake in. 
 
Where to now? 
This thesis represents a return to trans bodies in order to empirically understand trans 
embodiment and bodily aesthetics in contemporary Britain. The research, as I mentioned 
above, is timely due to the changing medicolegal contexts of transpeople in Britain. I 
suggested that by arguing for the importance of understanding difference in the personal 
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and public representations of trans bodily aesthetics a richer analysis of the aesthetic 
judgments that are made about the trans subject’s body will result. I argued that aesthetics 
were not the problem for (trans) gender theory per se. I understand trans embodiment and 
bodily aesthetics, in this research, as an agentic aspect of subjectivity. However, I 
suggested that the mechanisms which support judgements about aesthetic bodies do need to 
be exposed and scrutinised, some of which I have achieved in this thesis. 
 
What of future research in this area and what might this entail? I hope to have broadened 
the debate about trans (bodily) aesthetics by bringing the notions of intentionality, 
difference, and agency to the attention of different fields of research. Questions may be 
posed to the main players in the gender recognition panel about their aesthetic criteria for 
judging trans bodies especially because there is no research to date. What are the 
implications for transpeople when subjective aesthetic criteria are applied in relation to civil 
rights?  We may ask: how do postmodern and queer aesthetics create questions for the 
emerging field of transgender studies? Do queer aesthetics possess a truly radical relativism 
or are they confined by the fields they work in? Who has the resources to create cultural 
productions and to what effect are they utilised politically? By addressing judgements of 
(bodily) aesthetics in a number of research fields, it may raise issues particular to 
transpeople. This is due to the aesthetic judgements from the self and others that 
transpeople constantly face. 
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Appendices 
 
Transpeople and our bodies. 
Research on transpeople’s experiences of and feelings about our bodies. 
 
Aims: 
I am a (trans) PhD student at the University of Leeds.  I am looking for transpeople who 
are willing to be interviewed for my research.  The interviews will last about 1 ½ hours, and 
can be arranged at a time and place that suits you. 
 
The research: 
The research will explore how transpeople change their everyday lives and how we 
experience our bodies, including what changing our bodies (if we do) means to us.  I am 
interested in the styles, fashions and images that are important to transpeople.  I am keen 
to talk to a wide range of transpeople, so that the diversity of transpeople’s experiences 
can be represented. 
 
The research will also investigate the impact of the Gender Recognition Act on 
transpeople.  As the act does not require genital sex reassignment surgery, I will explore 
how transpeople and doctors understand gender identity. 
 
Aim of research 
One of the aims is to inform future social policies by developing a framework of common 
values in the ‘treatment’ of transsexual people in relation to body modification, which 
respects the diversity of transpeople’s practices and beliefs. 
 
All participants’ information will be held in the strictest of confidence, names and places 
will be changed, and I will work within the framework of the British Sociological 
Association’s ethical guidelines. 
 
If you would like more information about this research, please contact: Ms. Zowie Davy. 
Tel. No. 0113 3437614 email zowie.davy@ntlworld.com or research supervisors, Prof. 
Sasha Roseneil Tel. No. 0113 3434409 email S.Roseneil@leeds.ac.uk or Dr. Ruth 
Holliday Tel. No. 01133431868 email R.Holliday@leeds.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zowie Davy 
Centre For Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 
University of Leeds 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
All the information supplied will be held in strict confidence 
 
CONTACT DETAILS 
 
Name 
(of choice) 
 
Address 
 
 
Post Code 
 
 
Tel. No. 
 
 
Email Address 
 
 
Date of Birth 
 
 
Gender 
(self definition) 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT 
What best describes your current employment situation? 
 
□ Self-employed 
□ In paid employment (full-time or part-time) 
□ Unemployed 
□ Retired 
□ Looking after home, family or partner 
□ Student 
□ Long term sick or disabled 
□ Training scheme 
□ Other 
 
ETHNICITY 
How would you describe your ethnicity? 
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RELATIONSHIP STATUS 
Are you currently in a relationship  yes / no 
Are you currently married   yes / no 
 
 
SEXUALITY 
How would you describe your sexuality (e.g. gay, lesbian, heterosexual etc.) 
 
 
TRANS STATUS 
Please indicate how you would like to be described 
 
 
Would you be willing to discuss some personal photographs that you have of yourself? 
 
 
Have you or plan to apply for gender recognition? 
 
 
Please feel free to add any further information that you think is important and has not 
been covered by the above questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for completing this form and for your offer of participation.   
 
